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Claire Bishop
Introduction//Viewers as Producers

The point of departure for the selection of texts in this reader is the social
dimension of participation – rather than activation of the individual viewer in
so-called ‘interactive’ art and installation. The latter trajectory has been well
rehearsed elsewhere: the explosion of new technologies and the breakdown of
medium-specific art in the 1960s provided myriad opportunities for physically
engaging the viewer in a work of art.1 Less familiar is the history of those artistic
practices since the 1960s that appropriate social forms as a way to bring art
closer to everyday life: intangible experiences such as dancing samba (Hélio
Oiticica) or funk (Adrian Piper); drinking beer (Tom Marioni); discussing
philosophy (Ian Wilson) or politics (Joseph Beuys); organizing a garage sale
(Martha Rosler); running a café (Allen Ruppersberg; Daniel Spoerri; Gordon
Matta-Clark), a hotel (Alighiero Boetti; Ruppersberg) or a travel agency (Christo
and Jeanne-Claude). Although the photographic documentation of these
projects implies a relationship to performance art, they differ in striving to
collapse the distinction between performer and audience, professional and
amateur, production and reception. Their emphasis is on collaboration, and the
collective dimension of social experience.
These socially-oriented projects anticipate many artistic developments that
proliferated since the 1990s, but they also form part of a longer historical
trajectory. The most important precursors for participatory art took place
around 1920. The Paris ‘Dada-Season’ of April 1921 was a series of
manifestations that sought to involve the city’s public, the most salient being an
excursion to the church of Saint Julien le Pauvre which drew more than one
hundred people despite the pouring rain. A month later, Dada artists and writers
held a mock trial of the anarchist author turned nationalist Maurice Barrès, in
which members of the public were invited to sit on the jury. André Breton
coined the phrase ‘Artificial Hells’ to describe this new conception of Dada
events that moved out of the cabaret halls and took to the streets.2 At the other
extreme from these collaborative (yet highly authored) experiences were the
Soviet mass spectacles that sublated individualism into propagandistic displays
of collectivity. The Storming of the Winter Palace (1920), for example, was held
on the third anniversary of the October Revolution and involved over 8,000
performers in restaging the momentous events that had led to the Bolshevik
victory.3 The collective fervour of these theatrical spectacles was paralleled by
new proletarian music such as the Hooter Symphonies: celebrations of machinic
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noise (factory sirens, motors, turbines, hooters, etc.) performed by hundreds of
participants, directed by conductors signalling from the rooftops.4 These two
approaches continue to be seen throughout the multiple instances of
participatory art that develop in their wake: an authored tradition that seeks to
provoke participants, and a de-authored lineage that aims to embrace collective
creativity; one is disruptive and interventionist, the other constructive and
ameliorative. In both instances, the issue of participation becomes increasingly
inextricable from the question of political commitment.
One of the first texts to elaborate theoretically the political status of
participation dates from 1934, by the left-wing German theorist Walter
Benjamin. He argued that when judging a work’s politics, we should not look at
the artist’s declared sympathies, but at the position that the work occupies in
the production relations of its time. Referring directly to the example of Soviet
Russia, Benjamin maintained that the work of art should actively intervene in
and provide a model for allowing viewers to be involved in the processes of
production: ‘this apparatus is better, the more consumers it is able to turn into
producers – that is, the more readers or spectators into collaborators’.5 By way of
example he cites the letters page of a newspaper, but his ideal lies in the plays
of his contemporary, the German dramatist Bertolt Brecht. As Benjamin
explains, Brechtian theatre abandons long complex plots in favour of ‘situations’
that interrupt the narrative through a disruptive element, such as song. Through
this technique of montage and juxtaposition, audiences were led to break their
identification with the protagonists on stage and be incited to critical distance.
Rather than presenting the illusion of action on stage and filling the audiences
with sentiment, Brechtian theatre compels the spectator to take up a position
towards this action.
By today’s standards, many would argue that the Brechtian model offers a
relatively passive mode of spectatorship, since it relies on raising consciousness
through the distance of critical thinking. By contrast, a paradigm of physical
involvement – taking its lead from Antonin Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty among
others – sought to reduce the distance between actors and spectators.6 This
emphasis on proximity was crucial to myriad developments in avant-garde
theatre of the 1960s, and was paralleled by upheavals in visual art and pedagogy.
In this framework, physical involvement is considered an essential precursor to
social change. Today this equation is no less persistent, but its terms are perhaps
less convincing. The idea of collective presence has (for better or worse) been
scrutinized and dissected by numerous philosophers; on a technical level, most
contemporary art is collectively produced (even if authorship often remains
resolutely individual); participation is used by business as a tool for improving
efficiency and workforce morale, as well as being all-pervasive in the mass-
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media in the form of reality television.7 As an artistic medium, then, participation
is arguably no more intrinsically political or oppositional than any other.
Despite this changing context, we can nevertheless draw attention to
continuities between the participatory impulse of the 1960s and today.
Recurrently, calls for an art of participation tend to be allied to one or all of the
following agendas. The first concerns the desire to create an active subject, one
who will be empowered by the experience of physical or symbolic participation.
The hope is that the newly-emancipated subjects of participation will find
themselves able to determine their own social and political reality. An aesthetic
of participation therefore derives legitimacy from a (desired) causal relationship
between the experience of a work of art and individual/collective agency. The
second argument concerns authorship. The gesture of ceding some or all
authorial control is conventionally regarded as more egalitarian and democratic
than the creation of a work by a single artist, while shared production is also
seen to entail the aesthetic benefits of greater risk and unpredictability.
Collaborative creativity is therefore understood both to emerge from, and to
produce, a more positive and non-hierarchical social model. The third issue
involves a perceived crisis in community and collective responsibility. This
concern has become more acute since the fall of Communism, although it takes
its lead from a tradition of Marxist thought that indicts the alienating and
isolating effects of capitalism. One of the main impetuses behind participatory
art has therefore been a restoration of the social bond through a collective
elaboration of meaning.
These three concerns – activation; authorship; community – are the most
frequently cited motivations for almost all artistic attempts to encourage
participation in art since the 1960s. It is significant that all three appear in the
writing of Guy Debord, co-founder of the Situationist International, since it is
invariably against the backdrop of his critique of capitalist ‘spectacle’ that debates
on participation come to be staged. The spectacle – as a social relationship
between people mediated by images – is pacifying and divisive, uniting us only
through our separation from one another:
The specialization of the mass spectacle constitutes […] the epicentre of
separation and noncommunication.8
The spectacle is by definition immune from human activity, inaccessible to any
projected review or correction. It is the opposite of dialogue. […] It is the sun that
never sets on the empire of modern passivity.9

If spectacle denotes a mode of passivity and subjugation that arrests thought
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and prevents determination of one’s reality, then it is precisely as an injunction
to activity that Debord advocated the construction of ‘situations’. These, he
argued, were a logical development of Brechtian theatre, but with one important
difference: they would involve the audience function disappearing altogether in
the new category of viveur (one who lives). Rather than simply awakening
critical consciousness, as in the Brechtian model, ‘constructed situations’ aimed
to produce new social relationships and thus new social realities.
The idea of constructed situations remains an important point of reference
for contemporary artists working with live events and people as privileged
materials. It is, for example, frequently cited by Nicolas Bourriaud in his
Relational Aesthetics (1998), a collection of theoretical essays that has catalyzed
much debate around the status of contemporary participation. In parallel with
this debate, and perhaps addressing the sense of unrealized political potential in
the work that Bourriaud describes, a subsequent generation of artists have
begun to engage more directly with specific social constituencies, and to
intervene critically in participatory forms of mass media entertainment.10 The
texts in this reader have been selected with the development of this work in
mind. The aim has been to provide a historical and theoretical lineage for recent
socially-collaborative art, presenting a variety of positions that will allow
students and researchers to think more widely about the claims and
implications of the artistic injunction to participate.
The book is divided into three sections. The first offers a selection of
theoretical frameworks through which to consider participation. It begins with
key structuralist texts by Umberto Eco and Roland Barthes, which concern the
new role of the viewer in relation to modern art, music and literature. It is
followed by Peter Bürger’s classic Marxist critique of bourgeois art as a failure to
fuse art and social praxis. Jean-Luc Nancy, addressing the impasse of Marxist
theory in the 1980s, attempts to rethink political subjectivity outside the
conventional framework of activation. He posits a community that is
‘inoperative’ or ‘unworked’ (désoeuvrée), founded not on the absolute
immanence of man to man (for example, the ‘being-in-common’ of nations,
communities or lovers), but on the presence of that which impedes such
immanence, that is, our consciousness of death. Gilles Deleuze and Félix
Guattari have provided the foundation for several contemporary theories of
political action, most notably Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s influential
Empire (2000), one of the key texts of the anti-globalization movement. (Empire
is available online, and therefore has not been included in this reader; the most
relevant passage is section 4.3 on the multitude.) Ten years prior to Empire,
Édouard Glissant used Deleuze and Guattari as the theoretical basis of his
‘poetics of relation’, an argument for the creative subversion of colonialist
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ART

NO
LONGER WANTS TO RESPOND TO THE
EXCESS OF COMMODITIES AND SIGNS

BUT
TO A LACK OF CONNECTIONS
Jacques Rancière, ‘Problems and Transformations in Critical Art’, 2004

culture by those subjugated to its language. Guattari’s Chaosmosis (1992) and
Rancière’s Malaise dans l’esthétique (2004) both offer a tripartite history of art’s
development, and both argue for a culminating phase in which art has an
integral relation to other spheres: for Guattari the ethical, for Rancière the
political.
Section two comprises artist’s writings, the selection of which has been
partially determined by the desire to present informative texts relating to
substantial works of art. Another desire was to show a range of different
approaches to the documentation and analysis of these often elusive and
ephemeral projects. The chosen texts represent a variety of proposals for
recording process-based participation on the page: the manifesto format
(Debord, Kaprow, Beuys), the project description (Carnevale, Höller, Hirschhorn),
the detailed log of events (Schwarze on Beuys), reflections after the event (Piper,
Cufer, Deller), dialogues in the form of correspondence (Oiticica and Clark), and
a retrospective survey in the form of a third-person narrative (Tiravanija).
Limitations of space have prevented a fuller presentation of the Collective
Actions group, whose methodical approach to documentation erased the
boundary between collaboration, event and reflection: the participants in each
work were invited to document their response to it. Ten Appearances, for
example, is accompanied by long, detailed texts by the artist Ilya Kabakov and
the poet Vsevolod Nekrasov.
The final section presents a selection of recent curatorial and critical
positions. It begins with excerpts from Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics, part of
which formed the catalogue essay for his group exhibition Traffic (1995). Lars
Bang Larsen’s ‘Social Aesthetics’ (1999) is an attempt to present connections
between today’s participatory practice and historical precursors of the 1960s,
here with a focus on Scandinavia. One of the most memorable curatorial
gestures of the present decade was Utopia Station (Venice Biennale, 2003), a
collaborative exhibition whose project description draws a connection between
activated spectatorship and activism. The final essay in the book, by Hal Foster,
is more cautious, and reflects on the limitations of the participatory impulse.
The scope of this reader therefore ranges from the 1950s to the present day;
although there are important examples of social participation in the historic
avant-garde, it is not until the eve of the sixties that a coherent and welltheorized body of work emerges: Situationism in France, Happenings in the
United States, and Neo-Concretism in Brazil.
Many writings outside the discipline of art history could have been added to
this anthology, particularly texts that draw attention to the history of
participation in theatre, architecture and pedagogy.11 Important work remains to
be done in connecting these histories to participation in visual art. Rancière’s
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unpublished essay ‘The Emancipated Spectator’ (2004) has begun to do precisely
this task, drawing links between the history of theatre and education, and
questioning theories that equate spectacle with passivity.12 He argues that the
opposition of ‘active’ and ‘passive’ is riddled with presuppositions about looking
and knowing, watching and acting, appearance and reality. This is because the
binary of active/passive always ends up dividing a population into those with
capacity on one side, and those with incapacity on the other.13 As such, it is an
allegory of inequality. Drawing analogies with the history of education, Rancière
argues that emancipation should rather be the presupposition of equality: the
assumption that everyone has the same capacity for intelligent response to a
book, a play or a work of art. Rather than suppressing this mediating object in
favour of communitarian immediacy, Rancière argues that it should be a crucial
third term which both parts refer to and interpret. The distance that this
imposes, he writes, is not an evil that should be abolished, since it is the
precondition of any communication:

onto solid ground.’
3

For a detailed critical commentary see Frantisek Deak, ‘Russian Mass Spectacles’, Drama Review,
vol. 19, no. 2, June 1975, 7–22.

4

For a first-hand account of these events see René Fülöp-Miller, The Mind and Face of Bolshevism
(London and New York: Putnams and Sons Ltd, 1929) 184.

5

Walter Benjamin, ‘The Author as Producer’, in Benjamin, Selected Writings, vol. 2, part 2,
1931–34 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003) 777.

6

The French playwright and director Antonin Artaud developed the term ‘Theatre of Cruelty’ in
the late 1930s. He used it to denote a type of ritualistic drama that aimed, through technical
methods (sound, lighting, gesture), to express stark emotions and thereby desensitize the
audience, allowing them to confront themselves. See Artaud, Theatre and Its Double (London:
Calder and Boyars, 1970).

7

On a political level, participation is increasingly considered a privileged medium for British and
EU government cultural funding policies seeking to create the impression of social inclusion.
See François Matarasso, Use or Ornament? The Social Impact of Participation in the Arts
(London: Comedia, 1997). In Britain, Matarasso’s report has been key to the formulation of New

Spectatorship is not the passivity that has to be turned into activity. It is our

Labour’s funding for the arts; for a cogent critique of its claims, see Paola Merli, ‘Evaluating the

normal situation. We learn and teach, we act and know as spectators who link

Social Impact of Participation in Arts Activities: A Critical Review of François Matarasso’s Use or

what they see with what they have seen and told, done and dreamt. There is no

Ornament?’, International Journal of Cultural Policy, vol. 8, no. 1, 2002, 107–18.

privileged medium as there is no privileged starting point.

8

Guy Debord, cited in Tom McDonough, ed., Guy Debord and the Situationist International
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2002) 143.

In calling for spectators who are active as interpreters, Rancière implies that the
politics of participation might best lie, not in anti-spectacular stagings of
community or in the claim that mere physical activity would correspond to
emancipation, but in putting to work the idea that we are all equally capable of
inventing our own translations.14 Unattached to a privileged artistic medium, this
principle would not divide audiences into active and passive, capable and
incapable, but instead would invite us all to appropriate works for ourselves and
make use of these in ways that their authors might never have dreamed possible.

9

Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle (1967) (New York: Zone Books, 1997) 17.

10 See for example Matthieu Laurette’s The Great Exchange (2000), a television programme in which
the public exchange goods of progressively less value week by week, and Phil Collins, The Return

of the Real (2005), which involved a press conference for former stars of Turkish reality television.
11 See for example Paolo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (London: Penguin, 1970), Augusto Boal,

Theatre of the Oppressed (London: Pluto Press, 1979), Oskar Hansen, Towards Open Form
(Warsaw: Foksal Gallery Foundation/Warsaw Academy of Fine Arts Museum, 2005).
12 Jacques Rancière, ‘The Emancipated Spectator’, unpublished conference paper, Frankfurt, August
2004, http://theater.kein.org/

1

2

See for example Germano Celant, Ambiente/Arte: dal Futurismo alla Body Art (Venice: Edizioni

13 Be this a disparagement of the spectator because he does nothing, while the performers on stage

La Biennale di Venezia, 1977. Based on Ambiente/Arte exhibition, 1976 Venice Biennale);

do something – or the converse claim that those who act are inferior to those who are able to

Nicholas de Oliviera, et al., Installation Art in the New Millenium (London: Thames and Hudson,

look, contemplate ideas, and have critical distance on the world. The two positions can be

2003); Claire Bishop, Installation Art: A Critical History (London: Tate Publishing, 2005).

switched but the structure remains the same. See Rancière, ‘The Emancipated Spectator’.

See André Breton, ‘Artificial Hells, Inauguration of the “1921 Dada Season”’ (1921), trans. Matthew

14 A similar argument for consumption as creative is put forward by Michel de Certeau in The

S. Witkovsky in October, 105, Summer 2003, 139: ‘Dada events certainly involve a desire other

Practice of Everyday Life (1980). Literary variants of this idea can be found in Roland Barthes’

than to scandalize. Scandal, for all its force (one may easily trace it from Baudelaire to the present),

‘Death of the Author’ (1968) and ‘From Work to Text’ (1971), and in Jacques Derrida’s idea of the

would be insufficient to elicit the delight that one might expect from an artificial hell. One should

‘Countersignature’, Paragraph, vol. 27, no. 2, July 2004, 7–42.

also keep in mind the odd pleasure obtained in “taking to the street” or “keeping one’s footing”,
so to speak […] By conjoining thought with gesture, Dada has left the realm of shadows to venture
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TRUE
PARTICIPATION
IS OPEN
WE WILL
NEVER BE
ABLE TO
KNOW WHAT
WE GIVE
TO THE
SPECTATOR
AUTHOR
Lygia Clark, Letter to Hélio Oiticica, 14 November 1968
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Umberto Eco
The Poetics of the Open Work//1962

contrary, tends to develop towards the same climax. Since the performer can start
or finish with any one section, a considerable number of sequential permutations
are made available to him. Furthermore, the two sections which begin on the same
motif can be played simultaneously, so as to present a more complex structural
polyphony. It is not out of the question that we conceive these formal notations as

Italian semiotician Umberto Eco is one of the pioneers of reader response theory. The
Open Work (1962) addresses the open-ended and aleatory nature of modern music,
literature and art, pointing to the wider implications of this new mode of aesthetic
reception for sociology and pedagogy, and for new forms of communication.

a marketable product: if they were tape-recorded and the purchaser had a

A number of recent pieces of instrumental music are linked by a common
feature: the considerable autonomy left to the individual performer in the way
he chooses to play the work. Thus, he is not merely free to interpret the
composer’s instructions following his own discretion (which in fact happens in
traditional music), but he must impose his judgment on the form of the piece, as
when he decides how long to hold a note or in what order to group the sounds:
all this amounts to an act of improvised creation. Here are some of the bestknown examples of the process.

4. In Pierre Boulez’s Third Sonata for Piano, the first section (Antiphonie, Formant
1) is made up of ten different pieces on ten corresponding sheets of music paper.
These can be arranged in different sequences like a stack of filing cards, though
not all possible permutations are permissible. The second part (Formant 2,
Thrope) is made up of four parts with an internal circularity, so that the
performer can commence with any one of them, linking it successively to the
others until he comes round full circle. No major interpretative variants are
permitted inside the various sections, but one of them, Parenthèse, opens with a
prescribed time beat, which is followed by extensive pauses in which the beat is
left to the player’s discretion. A further prescriptive note is evinced by the
composer’s instructions on the manner of linking one piece to the next (for
example, sans retenir, enchaîner sans interruption, and so on).

1. In Klavierstück XI, by Karlheinz Stockhausen, the composer presents the
performer a single large sheet of music paper with a series of note groupings.
The performer then has to choose among these groupings, first for the one to
start the piece and, next, for the successive units in the order in which he elects
to weld them together. In this type of performance, the instrumentalist’s
freedom is a function of the ‘narrative’ structure of the piece, which allows him
to ‘mount’ the sequence of musical units in the order he chooses.
2. In Luciano Berio’s Sequence for Solo Flute, the composer presents the performer
a text which predetermines the sequence and intensity of the sounds to be
played. But the performer is free to choose how long to hold a note inside the
fixed framework imposed on him, which in turn is established by the fixed
pattern of the metronome’s beat.
3. Henri Pousseur has offered the following description of his piece Scambi:
Scambi is not so much a musical composition as a field of possibilities, an explicit
invitation to exercise choice. It is made up of sixteen sections. Each of these can
be linked to any two others, without weakening the logical continuity of the
musical process. Two of its sections, for example, are introduced by similar motifs
(after which they evolve in divergent patterns); another pair of sections, on the
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sufficiently sophisticated reception apparatus, then the general public would be in
a position to develop a private musical construct of its own and a new collective
sensibility in matters of musical presentation and duration could emerge.

What is immediately striking in such cases is the macroscopic divergence
between these forms of musical communication and the time-honoured
tradition of the classics. This difference can be formulated in elementary terms
as follows: a classical composition, whether it be a Bach fugue, Verdi’s Aïda, or
Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring, posits an assemblage of sound units which the
composer arranged in a closed, well-defined manner before presenting it to the
listener. He converted his idea into conventional symbols which more or less
obliged the eventual performer to reproduce the format devised by the
composer himself, whereas the new musical works referred to above reject the
definitive, concluded message and multiply the formal possibilities of the
distribution of their elements. They appeal to the initiative of the individual
performer, and hence they offer themselves not as finite works which prescribe
specific repetition along given structural coordinates but as ‘open’ works, which
are brought to their conclusion by the performer at the same time as he
experiences them on an aesthetic plane.1
To avoid any confusion in terminology, it is important to specify that here the
definition of the ‘open work’, despite its relevance in formulating a fresh
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dialectics between the work of art and its performer, still requires to be
separated from other conventional applications of this term. Aesthetic theorists,
for example, often have recourse to the notions of ‘completeness’ and ‘openness’
in connection with a given work of art. These two expressions refer to a standard
situation of which we are all aware in our reception of a work of art: we see it as
the end product of an author’s effort to arrange a sequence of communicative
effects in such a way that each individual addressee can refashion the original
composition devised by the author. The addressee is bound to enter into an
interplay of stimulus and response which depends on his unique capacity for
sensitive reception of the piece. In this sense the author presents a finished
product with the intention that this particular composition should be
appreciated and received in the same form as he devised it. As he reacts to the
play of stimuli and his own response to their patterning, the individual
addressee is bound to supply his own existential credentials, the sense
conditioning which is peculiarly his own, a defined culture, a set of tastes,
personal inclinations and prejudices. Thus, his comprehension of the original
artefact is always modified by his particular and individual perspective. In fact,
the form of the work of art gains its aesthetic validity precisely in proportion to
the number of different perspectives from which it can be viewed and
understood. These give it a wealth of different resonances and echoes without
impairing its original essence; a road traffic sign, on the other hand, can be
viewed in only one sense, and, if it is transfigured into some fantastic meaning
by an imaginative driver, it merely ceases to be that particular traffic sign with
that particular meaning. A work of art, therefore, is a complete and closed form
in its uniqueness as a balanced organic whole, while at the same time
constituting an open product on account of its susceptibility to countless
different interpretations which do not impinge on its unadulterable specificity.
Hence, every reception of a work of art is both an interpretation and a
performance of it, because in every reception the work takes on a fresh
perspective for itself.
Nonetheless, it is obvious that works like those of Berio and Stockhausen are
‘open’ in a far more tangible sense. In primitive terms we can say that they are
quite literally ‘unfinished’: the author seems to hand them on to the performer
more or less like the components of a construction kit. He seems to be
unconcerned about the manner of their eventual deployment. This is a loose and
paradoxical interpretation of the phenomenon, but the most immediately
striking aspect of these musical forms can lead to this kind of uncertainty,
although the very fact of our uncertainty is itself a positive feature: it invites us
to consider why the contemporary artist feels the need to work in this kind of
direction, to try to work out what historical evolution of aesthetic sensibility led
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up to it and which factors in modern culture reinforced it. We are then in a
position to surmise how these experiences should be viewed in the spectrum of
a theoretical aesthetics.
Pousseur has observed that the poetics of the ‘open’ work tends to encourage
‘acts of conscious freedom’ on the part of the performer and place him at the
focal point of a network of limitless interrelations, among which he chooses to
set up his own form without being influenced by an external necessity which
definitively prescribes the organization of the work in hand.2 At this point one
could object (with reference to the wider meaning of ‘openness’ already
introduced in this essay) that any work of art, even if it is not passed on to the
addressee in an unfinished state, demands a free, inventive response, if only
because it cannot really be appreciated unless the performer somehow reinvents
it in psychological collaboration with the author himself. Yet this remark
represents the theoretical perception of contemporary aesthetics, achieved only
after painstaking consideration of the function of artistic performance; certainly
an artist of a few centuries ago was far from being aware of these issues. Instead
nowadays it is primarily the artist who is aware of its implications. In fact, rather
than submit to the ‘openness’ as an inescapable element of artistic
interpretation, he subsumes it into a positive aspect of his production, recasting
the work so as to expose it to the maximum possible ‘opening’.
The force of the subjective element in the interpretation of a work of art (any
interpretation implies an interplay between the addressee and the work as an
objective fact) was noticed by classical writers, especially when they set
themselves to consider the figurative arts. In the Sophist Plato observes that
painters suggest proportions not by following some objective canon but by
judging ‘them in relation to the angle from which they are seen by the observer’.
Vitruvius makes a distinction between ‘symmetry’ and ‘eurhythmy’, meaning by
this latter term an adjustment of objective proportions to the requirements of a
subjective vision. The scientific and practical development of the technique of
perspective bears witness to the gradual maturation of this awareness of an
interpretative subjectivity pitted against the work of art. Yet it is equally certain
that this awareness has led to a tendency to operate against the ‘openness’ of the
work, to favour its ‘closing out’. The various devices of perspective were just so
many different concessions to the actual location of the observer in order to
ensure that he looked at the figure in the only possible right way – that is, the way
the author of the work had prescribed, by providing various visual devices for
the observer’s attention to focus on.
Let us consider another example. In the Middle Ages there grew up a theory
of allegory which posited the possibility of reading the Scriptures (and
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eventually poetry, figurative arts) not just in the literal sense but also in three
other senses: the moral, the allegorical and the anagogical. This theory is well
known from a passage in Dante, but its roots go back to Saint Paul (‘videmus nunc
per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem’) [‘For now we see through
a glass, darkly; but then face to face’], and it was developed by Saint Jerome,
Augustine, Bede, Scotus Erigena, Hugh and Richard of Saint Victor, Alain of Lille,
Bonaventure, Aquinas and others in such a way as to represent a cardinal point
of medieval poetics. A work in this sense is undoubtedly endowed with a
measure of ‘openness’. The reader of the text knows that every sentence and
every trope is ‘open’ to a multiplicity of meanings which he must hunt for and
find. Indeed, according to how he feels at one particular moment, the reader
might choose a possible interpretative key which strikes him as exemplary of
this spiritual state. He will use the work according to the desired meaning
(causing it to come alive again, somehow different from the way he viewed it at
an earlier reading). However, in this type of operation, ‘openness’ is far removed
from meaning ‘indefiniteness’ of communication, ‘infinite’ possibilities of form,
and complete freedom of reception. What in fact is made available is a range of
rigidly pre-established and ordained interpretative solutions, and these never
allow the reader to move outside the strict control of the author. Dante sums up
the issue in his thirteenth Letter:
We shall consider the following lines in order to make this type of treatment
clearer: In exitu Israel de Egypto, domus Jacob de populo barbaro, facta est judea
sanctificatio eius, Israel potestas eius. [When Israel went out of Egypt, the house of
Jacob from a people of strange language; Judah was his sanctuary, and Israel his
dominion.] Now if we just consider the literal meaning, what is meant here is the
departure of the children of Israel from Egypt at the time of Moses. If we consider
the allegory, what is meant is our human redemption through Christ. If we
consider the moral sense, what is meant is the conversion of the soul from the
torment and agony of sin to a state of grace. Finally, if we consider the anagogical
sense, what is meant is the release of the spirit from the bondage of this
corruption to the freedom of eternal glory.

It is obvious at this point that all available possibilities of interpretation have
been exhausted. The reader can concentrate his attention on one sense rather
than on another, in the limited space of this four-tiered sentence, but he must
always follow rules that entail a rigid univocality. The meaning of allegorical
figures and emblems which the medieval reader is likely to encounter is already
prescribed by his encyclopaedias, bestiaries and lapidaries. Any symbolism is
objectively defined and organized into a system. Underpinning this poetics of
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the necessary and the univocal is an ordered cosmos, a hierarchy of essences and
laws which poetic discourse can clarify at several levels, but which each
individual must understand in the only possible way, the one determined by the
creative logos. The order of a work of art in this period is a mirror of imperial and
theocratic society. The laws governing textual interpretation are the laws of an
authoritarian regime which guide the individual in his every action, prescribing
the ends for him and offering him the means to attain them.
It is not that the four solutions of the allegorical passage are quantitatively
more limited than the many possible solutions of a contemporary ‘open’ work.
As I shall try to show, it is a different vision of the world which lies under these
different aesthetic experiences.
If we limit ourselves to a number of cursory historical glimpses, we can find
one striking aspect of ‘openness’ in the ‘open form’ of Baroque. Here it is
precisely the static and unquestionable definitiveness of the classical
Renaissance form which is denied: the canons of space extended round a central
axis, closed in by symmetrical lines and shut angles which cajole the eye toward
the centre in such a way as to suggest an idea of ‘essential’ eternity rather than
movement. Baroque form is dynamic; it tends to an indeterminacy of effect (in
its play of solid and void, light and darkness, with its curvature, its broken
surfaces, its widely diversified angles of inclination); it conveys the idea of space
being progressively dilated. Its search for kinetic excitement and illusory effect
leads to a situation where the plastic mass in the Baroque work of art never
allows a privileged, definitive, frontal view; rather, it induces the spectator to
shift his position continuously in order to see the work in constantly new
aspects, as if it were in a state of perpetual transformation. Now if Baroque
spirituality is to be seen as the first clear manifestation of modern culture and
sensitivity, it is because here, for the first time, man opts out of the canon of
authorized responses and finds that he is faced (both in art and in science) by a
world in a fluid state which requires corresponding creativity on his part. The
poetic treatises concerning ‘maraviglia’, ‘wit’, ‘agudezas’, and so on really strain to
go further than their apparently Byzantine appearance: they seek to establish
the new man’s inventive role. He is no longer to see the work of art as an object
which draws on given links with experience and which demands to be enjoyed;
now he sees it as a potential mystery to be solved, a role to fulfil, a stimulus to
quicken his imagination. Nonetheless, even these conclusions have been codified
by modern criticism and organized into aesthetic canons. In fact, it would be rash
to interpret Baroque poetics as a conscious theory of the ‘open work’.
Between classicism and the Enlightenment, there developed a further
concept which is of interest to us in the present context. The concept of ‘pure
poetry’ gained currency for the very reason that general notions and abstract
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canons fell out out fashion, while the tradition of English empiricism
increasingly argued in favour of the ‘freedom’ of the poet and set the stage for
the coming theories of creativity. From Burke’s declarations about the emotional
power of words, it was a short step to Novalis’ view of the pure evocative power
of poetry as an art of blurred sense and vague outlines. An idea is now held to be
all the more original and stimulating in so far as it ‘allows for a greater interplay
and mutual convergence of concepts, life-views and attitudes. When a work
offers a multitude of intentions, a plurality of meaning, and above all a wide
variety of different ways of being understood and appreciated, then under these
conditions we can only conclude that it is of vital interest and that it is a pure
expression of personality.’3
To close our consideration of the Romantic period, it will be useful to refer to
the first occasion when a conscious poetics of the open work appears. The
moment is late-nineteenth-century Symbolism; the text is Verlaine’s Art Poétique:
De la musique avant toute chose,
et pour cela préfère l’impair
plus vague et plus soluble dans l’air
sans rien en lui qui pèse et qui pose.
Music before everything else,
and, to that end, prefer the uneven
more vague and more soluble in air
with nothing in it that is heavy or still.

Mallarmé’s programmatic statement is even more explicit and pronounced
in this context: ‘Nommer un objet c’est supprimer les trois quarts de la jouissance
du poème, qui est faite du bonheur de deviner peu a peu: le suggérer … voila le rêve’
(‘To name an object is to suppress three-fourths of the enjoyment of the poem,
which is composed of the pleasure of guessing little by little: to suggest … there
is the dream’). The important thing is to prevent a single sense from imposing
itself at the very outset of the receptive process. Blank space surrounding a
word, typographical adjustments, and spatial composition in the page setting of
the poetic text – all contribute to create a halo of indefiniteness and to make the
text pregnant with infinite suggestive possibilities.
This search for suggestiveness is a deliberate move to ‘open’ the work to the
free response of the addressee. An artistic work that suggests is also one that can
be performed with the full emotional and imaginative resources of the
interpreter. Whenever we read poetry there is a process by which we try to
adapt our personal world to the emotional world proposed by the text. This is all
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the more true of poetic works that are deliberately based on suggestiveness,
since the text sets out to stimulate the private world of the addressee so that he
can draw from inside himself some deeper response that mirrors the subtler
resonances underlying the text.
A strong current in contemporary literature follows this use of symbol as a
communicative channel for the indefinite, open to constantly shifting responses
and interpretative stances. It is easy to think of Kafka’s work as ‘open’: trial,
castle, waiting, passing sentence, sickness, metamorphosis and torture – none of
these narrative situations is to be understood in the immediate literal sense. But,
unlike the constructions of medieval allegory, where the superimposed layers of
meaning are rigidly prescribed, in Kafka there is no confirmation in an
encyclopaedia, no matching paradigm in the cosmos, to provide a key to the
symbolism. The various existentialist, theological, clinical and psychoanalytic
interpretations of Kafka’s symbols cannot exhaust all the possibilities of his
works. The work remains inexhaustible in so far as it is ‘open’, because in it an
ordered world based on universally acknowledged laws is being replaced by a
world based on ambiguity, both in the negative sense that directional centres are
missing and in a positive sense, because values and dogma are constantly being
placed in question.
Even when it is difficult to determine whether a given author had symbolist
intentions or was aiming at effects of ambivalence or indeterminacy, there is a
school of criticism nowadays which tends to view all modern literature as built
upon symbolic patterns. W.Y. Tindall, in his book on the literary symbol, offers
an analysis of some of the greatest modern literary works in order to test
Valéry’s declaration that ‘il n’y a pas de vrai sens d’un texte’ (‘there is no true
meaning of a text’). Tindall eventually concludes that a work of art is a construct
which anyone at all, including its author, can put to any use whatsoever, as he
chooses. This type of criticism views the literary work as a continuous
potentiality of ‘openness’ – in other words, an indefinite reserve of meanings.
This is the scope of the wave of American studies on the structure of metaphor,
or of modern work on ‘types of ambiguity’ offered by poetic discourse.4
Clearly, the work of James Joyce is a major example of an ‘open’ mode, since
it deliberately seeks to offer an image of the ontological and existential situation
of the contemporary world. The ‘Wandering Rocks’ chapter in Ulysses amounts
to a tiny universe that can be viewed from different perspectives: the last
residue of Aristotelian categories has now disappeared. Joyce is not concerned
with a consistent unfolding of time or a plausible spatial continuum in which to
stage his characters’ movements. Edmund Wilson has observed that, like
Proust’s or Whitehead’s or Einstein’s world, ‘Joyce’s world is always changing as
it is perceived by different observers and by them at different times.’5
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In Finnegans Wake we are faced with an even more startling process of
‘openness’: the book is moulded into a curve that bends back on itself, like the
Einsteinian universe. The opening word of the first page is the same as the
closing word of the last page of the novel. Thus, the work is finite in one sense,
but in another sense it is unlimited. Each occurrence, each word stands in a series
of possible relations with all the others in the text. According to the semantic
choice which we make in the case of one unit, so goes the way we interpret all
the other units in the text. This does not mean that the book lacks specific sense.
If Joyce does introduce some keys into the text, it is precisely because he wants
the work to be read in a certain sense. But this particular ‘sense’ has all the
richness of the cosmos itself. Ambitiously, the author intends his book to imply
the totality of space and time, of all spaces and all times that are possible. The
principal tool for this all-pervading ambiguity is the pun, the calembour, by
which two, three or even ten different etymological roots are combined in such
a way that a single word can set up a knot of different sub-meanings, each of
which in turn coincides and interrelates with other local allusions, which are
themselves ‘open’ to new configurations and probabilities of interpretation. The
reader of Finnegans Wake is in a position similar to that of the person listening
to post-dodecaphonic serial composition as he appears in a striking definition by
Pousseur: ‘Since the phenomena are no longer tied to one another by a term-toterm determination, it is up to the listener to place himself deliberately in the
midst of an inexhaustible network of relationships and to choose for himself, so
to speak, his own modes of approach, his reference points and his scale, and to
endeavour to use as many dimensions as he possibly can at the same time and
thus dynamize, multiply and extend to the utmost degree his perceptual
faculties.’6
Nor should we imagine that the tendency toward openness operates only at
the level of indefinite suggestion and stimulation of emotional response. In
Brecht’s theoretical work on drama, we shall see that dramatic action is
conceived as the problematic exposition of specific points of tension. Having
presented these tension points (by following the well-known technique of epic
recitation, which does not seek to influence the audience, but rather to offer a
series of facts to be observed, employing the device of ‘defamiliarization’),
Brecht’s plays do not, in the strict sense, devise solutions at all. It is up to the
audience to draw its own conclusions from what it has seen on stage. Brecht’s
plays also end in a situation of ambiguity (typically, and more than any other, his
Galileo), although it is no longer the morbid ambiguousness of a half-perceived
infinitude or an anguish-laden mystery, but the specific concreteness of an
ambiguity in social intercourse, a conflict of unresolved problems taxing the
ingenuity of playwright, actors and audience alike. Here the work is ‘open’ in the
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same sense that a debate is ‘open’. A solution is seen as desirable and is actually
anticipated, but it must come from the collective enterprise of the audience. In
this case the ‘openness’ is converted into an instrument of revolutionary
pedagogics.
In all the phenomena we have so far examined, I have employed the category of
‘openness’ to define widely differing situations, but on the whole the sorts of
works taken into consideration are substantially different from the postWebernian musical composers whom I considered at the opening of this essay.
From the Baroque to modern Symbolist poetics, there has been an eversharpening awareness of the concept of the work susceptible to many different
interpretations. However, the examples considered in the preceding section
propose an ‘openness’ based on the theoretical, mental collaboration of the
consumer, who must freely interpret an artistic datum, a product which has
already been organized in its structural entirety (even if this structure allows for
an indefinite plurality of interpretations). On the other hand, a composition like
Scambi, by Pousseur, represents a fresh advance. Somebody listening to a work
by Webern freely reorganizes and enjoys a series of interrelations inside the
context of the sound system offered to him in that particular (already fully
produced) composition. But in listening to Scambi the auditor is required to do
some of this organizing and structuring of the musical discourse. He collaborates
with the composer in making the composition.
None of this argument should be conceived as passing an aesthetic judgment
on the relative validity of the various types of works under consideration.
However, it is clear that a composition such as Scambi poses a completely new
problem. It invites us to identify inside the category of ‘open’ works a further,
more restricted classification of works which can be defined as ‘works in
movement’, because they characteristically consist of unplanned or physically
incomplete structural units.
In the present cultural context, the phenomenon of the ‘work in movement’
is certainly not limited to music. There are, for example, artistic products which
display an intrinsic mobility, a kaleidoscopic capacity to suggest themselves in
constantly renewed aspects to the consumer. A simple example is provided by
Calder’s mobiles or by mobile compositions by other artists: elementary
structures which can move in the air and assume different spatial dispositions.
They continuously create their own space and the shapes to fill it.
If we turn to literary production to try to isolate an example of a ‘work in
movement’, we are immediately obliged to take into consideration Mallarmé’s
Livre, a colossal and far-reaching work, the quintessence of the poet’s
production. He conceived it as the work which would constitute not only the
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goal of his activities but also the end goal of the world: ‘Le monde existe pour
aboutir à un livre.’ [‘The world exists to end up in a book’.] Mallarmé never
finished the book, although he worked on it at different periods throughout his
life. But there are sketches for the ending which have recently been brought to
light by the acute philological research of Jacques Schérer.7
The metaphysical premises for Mallarmé’s Livre are enormous and possibly
questionable. I would prefer to leave them aside in order to concentrate on the
dynamic structure of this artistic object which deliberately sets out to validate a
specific poetic principle: ‘Un livre ne commence ni ne finit; tout au plus fait-il
semblant.’ [‘A book neither begins nor ends; it only pretends to do so.’] The Livre
was conceived as a mobile apparatus, not just in the mobile and ‘open’ sense of
a composition such as Un coup de dès … [A Throw of the Dice … ], where grammar,
syntax and typesetting introduced a plurality of elements, polymorphous in
their indeterminate relation to each other.
However, Mallarmé’s immense enterprise was utopian: it was embroidered
with ever more disconcerting aspirations and ingenuities, and it is not surprising
that it was never brought to completion. We do not know whether, had the work
been completed, the whole project would have had any real value. It might well
have turned out to be a dubious mystical and esoteric incarnation of a decadent
sensitivity that had reached the extreme point of its creative parabola. I am
inclined to this second view, but it is certainly interesting to find at the very
threshold of the modern period such a vigorous programme for a work in
movement, and this is a sign that certain intellectual currents circulate
imperceptibly until they are adopted and justified as cultural data which have to
be integrated organically into the panorama of a whole period.
In every century, the way that artistic forms are structured reflects the way in
which science or contemporary culture views reality. The closed, single
conception in a work by a medieval artist reflected the conception of the cosmos
as a hierarchy of fixed, pre-ordained orders. The work as a pedagogical vehicle,
as a monocentric and necessary apparatus (incorporating a rigid internal pattern
of metre and rhymes) simply reflects the syllogistic system, a logic of necessity,
a deductive consciousness by means of which reality could be made manifest
step by step without unforeseen interruptions, moving forward in a single
direction, proceeding from first principles of science which were seen as one and
the same with the first principles of reality. The openness and dynamism of the
Baroque mark, in fact, the advent of a new scientific awareness: the tactile is
replaced by the visual (meaning that the subjective element comes to prevail)
and attention is shifted from the essence to the appearance of architectural and
pictorial products. It reflects the rising interest in a psychology of impression
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and sensation – in short, an empiricism which converts the Aristotelian concept
of real substance into a series of perceptions by the viewer. On the other hand,
by giving up the essential focus of the composition and the prescribed point of
view for its viewer, aesthetic innovations were in fact mirroring the Copernican
vision of the universe. This definitively eliminated the notion of geocentricity
and its allied metaphysical constructs. In the modern scientific universe, as in
architecture and in Baroque pictorial production, the various component parts
are all endowed with equal value and dignity, and the whole construct expands
toward a totality which is close to the infinite. It refuses to be hemmed in by any
ideal normative conception of the world. It shares in a general urge toward
discovery and constantly renewed contact with reality.
In its own way, the ‘openness’ that we meet in the decadent strain of
Symbolism reflects a cultural striving to unfold new vistas. For example, one of
Mallarmé’s projects for a multidimensional, deconstructible book envisaged the
breaking down of the initial unit into sections which could be reformulated and
which could express new perspectives by being deconstructed into
correspondingly smaller units which were also mobile and reducible. This
project obviously suggests the universe as it is conceived by modern, nonEuclidean geometries.
Hence, it is not overambitious to detect in the poetics of the ‘open’ work –
and even less so in the ‘work in movement’ – more or less specific overtones of
trends in contemporary scientific thought. For example, it is a critical
commonplace to refer to the spatio-temporal continuum in order to account for
the structure of the universe in Joyce’s works. Pousseur has offered a tentative
definition of his musical work which involves the term ‘field of possibilities’. In
fact, this shows that he is prepared to borrow two extremely revealing technical
terms from contemporary culture. The notion of ‘field’ is provided by physics
and implies a revised vision of the classic relationship posited between cause
and effect as a rigid, one-directional system: now a complex interplay of motive
forces is envisaged, a configuration of possible events, a complete dynamism of
structure. The notion of ‘possibility’ is a philosophical canon which reflects a
widespread tendency in contemporary science; the discarding of a static,
syllogistic view of order, and a corresponding devolution of intellectual
authority to personal decision, choice and social context.
If a musical pattern no longer necessarily determines the immediately
following one, if there is no tonal basis which allows the listener to infer the next
steps in the arrangement of the musical discourse from what has physically
preceded them, this is just part of a general breakdown in the concept of
causation. The two-value truth logic which follows the classical aut-aut, the
disjunctive dilemma between true and false, a fact and its contradictory, is no
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longer the only instrument of philosophical experiment. Multi-value logics are
now gaining currency, and these are quite capable of incorporating
indeterminacy as a valid stepping-stone in the cognitive process. In this general
intellectual atmosphere, the poetics of the open work is peculiarly relevant: it
posits the work of art stripped of necessary and foreseeable conclusions, works
in which the performer’s freedom functions as part of the discontinuity which
contemporary physics recognizes, not as an element of disorientation, but as an
essential stage in all scientific verification procedures and also as the verifiable
pattern of events in the subatomic world.
From Mallarmé’s Livre to the musical compositions which we have
considered, there is a tendency to see every execution of the work of art as
divorced from its ultimate definition. Every performance explains the
composition but does not exhaust it. Every performance makes the work an
actuality, but is itself only complementary to all possible other performances of
the work. In short, we can say that every performance offers us a complete and
satisfying version of the work, but at the same time makes it incomplete for us,
because it cannot simultaneously give all the other artistic solutions which the
work may admit.
Perhaps it is no accident that these poetic systems emerge at the same period
as the physicists’ principle of complementarity, which rules that it is not possible
to indicate the different behaviour patterns of an elementary particle
simultaneously. To describe these different behaviour patterns, different models,
which Heisenberg has defined as adequate when properly utilized, are put to
use, but, since they contradict one another, they are therefore also
complementary.8 Perhaps we are in a position to state that for these works of art
an incomplete knowledge of the system is in fact an essential feature in its
formulation. Hence one could argue, with Bohr, that the data collected in the
course of experimental situations cannot be gathered in one image but should
be considered as complementary, since only the sum of all the phenomena could
exhaust the possibilities of information.9
Above I discussed the principle of ambiguity as moral disposition and
problematic construct. Again, modern psychology and phenomenology use the
term ‘perceptive ambiguities’, which indicates the availability of new cognitive
positions that fall short of conventional epistemological stances and that allow
the observer to conceive the world in a fresh dynamics of potentiality before the
fixative process of habit and familiarity comes into play. Husserl observed that
each state of consciousness implies the existence of a horizon which varies with
the modification of its connections together with other states, and also with its
own phases of duration… In each external perception, for instance, the sides of
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the objects which are actually perceived suggest to the viewer’s attention the

in that of consciousness; it is its very definition … Consciousness, which is

unperceived sides which, at the present, are viewed only in a non-intuitive

commonly taken as an extremely enlightened region, is, on the contrary, the very

manner and are expected to become elements of the succeeding perception. This

region of indetermination.’12

process is similar to a continuous projection which takes on a new meaning with
each phase of the perceptive process. Moreover, perception itself includes
horizons which encompass other perceptive possibilities, such as a person might
experience by changing deliberately the direction of his perception, by turning
his eyes one way instead of another, or by taking a step forward or sideways, and
so forth.10

Sartre notes that the existent object can never be reduced to a given series of
manifestations, because each of these is bound to stand in relationship with a
continuously altering subject. Not only does an object present different
Abschattungen (or profiles), but also different points of view are available by way
of the same Abschattung. In order to be defined, the object must be related back
to the total series of which, by virtue of being one possible apparition, it is a
member. In this way the traditional dualism between being and appearance is
replaced by a straight polarity of finite and infinite, which locates the infinite at
the very core of the finite. This sort of ‘openness’ is at the heart of every act of
perception. It characterizes every moment of our cognitive experience. It means
that each phenomenon seems to be ‘inhabited’ by a certain power – in other
words, ‘the ability to manifest itself by a series of real or likely manifestations.’
The problem of the relationship of a phenomenon to its ontological basis is
altered by the perspective of perceptive ‘openness’ to the problem of its
relationship to the multiplicity of different-order perceptions which we can
derive from it.11
This intellectual position is further accentuated in Merleau-Ponty:
How can anything ever present itself truly to us since its synthesis is never
completed? How could I gain the experience of the world, as I would of an
individual actuating his own existence, since none of the views or perceptions I
have of it can exhaust it and the horizons remain forever open? … The belief in
things and in the world can only express the assumption of a complete synthesis.
Its completion, however, is made impossible by the very nature of the
perspectives to be connected, since each of them sends back to other perspectives
through its own horizons … The contradiction which we feel exists between the
world’s reality and its incompleteness is identical to the one that exists between
the ubiquity of consciousness and its commitment to a field of presence. This
ambiguousness does not represent an imperfection in the nature of existence or

34//THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

These are the sorts of problems which phenomenology picks out at the very
heart of our existential situation. It proposes to the artist, as well as to the
philosopher and the psychologist, a series of declarations which are bound to act
as a stimulus to his creative activity in the world of forms: ‘It is therefore
essential for an object and also for the world to present themselves to us as
“open” … and as always promising future perceptions.’13
It would be quite natural for us to think that this flight away from the old,
solid concept of necessity and the tendency toward the ambiguous and the
indeterminate reflect a crisis of contemporary civilization. On the other hand,
we might see these poetical systems, in harmony with modern science, as
expressing the positive possibility of thought and action made available to an
individual who is open to the continuous renewal of his life patterns and
cognitive processes. Such an individual is productively committed to the
development of his own mental faculties and experiential horizons. This
contrast is too facile and Manichaean. Our main intent has been to pick out a
number of analogies which reveal a reciprocal play of problems in the most
disparate areas of contemporary culture and which point to the common
elements in a new way of looking at the world.
What is at stake is a convergence of new canons and requirements which the
forms of art reflect by way of what we could term structural homologies. This
need not commit us to assembling a rigorous parallelism – it is simply a case of
phenomena like the ‘work in movement’ simultaneously reflecting mutually
contrasted epistemological situations, as yet contradictory and not satisfactorily
reconciled. Thus, the concepts of ‘openness’ and dynamism may recall the
terminology of quantum physics: indeterminacy and discontinuity. But at the
same time they also exemplify a number of situations in Einsteinian physics.
The multiple polarity of a serial composition in music, where the listener is
not faced by an absolute conditioning centre of reference, requires him to
constitute his own system of auditory relationships.14 He must allow such a
centre to emerge from the sound continuum. Here are no privileged points of
view, and all available perspectives are equally valid and rich in potential. Now,
this multiple polarity is extremely close to the spatio-temporal conception of
the universe which we owe to Einstein. The thing which distinguishes the
Einsteinian concept of the universe from quantum epistemology is precisely this
faith in the totality of the universe, a universe in which discontinuity and
indeterminacy can admittedly upset us with their surprise apparitions, but in
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fact, to use Einstein’s words, presuppose not a God playing random games with
dice but the Divinity of Spinoza, who rules the world according to perfectly
regulated laws. In this kind of universe, relativity means the infinite variability
of experience as well as the infinite multiplication of possible ways of measuring
things and viewing their position. But the objective side of the whole system can
be found in the invariance of the simple formal descriptions (of the differential
equations) which establish once and for all the relativity of empirical
measurement.
This is not the place to pass judgment on the scientific validity of the
metaphysical construct implied by Einstein’s system. But there is a striking
analogy between his universe and the universe of the work in movement. The
God in Spinoza, who is made into an untestable hypothesis by Einsteinian
metaphysics, becomes a cogent reality for the work of art and matches the
organizing impulse of its creator.
The possibilities which the work’s openness makes available always work
within a given field of relations. As in the Einsteinian universe, in the ‘work in
movement’ we may well deny that there is a single prescribed point of view. But
this does not mean complete chaos in its internal relations. What it does imply
is an organizing rule which governs these relations. Therefore, to sum up, we can
say that the ‘work in movement’ is the possibility of numerous different
personal interventions, but it is not an amorphous invitation to indiscriminate
participation. The invitation offers the performer the opportunity for an
oriented insertion into something which always remains the world intended by
the author.
In other words, the author offers the interpreter, the performer, the
addressee, a work to be completed. He does not know the exact fashion in which
his work will be concluded, but he is aware that once completed the work in
question will still be his own. It will not be a different work, and, at the end of
the interpretative dialogue, a form which is his form will have been organized,
even though it may have been assembled by an outside party in a particular way
that he could not have foreseen. The author is the one who proposed a number
of possibilities which had already been rationally organized, oriented and
endowed with specifications for proper development.
Berio’s Sequence, which is played by different flutists, Stockhausen’s
Klavierstück XI, or Pousseur’s Mobiles, which are played by different pianists (or
performed twice over by the same pianists), will never be quite the same on
different occasions. Yet they will never be gratuitously different. They are to be
seen as the actualization of a series of consequences whose premises are firmly
rooted in the original data provided by the author.
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This happens in the musical works which we have already examined, and it
happens also in the plastic artefacts we considered. The common factor is a
mutability which is always deployed within the specific limits of a given taste,
or of predetermined formal tendencies, and is authorized by the concrete
pliability of the material offered for the performer’s manipulation. Brecht’s plays
appear to elicit free and arbitrary response on the part of the audience. Yet they
are also rhetorically constructed in such a way as to elicit a reaction oriented
toward, and ultimately anticipating, a Marxist dialectic logic as the basis for the
whole field of possible responses.
All these examples of ‘open’ works and ‘works in movement’ have this latent
characteristic, which guarantees that they will always be seen as ‘works’ and not
just as a conglomeration of random components, ready to emerge from the
chaos in which they previously stood and permitted to assume any form
whatsoever.
Now, a dictionary clearly presents us with thousands upon thousands of
words which we could freely use to compose poetry, essays on physics,
anonymous letters or grocery lists. In this sense the dictionary is clearly open to
the reconstitution of its raw material in any way that the manipulator wishes.
But this does not make it a ‘work’. The ‘openness’ and dynamism of an artistic
work consist in factors which make it susceptible to a whole range of
integrations. They provide it with organic complements which they graft into
the structural vitality which the work already possesses, even if it is incomplete.
This structural vitality is still seen as a positive property of the work, even
though it admits of all kinds of different conclusions and solutions for it.
The preceding observations are necessary because, when we speak of a work of
art, our Western aesthetic tradition forces us to take ‘work’ in the sense of a
personal production which may well vary in the ways it can be received but
which always maintains a coherent identity of its own and which displays the
personal imprint that makes it a specific, vital and significant act of
communication. Aesthetic theory is quite content to conceive of a variety of
different poetics, but ultimately it aspires to general definitions, not necessarily
dogmatic or sub specie aeternitatis, which are capable of applying the category of
the ‘work of art’ broadly speaking to a whole variety of experiences, which can
range from the Divine Comedy to, say, electronic composition based on the
different permutations of sonic components.
We have, therefore, seen that (i) ‘open’ works, in so far as they are in
movement, are characterized by the invitation to make the work together with
the author and that (ii) on a wider level (as a subgenus in the species ‘work in
movement’) there exist works which, though organically completed, are ‘open’
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to a continuous generation of internal relations which the addressee must
uncover and select in his act of perceiving the totality of incoming stimuli. (iii)
Every work of art, even though it is produced by following an explicit or implicit
poetics of necessity, is effectively open to a virtually unlimited range of possible
readings, each of which causes the work to acquire new vitality in terms of one
particular taste, or perspective, or personal performance.
Contemporary aesthetics has frequently pointed out this last characteristic of
every work of art. According to Luigi Pareyson:
The work of art … is a form, namely of movement, that has been concluded; or
we can see it as an infinite contained within finiteness … The work therefore has
infinite aspects, which are not just ‘parts’ or fragments of it, because each of them
contains the totality of the work, and reveals it according to a given perspective.
So the variety of performances is founded both in the complex factor of the
performer’s individuality and in that of the work to be performed … The infinite
points of view of the performers and the infinite aspects of the work interact with
each other, come into juxtaposition and clarify each other by a reciprocal process,
in such a way that a given point of view is capable of revealing the whole work
only if it grasps it in the relevant, highly personalized aspect. Analogously, a
single aspect of the work can only reveal the totality of the work in a new light if
it is prepared to wait for the right point of view, capable of grasping and
proposing the work in all its vitality.

The foregoing allows Pareyson to move on to the assertion that
all performances are definitive in the sense that each one is for the performer,
tantamount to the work itself; equally, all performances are bound to be
provisional in the sense that each performer knows that he must always try to
deepen his own interpretation of the work. In so far as they are definitive, these
interpretations are parallel, and each of them is such as to exclude the others
without in any way negating them.15

This doctrine can be applied to all artistic phenomena and to artworks
throughout the ages. But it is useful to have underlined that now is the period
when aesthetics has paid especial attention to the whole notion of ‘openness’
and sought to expand it. In a sense these requirements, which aesthetics has
referred widely to every type of artistic production, are the same as those posed
by the poetics of the ‘open work’ in a more decisive and explicit fashion. Yet this
does not mean that the existence of ‘open’ works and of ‘works in movement’
adds absolutely nothing to our experience, because everything in the world is
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already implied and subsumed by everything else, from the beginning of time,
in the same way that it now appears that every discovery has already been made
by the Chinese. Here we have to distinguish between the theoretical level of
aesthetics as a philosophical discipline which attempts to formulate definitions
and the practical level of poetics as programmatic projects for creation. While
aesthetics brings to light one of the fundamental demands of contemporary
culture, it also reveals the latent possibilities of a certain type of experience in
every artistic product, independently of the operative criteria which presided
over its moment of inception.
The poetic theory or practice of the ‘work in movement’ senses this
possibility as a specific vocation. It allies itself openly and selfconsciously to
current trends in scientific method and puts into action and tangible form the
very trend which aesthetics has already acknowledged as the general
background to performance. These poetic systems recognize ‘openness’ as the
fundamental possibility of the contemporary artist or consumer. The aesthetic
theoretician, in his turn, will see a confirmation of his own intuitions in these
practical manifestations; they constitute the ultimate realization of a receptive
mode which can function at many different levels of intensity.
Certainly this new receptive mode vis-a-vis the work of art opens up a much
vaster phase in culture and in this sense is not intellectually confined to the
problems of aesthetics. The poetics of the ‘work in movement’ (and partly that
of the ‘open’ work) sets in motion a new cycle of relations between the artist and
his audience, a new mechanics of aesthetic perception, a different status for the
artistic product in contemporary society. It opens a new page in sociology and in
pedagogy, as well as a new chapter in the history of art. It poses new practical
problems by organizing new communicative situations. In short, it installs a new
relationship between the contemplation and the utilization of a work of art.
Seen in these terms and against the background of historical influences and
cultural interplay which links art by analogy to widely diversified aspects of the
contemporary world view, the situation of art has now become a situation in the
process of development. Far from being fully accounted for and catalogued, it
deploys and poses problems in several dimensions. In short, it is an ‘open’
situation, in movement. A work in progress.
1

Here we must eliminate a possible misunderstanding straight away: the practical intervention
of a ‘performer’ (the instrumentalist who plays a piece of music or the actor who recites a
passage) is different from that of an interpreter in the sense of consumer (somebody who looks
at a picture, silently reads a poem, or listens to a musical composition performed by somebody
else). For the purposes of aesthetic analysis, however, both cases can be seen as different
manifestations of the same interpretative attitude. Every ‘reading’, ‘contemplation’ or
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‘enjoyment’ of a work of art represents a tacit or private form of ‘performance’.
2

Henri Pousseur, ‘La nuova sensibilita musicale’, Incontri musicali, 2 (May 1958) 25.

3

For the evolution of pre-Romantic and Romantic poets in this sense, see L. Anceschi, Autonomia

Roland Barthes
The Death of the Author//1968

ed eteronomia dell’arte, 2nd ed. (Florence: Vallecchi, 1959).
4

See W.Y. Tindall, The Literary Symbol (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955). For an
analysis of the aesthetic importance of the notion of ambiguity, see the useful observations and
bibliographical references in Gillo Dorfles, II divenire delle arti (Turin: Einaudi, 1959) 51 ff.

5

Edmund Wilson, Axel’s Castle (London: Collins, Fontana Library, 1961) 178.

6

Pousseur, ‘La nuova sensibilita musicale’, 25.

7

J. Schérer, Le ‘Livre’ de Mallarmé Premières recherches sur des documents inédits (Paris: Gallimard,
1957). See in particular the third chapter, ‘Physique du livre’.

8
9

Roland Barthes’ short essay ‘The Death of the Author’ (1968) should ideally be read
alongside ‘From Work to Text’ (1971) as his key statement on the idea that a work’s
meaning is not dependent on authorial intention but on the individual point of
active reception. Barthes was concerned primarily with literature but his insights are
analogous to much contemporary art of this period, particularly works that
emphasize the viewer’s role in their completion.

Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1959) ch. 3.
Niels Bohr, in his epistemological debate with Einstein; see P.A. Schlipp, ed., Albert Einstein:
Philosopher-Scientist (Evanston, 111: Library of Living Philosophers, 1949). Epistemological
thinkers connected with quantum methodology have rightly warned against an ingenuous
transposition of physical categories into the fields of ethics and psychology (for example, the
identification of indeterminacy with moral freedom; see P. Frank, Present Role of Science,
Opening Address to the Seventh International Congress of Philosophy, Venice, September 1958).
Hence, it would not be justified to understand my formulation as making an analogy between
the structures of the work of art and the supposed structures of the world. Indeterminacy,
complementarity, noncausality are not modes of being in the physical world, but systems for
describing it in a convenient way. The relationship which concerns my exposition is not the
supposed nexus between an ‘ontological’ situation and a morphological feature in the work of
art, but the relation between an operative procedure for explaining physical processes and an
operative procedure for explaining the processes of artistic production and reception. In other
words, the relationship between a scientific methodology and a poetics.

10 Edmund Husserl, Méditations cartésiennes, Med. 2, par. 19 (Paris: Vrin, 1953) 39. The translation
of this passage is by Anne Fabre-Luce.
11 Jean-Paul Sartre, L’Être et le néant (Paris: Gallimard, 1943) ch. i.
12 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phénomenologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945) 381–3.
13 Ibid., 384.
14 On this ‘éclatement multidirectionnel des structures’, see A. Boucourechliev, ‘Problèmes de la
musique moderne’, Nouvelle revue française (December–January 1960–61).
15 Luigi Pareyson, Estetica: teoria della formatività, 2nd ed. (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1960) 194 ff., and
in general the whole of chapter 8, ‘Lettura, interpretazione e critica’.
Umberto Eco, Opera aperta (Milan: Bompiano, 1962); trans. Anna Cancogni, The Open Work
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989) 1–23.
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In his story Sarrasine Balzac, describing a castrato disguised as a woman, writes
the following sentence: ‘This was woman herself, with her sudden fears, her
irrational whims, her instinctive worries, her impetuous boldness, her fussings,
and her delicious sensibility.’ Who is speaking thus? Is it the hero of the story bent
on remaining ignorant of the castrato hidden beneath the woman? Is it Balzac the
individual, furnished by his personal experience with a philosophy of Woman? Is
it Balzac the author professing ‘literary’ ideas on femininity? Is it universal
wisdom? Romantic psychology? We shall never know, for the good reason that
writing is the destruction of every voice, of every point of origin. Writing is that
neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips away; the negative
where all identity is lost, starting with the very identity of the body writing.
No doubt it has always been that way. As soon as a fact is narrated no longer
with a view to acting directly on reality but intransitively, that is to say, finally
outside of any function other than that of the very practice of the symbol itself,
this disconnection occurs, the voice loses its origin, the author enters into his
own death, writing begins. The sense of this phenomenon, however, has varied;
in ethnographic societies the responsibility for a narrative is never assumed by
a person but by a mediator, shaman or relator whose ‘performance’ – the
mastery of the narrative code – may possibly be admired but never his ‘genius’.
The author is a modern figure, a product of our society in so far as, emerging
from the Middle Ages with English empiricism, French rationalism and the
personal faith of the Reformation, it discovered the prestige of the individual, of,
as it is more nobly put, the ‘human person’. It is thus logical that in literature it
should be this positivism, the epitome and culmination of capitalist ideology,
which has attached the greatest importance to the ‘person’ of the author. The
author still reigns, in histories of literature, biographies of writers, interviews,
magazines, as in the very consciousness of men of letters anxious to unite their
person and their work through diaries and memoirs. The image of literature to
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be found in ordinary culture is tyrannically centred on the author, his person, his
life, his tastes, his passions, while criticism still consists for the most part in
saying that Baudelaire’s work is the failure of Baudelaire the man, Van Gogh’s his
madness, Tchaikovsky’s his vice. The explanation of a work is always sought in
the man or woman who produced it, as if it were always in the end, through the
more or less transparent allegory of the fiction, the voice of a single person, the
author ‘confiding’ in us.
Though the sway of the Author remains powerful (the new criticism has
often done no more than consolidate it), it goes without saying that certain
writers have long since attempted to loosen it. In France, Mallarmé was
doubtless the first to see and to foresee in its full extent the necessity to
substitute language itself for the person who until then had been supposed to be
its owner. For him, for us too, it is language which speaks, not the author; to
write is, through a prerequisite impersonality (not at all to be confused with the
castrating objectivity of the realist novelist), to reach that point where only
language acts, ‘performs’, and not ‘me’. Mallarmé’s entire poetics consists in
suppressing the author in the interests of writing (which is, as will be seen, to
restore the place of the reader). Valéry, encumbered by a psychology of the Ego,
considerably diluted Mallarmé’s theory but, his taste for classicism leading him
to turn to the lessons of rhetoric, he never stopped calling into question and
deriding the Author; he stressed the linguistic and, as it were, ‘hazardous’ nature
of his activity, and throughout his prose works he militated in favour of the
essentially verbal condition of literature, in the face of which all recourse to the
writer’s interiority seemed to him pure superstition. Proust himself, despite the
apparently psychological character of what are called his analyses, was visibly
concerned with the task of inexorably blurring, by an extreme subtilization, the
relation between the writer and his characters; by making of the narrator not he
who has seen and felt nor even he who is writing, but he who is going to write
(the young man in the novel – but, in fact, how old is he and who is he? – wants
to write but cannot; the novel ends when writing at last becomes possible),
Proust gave modern writing its epic. By a radical reversal, instead of putting his
life into his novel, as is so often maintained, he made of his very life a work for
which his own book was the model; so that it is clear to us that Charlus does not
imitate Montesquieu but that Montesquieu – in his anecdotal, historical reality
– is no more than a secondary fragment, derived from Charlus. Lastly, to go no
further than this prehistory of modernity, Surrealism, though unable to accord
language a supreme place (language being system and the aim of the movement
being, romantically, a direct subversion of codes – itself moreover illusory: a
code cannot be destroyed, only ‘played off’), contributed to the desacrilization of
the image of the Author by ceaselessly recommending the abrupt
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disappointment of expectations of meaning (the famous surrealist ‘jolt’), by
entrusting the hand with the task of writing as quickly as possible what the head
itself is unaware of (automatic writing), by accepting the principle and the
experience of several people writing together. Leaving aside literature itself
(such distinctions really becoming invalid), linguistics has recently provided the
destruction of the Author with a valuable analytical tool by showing that the
whole of the enunciation is an empty process, functioning perfectly without
there being any need for it to be filled with the person of the interlocutors.
Linguistically, the author is never more than the instance writing, just as I is
nothing other than the instance saying I: language knows a ‘subject’, not a
‘person’, and this subject, empty outside of the very enunciation which defines
it, suffices to make language ‘hold together’, suffices, that is to say, to exhaust it.
The removal of the Author (one could talk here with Brecht of a veritable
‘distancing’, the Author diminishing like a figurine at the far end of the literary
stage) is not merely an historical fact or an act of writing; it utterly transforms
the modern text (or – which is the same thing – the text is henceforth made and
read in such a way that at all its levels the author is absent). The temporality is
different. The Author, when believed in, is always conceived of as the past of his
own book: book and author stand automatically on a single line divided into a
before and an after. The Author is thought to nourish the book, which is to say
that he exists before it, thinks, suffers, lives for it, is in the same relation of
antecedence to his work as a father to his child. In complete contrast, the modem
scriptor is born simultaneously with the text, is in no way equipped with a being
preceding or exceeding the writing, is not the subject with the book as
predicate; there is no other time than that of the enunciation and every text is
eternally written here and now. The fact is (or, it follows) that writing can no
longer designate an operation of recording, notation, representation, ‘depiction’
(as the Classics would say); rather, it designates exactly what linguists, referring
to Oxford philosophy, call a performative, a rare verbal form (exclusively given
in the first person and in the present tense) in which the enunciation has no
other content (contains no other proposition) than the act by which it is uttered
– something like the I declare of kings or the I sing of very ancient poets. Having
buried the Author, the modern scriptor can thus no longer believe, as according
to the pathetic view of his predecessors, that this hand is too slow for his
thought or passion and that consequently, making a law of necessity, he must
emphasize this delay and indefinitely ‘polish’ his form. For him, on the contrary,
the hand, cut off from any voice, borne by a pure gesture of inscription (and not of
expression), traces a field without origin – or which, at least, has no other origin
than language itself, language which ceaselessly calls into question all origins.
We know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a single ‘theological’
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meaning (the ‘message’ of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in
which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash. The text is a
tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture. Similar to
Bouvard and Pécuchet, those eternal copyists, at once sublime and comic and
whose profound ridiculousness indicates precisely the truth, of writing, the
writer can only imitate a gesture that is always anterior, never original. His only
power is to mix writings, to counter the ones with the others, in such a way as
never to rest on any one of them. Did he wish to express himself, he ought at least
to know that the inner ‘thing’ he thinks to ‘translate’ is itself only a ready-formed
dictionary, its words only explainable through other words, and so on
indefinitely; something experienced in exemplary fashion by the young Thomas
de Quincey, he who was so good at Greek that in order to translate absolutely
modern ideas and images into that dead language, he had, so Baudelaire tells us
(in Paradis Artificiels), ‘created for himself an unfailing dictionary, vastly more
extensive and complex than those resulting from the ordinary patience of purely
literary themes’. Succeeding the Author, the scriptor no longer bears within him
passions, humours, feelings, impressions, but rather this immense dictionary
from which he draws a writing that can know no halt: life never does more than
imitate the book, and the book itself is only a tissue of signs, an imitation that is
lost, infinitely deferred.
Once the Author is removed, the claim to decipher a text becomes quite
futile. To give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with
a final signified, to close the writing. Such a conception suits criticism very well,
the latter then allotting itself the important task of discovering the Author (or its
hypostases: society, history, psyche, liberty) beneath the work: when the Author
has been found, the text is ‘explained’ – victory to the critic. Hence there is no
surprise in the fact that, historically, the reign of the Author has also been that
of the Critic, nor again in the fact that criticism (be it new) is today undermined
along with the Author. In the multiplicity of writing, everything is to be
disentangled, nothing deciphered; the structure can be followed, ‘run’ (like the
thread of a stocking) at every point and at every level, but there is nothing
beneath: the space of writing is to be ranged over, not pierced; writing
ceaselessly posits meaning ceaselessly to evaporate it, carrying out a systematic
exemption of meaning. In precisely this way literature (it would be better from
now on to say writing), by refusing to assign a ‘secret’, an ultimate meaning, to
the text (and to the world as text), liberates what may be called an antitheological activity, an activity that is truly revolutionary since to refuse to fix
meaning is, in the end, to refuse God and his hypostases – reason, science, law.
Let us come back to the Balzac sentence. No one, no ‘person’, says it: its
source, its voice, is not the true place of the writing, which is reading. Another –
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very precise – example will help to make this clear: recent research (J.-P.
Vernant)1 has demonstrated the constitutively ambiguous nature of Greek
tragedy, its texts being woven from words with double meanings that each
character understands unilaterally (this perpetual misunderstanding is exactly
the ‘tragic’); there is, however, someone who understands each word in its
duplicity and who, in addition, hears the very deafness of the characters
speaking in front of him – this someone being precisely the reader (or here the
listener). Thus is revealed the total existence of writing: a text is made of
multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mutual relations
of dialogue, parody, contestation, but there is one place where this multiplicity
is focused and that place is the reader, not, as was hitherto said, the author. The
reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are
inscribed without any of them being lost; a text’s unity lies not in its origin but
in its destination. Yet this destination cannot any longer be personal: the reader
is without history, biography, psychology; he is simply that someone who holds
together in a single field all the traces by which the written text is constituted.
Which is why it is derisory to condemn the new writing in the name of a
humanism hypocritically turned champion of the reader’s rights. Classic
criticism has never paid any attention to the reader; for it, the writer is the only
person in literature. We are now beginning to let ourselves be fooled no longer
by the arrogant antiphrastical recriminations of good society in favour of the
very thing it sets aside, ignores, smothers or destroys; we know that to give
writing its future, it is necessary to overthrow the myth: the birth of the reader
must be at the cost of the death of the Author.
1

See Jean-Pierre Vernant, with Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Mythe et tragédie en Grèce ancienne (Paris
1972), especially pages 19–40; 99–131. [Translator]

Roland Barthes, ‘La mort de l’auteur’, Mantéia, V (Paris, 1968); trans. ‘The Death of the Author’, in
Roland Barthes, Image – Music – Text, ed. and trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill & Wang/London:
Fontana, 1977) 142–8.
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Peter Bürger
The Negation of the Autonomy of Art
by the Avant-garde//2002
Informed by the Frankfurt School of critical theory, Peter Bürger’s Theory of the
Avant-garde (1974) decries a bourgeois model of art that is produced and consumed
by individuals. His influential reading of the historic avant-garde (Dada,
Constructivism and Surrealism) as an attempt to fuse art with social praxis, together
with the chart reproduced below, provide a poignant contextualization for
contemporary collaborative art.
In scholarly discussion up to now, the category ‘autonomy’ has suffered from the
imprecision of the various subcategories thought of as constituting a unity in the
concept of the autonomous work of art. Since the development of the individual
subcategories is not synchronous, it may happen that sometimes courtly art
seems already autonomous, while at other times only bourgeois art appears to
have that characteristic. To make clear that the contradictions between the
various interpretations result from the nature of the case, we will sketch a
historical typology that is deliberately reduced to three elements (purpose or
function, production, reception), because the point here is to have the
nonsynchronism in the development of individual categories emerge with clarity.
A. Sacral Art (example: the art of the High Middle Ages) serves as cult object.
It is wholly integrated into the social institution ‘religion’. It is produced
collectively, as a craft. The mode of reception also is institutionalized as
collective.1
B. Courtly Art (example: the art at the court of Louis XIV) also has a precisely
defined function. It is representational and serves the glory of the prince and the
self-portrayal of courtly society. Courtly art is part of the life praxis of courtly
society, just as sacral art is part of the life praxis of the faithful. Yet the
detachment from the sacral tie is a first step in the emancipation of art.
(‘Emancipation’ is being used here as a descriptive term, as referring to the
process by which art constitutes itself as a distinct social subsystem.) The
difference from sacral art becomes particularly apparent in the realm of
production: the artist produces as an individual and develops a consciousness of
the uniqueness of his activity. Reception, on the other hand, remains collective.
But the content of the collective performance is no longer sacral, it is sociability.
C. Only to the extent that the bourgeoisie adopts concepts of value held by
the aristocracy does bourgeois art have a representational function. When it is
genuinely bourgeois, this art is the objectification of the self-understanding of
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the bourgeois class. Production and reception of the self-understanding as
articulated in art are no longer tied to the praxis of life. Habermas calls this the
satisfaction of residual needs, that is, of needs that have become submerged in
the life praxis of bourgeois society. Not only production but reception also are
now individual acts. The solitary absorption in the work is the adequate mode of
appropriation of creations removed from the life praxis of the bourgeois, even
though they still claim to interpret that praxis. In Aestheticism, finally, where
bourgeois art reaches the stage of self-reflection, this claim is no longer made.
Apartness from the praxis of life, which had always been the condition that
characterized the way art functioned in bourgeois society, now becomes its
content. The typology we have sketched here can be represented in the
accompanying tabulation (the vertical lines in boldface [substituted by boldface
text below] refer to a decisive change in the development, the broken ones
[substituted by italicized text] to a less decisive one).

Purpose or

Sacral Art

Courtly Art

cult object

representational

function

object

Bourgeois Art

portrayal of bourgeois
self-understanding

Production

collective craft

individual

individual

Reception

collective (sacral)

collective (sociable)

individual

The tabulation allows one to notice that the development of the categories was
not synchronous. Production by the individual that characterizes art in
bourgeois society has its origins as far back as courtly patronage. But courtly art
still remains integral to the praxis of life, although as compared with the cult
function, the representational function constitutes a step toward a mitigation of
claims that art play a direct social role. The reception of courtly art also remains
collective, although the content of the collective performance has changed. As
regards reception, it is only with bourgeois art that a decisive change sets in: its
reception is one by isolated individuals. The novel is that literary genre in which
the new mode of reception finds the form appropriate to it.2 The advent of
bourgeois art is also the decisive turning point as regards use or function.
Although in different ways, both sacral and courtly art are integral to the life
praxis of the recipient. As cult and representational objects, works of art are put
to a specific use. This requirement no longer applies to the same extent to
bourgeois art. In bourgeois art, the portrayal of bourgeois self-understanding
occurs in a sphere that lies outside the praxis of life. The citizen who, in everyday
life, has been reduced to a partial function (means-ends activity) can be
discovered in art as ‘human being’. Here, one can unfold the abundance of one’s
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talents, though with the proviso that this sphere remain strictly separate from
the praxis of life. Seen in this fashion, the separation of art from the praxis of life
becomes the decisive characteristic of the autonomy of bourgeois art (a fact that
the tabulation does not bring out adequately). To avoid misunderstandings, it
must be emphasized once again that autonomy in this sense defines the status
of art in bourgeois society but that no assertions concerning the contents of
works are involved. Although art as an institution may be considered fully
formed towards the end of the eighteenth century, the development of the
contents of works is subject to a historical dynamics, whose terminal point is
reached in Aestheticism, where art becomes the content of art.
The European avant-garde movements can be defined as an attack on the
status of art in bourgeois society. What is negated is not an earlier form of art (a
style) but art as an institution that is unassociated with the life praxis of men.
When the avant-gardistes demand that art become practical once again, they do
not mean that the contents of works of art should be socially significant. The
demand is not raised at the level of the contents of individual works. Rather, it
directs itself to the way art functions in society, a process that does as much to
determine the effect that works have as does the particular content.
The avant-gardistes view its dissociation from the praxis of life as the
dominant characteristic of art in bourgeois society. One of the reasons this
dissociation was possible is that Aestheticism had made the element that
defines art as an institution the essential content of works. Institution and work
contents had to coincide to make it logically possible for the avant-garde to call
art into question. The avant-gardistes proposed the sublation of art – sublation
in the Hegelian sense of the term: art was not to be simply destroyed, but
transferred to the praxis of life where it would be preserved, albeit in a changed
form. The avant-gardistes thus adopted an essential element of Aestheticism.
Aestheticism had made the distance from the praxis of life the content of works.
The praxis of life to which Aestheticism refers and which it negates is the meansends rationality of the bourgeois everyday. Now, it is not the aim of the avantgardistes to integrate art into this praxis. On the contrary, they assent to the
aestheticists’ rejection of the world and its means-ends rationality. What
distinguishes them from the latter is the attempt to organize a new life praxis
from a basis in art. In this respect also, Aestheticism turns out to have been the
necessary precondition of the avant-gardiste intent. Only an art the contents of
whose individual works is wholly distinct from the (bad) praxis of the existing
society can be the centre that can be the starting point for the organization of a
new life praxis.
With the help of Herbert Marcuse’s theoretical formulation concerning the
twofold character of art in bourgeois society, the avant-gardiste intent can be
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understood with particular clarity. All those needs that cannot be satisfied in
everyday life, because the principle of competition pervades all spheres, can find
a home in art, because art is removed from the praxis of life. Values such as
humanity, joy, truth, solidarity are extruded from life, as it were, and preserved
in art. In bourgeois society, art has a contradictory role: it projects the image of
a better order and to that extent protests against the bad order that prevails. But
by realizing the image of a better order in fiction, which is semblance (Schein)
only, it relieves the existing society of the pressure of those forces that make for
change. They are assigned to confinement in an ideal sphere. Where art
accomplishes this, it is ‘affirmative’ in Marcuse’s sense of the term. If the twofold
character of art in bourgeois society consists in the fact that the distance from
the social production and reproduction process contains an element of freedom
and an element of the noncommittal and an absence of any consequences, it can
be seen that the avant-gardistes’ attempt to reintegrate art into the life process
is itself a profoundly contradictory endeavour. For the (relative) freedom of art
vis-a-vis the praxis of life is at the same time the condition that must be fulfilled
if there is to be a critical cognition of reality. An art no longer distinct from the
praxis of life but wholly absorbed in it will lose the capacity to criticize it, along
with its distance. During the time of the historical avant-garde movements, the
attempt to do away with the distance between art and life still had all the pathos
of historical progressiveness on its side. But in the meantime, the culture
industry has brought about the false elimination of the distance between art and
life, and this also allows one to recognize the contradictoriness of the avantgardiste undertaking.3
In what follows, we will outline how the intent to eliminate art as an
institution found expression in the three areas that we used above to
characterize autonomous art: purpose or function, production, reception.
Instead of speaking of the avant-gardiste work, we will speak of avant-gardiste
manifestation. A dadaist manifestation does not have work character but is
nonetheless an authentic manifestation of the artistic avant-garde. This is not to
imply that the avant-gardistes produced no works whatever and replaced them
by ephemeral events. We will see that whereas they did not destroy it, the avantgardistes profoundly modified the category of the work of art.
Of the three areas, the intended purpose or function of the avant-gardiste
manifestation is most difficult to define. In the aestheticist work of art, the
disjointure of the work and the praxis of life characteristic of the status of art in
bourgeois society has become the work’s essential content. It is only as a
consequence of this fact that the work of art becomes its own end in the full
meaning of the term. In Aestheticism, the social functionlessness of art becomes
manifest. The avant-gardiste artists counter such functionlessness not by an art
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that would have consequences within the existing society, but rather by the
principle of the sublation of art in the praxis of life. But such a conception makes
it impossible to define the intended purpose of art. For an art that has been
reintegrated into the praxis of life, not even the absence of a social purpose can
be indicated, as was still possible in Aestheticism. When art and the praxis of life
are one, when the praxis is aesthetic and art is practical, art’s purpose can no
longer be discovered, because the existence of two distinct spheres (art and the
praxis of life) that is constitutive of the concept of purpose or intended use has
come to an end.
We have seen that the production of the autonomous work of art is the act of
an individual. The artist produces as individual, individuality not being
understood as the expression of something but as radically different. The
concept of genius testifies to this. The quasi-technical consciousness of the
makeability of works of art that Aestheticism attains seems only to contradict
this. Valéry, for example, demystifies artistic genius by reducing it to
psychological motivations on the one hand, and the availability to it of artistic
means on the other. While pseudo-romantic doctrines of inspiration thus come
to be seen as the self-deception of producers, the view of art for which the
individual is the creative subject is let stand. Indeed, Valéry’s theorem
concerning the force of pride (orgueil) that sets off and propels the creative
process renews once again the notion of the individual character of artistic
production central to art in bourgeois society.4 In its most extreme
manifestations, the avant-garde’s reply to this is not the collective as the subject
of production but the radical negation of the category of individual creation.
When Duchamp signs mass-produced objects (a urinal, a bottle drier) and sends
them to art exhibits, he negates the category of individual production. The
signature, whose very purpose it is to mark what is individual in the work, that
it owes its existence to this particular artist, is inscribed on an arbitrarily chosen
mass product, because all claims to individual creativity are to be mocked.
Duchamp’s provocation not only unmasks the art market where the signature
means more than the quality of the work; it radically questions the very
principle of art in bourgeois society according to which the individual is
considered the creator of the work of art. Duchamp’s Readymades are not works
of art but manifestations. Not from the form-content totality of the individual
object Duchamp signs can one infer the meaning, but only from the contrast
between mass-produced object on the one hand, and signature and art exhibit
on the other. It is obvious that this kind of provocation cannot be repeated
indefinitely. The provocation depends on what it turns against: here, it is the
idea that the individual is the subject of artistic creation. Once the signed bottle
drier has been accepted as an object that deserves a place in a museum, the
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provocation no longer provokes; it turns into its opposite. If an artist today signs
a stove pipe and exhibits it, that artist certainly does not denounce the art
market but adapts to it. Such adaptation does not eradicate the idea of individual
creativity, it affirms it, and the reason is the failure of the avant-gardiste intent
to sublate art. Since now the protest of the historical avant-garde against art as
institution is accepted as art, the gesture of protest of the neo-avant-garde
becomes inauthentic. Having been shown to be irredeemable, the claim to be
protest can no longer be maintained. This fact accounts for the arts-and-crafts
impression that works of the avant-garde not infrequently convey.5
The avant-garde not only negates the category of individual production but
also that of individual reception. The reactions of the public during a dada
manifestation where it has been mobilized by provocation, and which can range
from shouting to fisticuffs, are certainly collective in nature. True, these remain
reactions, responses to a preceding provocation. Producer and recipient remain
clearly distinct, however active the public may become. Given the avant-gardiste
intention to do away with art as a sphere that is separate from the praxis of life,
it is logical to eliminate the antithesis between producer and recipient. It is no
accident that both Tzara’s instructions for the making of a Dadaist poem and
Breton’s for the writing of automatic texts have the character of recipes.6 This
represents not only a polemical attack on the individual creativity of the artist;
the recipe is to be taken quite literally as suggesting a possible activity on the
part of the recipient. The automatic texts also should be read as guides to
individual production. But such production is not to be understood as artistic
production, but as part of a liberating life praxis. This is what is meant by
Breton’s demand that poetry be practiced (pratiquer la poésie). Beyond the
coincidence of producer and recipient that this demand implies, there is the fact
that these concepts lose their meaning: producers and recipients no longer exist.
All that remains is the individual who uses poetry as an instrument for living
one’s life as best one can. There is also a danger here to which Surrealism at least
partly succumbed, and that is solipsism, the retreat to the problems of the
isolated subject. Breton himself saw this danger and envisaged different ways of
dealing with it. One of them was the glorification of the spontaneity of the erotic
relationship. Perhaps the strict group discipline was also an attempt to exorcise
the danger of solipsism that surrealism harbours.7
In summary, we note that the historical avant-garde movements negate
those determinations that are essential in autonomous art: the disjunction of art
and the praxis of life, individual production, and individual reception as distinct
from the former. The avant-garde intends the abolition of autonomous art, by
which it means that art is to be integrated into the praxis of life. This has not
occurred, and presumably cannot occur, in bourgeois society unless it be as a
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false sublation of autonomous art.8 Pulp fiction and commodity aesthetics prove
that such a false sublation exists. A literature whose primary aim it is to impose
a particular kind of consumer behaviour on the reader is in fact practical, though
not in the sense the avant-gardistes intended. Here, literature ceases to be an
instrument of emancipation and becomes one of subjection.9 Similar comments
could be made about commodity aesthetics that treat form as mere enticement,
designed to prompt purchasers to buy what they do not need. Here also, art
becomes practical but it is an art that enthralls.10 This brief allusion will show
that the theory of the avant-garde can also serve to make us understand popular
literature and commodity aesthetics as forms of a false sublation of art as
institution. In late capitalist society, intentions of the historical avant-garde are
being realized but the result has been a disvalue. Given the experience of the
false sublation of autonomy, one will need to ask whether a sublation of the
autonomy status can be desirable at all, whether the distance between art and
the praxis of life is not requisite for that free space within which alternatives to
what exists become conceivable.

form, connected to the skill and the intensive search for the suitable form – those are the things
the slogan “art for all” should mean.’ (S. Tretjakov, ‘Die Kunst in der Revolution and die
Revolution in der Kunst’, in Tretjakov, Die Arbeit des Schriftstellers, ed. H. Boehncke (Reinbek bei
Hamburg: Rowohit, 1971) 13. ‘Basing himself on the technique which is common to all spheres
of life, the artist is imbued with the idea of suitability. It is not by subjective taste that he will
allow himself to be guided as he works on his material but by the objective tasks of production’
(B. Arvatov, ‘Die Kunst im System der proletarischen Kultur’, in Arvatov, Kunst und Produktion,
15). With the theory of the avant-garde as a point of departure, and with concrete investigations
as guide, one should also discuss the problem of the extent (and of the kinds of consequences
for the artistic subjects) to which art as an institution occupies a place in the society of the
socialist countries that differs from its place in bourgeois society.
9

[22] See Christa Bürger, Textanalyse als Ideologiekritik. Zur Rezeption witgen ossischer
Unterhaltungsliteratur (Frankfurt: Athenaum, 1973).

10 [23] See W.F. Haug, Kritik der Warendsthetik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971).

Peter Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974); trans. Michael
Shaw, Theory of the Avant-garde (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984) 47–54.

1

[footnote 14 in source] On this, see the essay by R. Warning, ‘Ritus, Mythos und geistliches Spiel’,
in Terror und Spiel. Probleme der Mythenrezeption, ed. Fuhrmann (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag,
1971) 211–39.

2

[15] Hegel already referred to the novel as ‘the modern middle-class epic’ (Asthetik, ed. F.
Bassenge, vol. II [Berlin/Weimar, 1965] 452.)

3

[16] On the problem of the false sublation of art in the praxis of life, see J. Habermas,
Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft
(Neuwied/Berlin, 1968) § 18, 176 ff.

4

[17] See P. Bürger, ‘Funktion und Bedeutung des orgueil bei Paul Valéry’, in Romanistisches
Jahrbuch, 16 (1965) 149–68.

5

[18] Examples of neo-avant-gardiste paintings and sculptures to be found in the catalogue of the
exhibit Sammlung Cremer. Europäische Avantgarde 1950–1970, ed. G. Adriani (Tubingen, 1973).

6

[19] Tristan Tzara, ‘Pour faire un poème dadaiste’, in Tzara, Lampisteries précédées des sept
manifestos dada (place of publication not given, 1963) 64. André Breton, ‘Manifeste du
surréalisme’ (1924), in Breton, Manifestos du surréalisme (Paris: Coll. Idées 23, 1963) 42 f.

7

[20] On the Surrealists’ conception of groups and the collective experiences they sought and
partially realized, see Elisabeth Lenk, Der springende Narziss. André Breton’s poetischer
Materialismus (Munich, 1971) 57 ff., 73 f.

8

[21] One would have to investigate to what extent, after the October revolution, the Russian
avant-gardistes succeeded to a degree, because social conditions had changed, in realizing their
intent to reintegrate art in the praxis of life. Both B. Arvatov and S. Tretjakov turn the concept of
art as developed in bourgeois society around and define art quite straightforwardly as socially
useful activity: ‘The pleasure of transforming the raw material into a particular, socially useful
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Jean-Luc Nancy
The Inoperative Community//1986

A number of post-Marxist theories of community emerged in the 1980s. French
philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy, writing in a Heideggerian and Derridean tradition,
argues for an understanding of community founded not on the immanence of
individuals being-in-common, but on an ‘unworking’ (désoeuvrement) of
togetherness brought about by that which presents a limit to community – that
is, death. Nancy’s complex text has been referenced by a number of writers on
participatory art (George Baker, Miwon Kwon, Pamela M. Lee, Jessica Morgan).
The gravest and most painful testimony of the modern world, the one that
possibly involves all other testimonies to which this epoch must answer (by
virtue of some unknown decree or necessity, for we bear witness also to the
exhaustion of thinking through History), is the testimony of the dissolution, the
dislocation, or the conflagration of community. Communism, as Sartre said, is
‘the unsurpassable horizon of our time’, and it is so in many senses – political,
ideological and strategic. But not least important among these senses is the
following consideration, quite foreign to Sartre’s intentions: the word
‘communism’ stands as an emblem of the desire to discover or rediscover a place
of community at once beyond social divisions and beyond subordination to
technopolitical dominion, and thereby beyond such wasting away of liberty, of
speech or of simple happiness as comes about whenever these become
subjugated to the exclusive order of privatization; and finally, more simply and
even more decisively, a place from which to surmount the unravelling that
occurs with the death of each one of us – that death that, when no longer
anything more than the death of the individual, carries an unbearable burden
and collapses into insignificance.
More or less consciously, more or less deliberately, and more or less
politically, the word ‘communism’ has constituted such an emblem – which no
doubt amounted to something other than a concept, and even something other
than the meaning of a word. This emblem is no longer in circulation, except in a
belated way for a few; for still others, though very rare nowadays, it is an
emblem capable of inferring a fierce but impotent resistance to the visible
collapse of what it promised. If it is no longer in circulation, this is not only
because the States that acclaimed it have appeared, for some time now, as the
agents of its betrayal. (Bataille in 1933: ‘The Revolution’s minimal hope has been
described as the decline of the State: but it is in fact the revolutionary forces that
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the present world is seeing perish and, at the same time, every vital force today
1
has assumed the form of the totalitarian State’) The schema of betrayal, aimed
at preserving an originary communist purity of doctrine or intention, has come
to be seen as less and less tenable. Not that totalitarianism was already present,
as such, in Marx: this would be a crude proposition, one that remains ignorant
of the strident protest against the destruction of community that in Marx
continuously parallels the Hegelian attempt to bring about a totality, and that
thwarts or displaces this attempt.
But the schema of betrayal is seen to be untenable in that it was the very
basis of the communist ideal that ended up appearing most problematic:
namely, human beings defined as producers (one might even add: human beings
defined at all), and fundamentally as the producers of their own essence in the
form of their labour or their work.
That the justice and freedom – and the equality – included in the communist
idea or ideal have in effect been betrayed in so-called real communism is
something at once laden with the burden of an intolerable suffering (along with
other, no less intolerable forms of suffering inflicted by our liberal societies) and
at the same time politically decisive (not only in that a political strategy must
favour resistance to this betrayal, but because this strategy, as well as our
thought in general, must reckon with the possibility that an entire society has
been forged, docilely and despite more than one forum of revolt, in the mould of
this betrayal – or more plainly, at the mercy of this abandonment: this would be
Zinoviev’s question, rather than, Solzhenitsyn’s). But these burdens are still
perhaps only relative compared with the absolute weight that crushes or blocks
all our ‘horizons’: there is, namely, no form of communist opposition – or let us
say rather ‘communitarian’ opposition, in order to emphasize that the word
should not be restricted in this context to strictly political references – that has
not been or is not still profoundly subjugated to the goal of a human community,
that is, to the goal of achieving a community of beings producing in essence
their own essence as their work, and furthermore producing precisely this
essence as community. An absolute immanence of man to man – a humanism –
and of community to community – a communism – obstinately subtends,
whatever be their merits or strengths, all forms of oppositional communism, all
leftist and ultraleftist models, and all models based on the workers’ council.2 In
a sense, all ventures adopting a communitarian opposition to ‘real communism’
have by now run their course or been abandoned, but everything continues
along its way as though, beyond these ventures, it were no longer even a
question of thinking about community.
Yet it is precisely the immanence of man to man, or it is man, taken
absolutely, considered as the immanent being par excellence, that constitutes
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the stumbling block to thinking of community. A community presupposed as
having to be one of human beings presupposes that it effect, or that it must effect,
as such and integrally, its own essence, which is itself the accomplishment of the
essence of humanness. (‘What can be fashioned by man? Everything. Nature,
human society, humanity’, wrote Herder. We are stubbornly bound to this
regulative idea, even when we consider that this ‘fashioning’ is itself only a
‘regulative idea’.) Consequently, economic ties, technological operations and
political fusion (into a body or under a leader) represent or rather present,
expose and realize this essence necessarily in themselves. Essence is set to work
in them; through them, it becomes its own work. This is what we have called
‘totalitarianism’, but it might be better named ‘immanentism’, as long as we do
not restrict the term to ‘designating certain types of societies or regimes but
rather see in it the general horizon of our time, encompassing both democracies
and their fragile juridical parapets.
Is it really necessary to say something about the individual here? Some see in its
invention and in the culture, if not in the cult built around the individual,
Europe’s incontrovertible merit of having shown the world the sole path to
emancipation from tyranny, and the norm by which to measure all our collective
or communitarian undertakings. But the individual is merely the residue of the
experience of the dissolution of community. By its nature – as its name
indicates, it is the atom, the indivisible – the individual reveals that it is the
abstract result of a decomposition. It is another, and symmetrical, figure of
immanence: the absolutely detached for-itself, taken as origin and as certainty.
But the experience through which this individual has passed, since Hegel at
least, (and through which he passes, it must be confessed, with staggering
opinionatedness) is simply the experience of this: that the individual can be the
origin and the certainty of nothing but its own death. And once immortality has
passed into its works, an operative immortality remains its own alienation and
renders its death still more strange than the irremediable strangeness that it
already ‘is’.
Still, one cannot make a world with simple atoms. There has to be a clinamen.
There has to be an inclination or an inclining from one towards the other, of one
by the other, or from one to the other. Community is at least the clinamen of the
‘individual’. Yet there is no theory, ethics, politics or metaphysics of the
individual that is capable ‘of envisaging this clinamen, this declination or decline
of the individual within community. Neither ‘Personalism’ nor Sartre ever
managed to do anything more than coat the most classical individual-subject
with a moral or sociological paste: they never inclined it, outside itself, over that
edge that opens up its being-in-common.
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An inconsequential atomism, individualism tends to forget that the atom is a
world. This is why the question of community is so markedly absent from the
metaphysics of the subject, that is to say, from the metaphysics of the absolute
for-itself – be it in the form of the individual or the total State – which means
also the metaphysics of the absolute in general, of being as absolute, as perfectly
detached, distinct and closed: being without relation. This absolute can appear
in the form of the Idea, History, the Individual, the State, Science, the Work of
Art, and so on. Its logic will always be the same in as much as it is without
relation. A simple and redoubtable logic will always imply that within its very
separation the absolutely separate encloses, if we can say this, more than what
is simply separated. Which is to say that the separation itself must be enclosed,
that the closure must not only close around a territory (while still remaining
exposed, at its outer edge, to another territory, with which it thereby
communicates), but also, in order to complete the absoluteness of its separation,
around the enclosure itself. The absolute must be the absolute of its own
absoluteness, or not be at all. In other words: to be absolutely alone, it is not
enough that I be so; I must also be alone being alone – and this of course is
contradictory. The logic of the absolute violates the absolute. It implicates it in a
relation that it refuses and precludes by its essence. This relation tears and forces
open, from within and from without at the same time, and from an outside that
is nothing other than the rejection of an impossible interiority, the ‘without
relation’ from which the absolute would constitute itself.
Excluded by the logic of the absolute subject of metaphysics (Self, Will, Life,
Spirit, etc.), community comes perforce to cut into this subject by virtue of this
same logic. The logic of the absolute sets it in relation: but this, obviously, cannot
make for a relation between two or several absolutes, no more than it can make
an absolute of the relation. It undoes the absoluteness of the absolute. The
relation (the community) is, if it is, nothing other than what undoes, in its very
principle – and at its closure or on its limit – the autarchy of absolute
immanence. […]
The solidarity of the individual with communism at the heart of a thinking of
immanence, while neglecting ecstasy, does not however entail a simple
symmetry. Communism – as, for example, in the generous exuberance that will
not let Marx conclude without pointing to a reign of freedom, one beyond the
collective regulation of necessity, in which surplus work would no longer be an
exploitative work, but rather art and invention – communicates with an
extremity of play, of sovereignty, even of ecstasy from which the individual as
such remains definitively removed. But this link has remained distant, secret,
and most often unknown to communism itself (let us say, to lend concreteness,

Nancy//The Inoperative Community//57

Particip-05-09-06

7/9/06

11:33

Page 58

unknown to Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky), except in the fulgurating bursts of poetry,
painting and cinema at the very beginning of the Soviet revolution, or the motifs
that Benjamin allowed as reasons for calling oneself a Marxist, or what Blanchot
tried to bring across or propose (rather than signify) with the word
‘communism’ (‘Communism: that which excludes [and excludes itself from]
every community already constituted’).3 But again even this proposal in the final
analysis went unrecognized, not only by ‘real’ communism, but also, on close
inspection, by those singular ‘communists’ themselves, who were perhaps never
able to recognize (until now at least) either where the metaphor (or the
hyperbole) began and ended in the usage they made of the word, or, especially,
what other trope – supposing it were necessary to change words – or what
effacement of tropes might have been appropriate to reveal what haunted their
use of the word ‘communism’.
By the usage to which this word was put, they were able to communicate
with a thinking of art, of literature, and of thought itself – other figures or other
exigencies of ecstasy – but they were not truly able to communicate, explicitly
and thematically (even if ‘explicit’ and ‘thematic’ are only very fragile categories
here), with a thinking of community. Or rather, their communication with such
a thinking has remained secret, or suspended.
The ethics, the politics, the philosophies of community, when there were any
(and there always are, even if they are reduced to chatter about fraternity or to
laborious constructions around ‘intersubjectivity’), have pursued their paths or
their humanist dead ends without suspecting for an instant that these singular
voices were speaking about community and were perhaps speaking about
nothing else, without suspecting that what was taken for a ‘literary’ or ‘aesthetic’
experience was entrenched in the ordeal of community, was at grips with it. (Do
we need to be reminded, to take a further example, what Barthes’ first writings
were about, and some of the later ones as well?)
Subsequently, these same voices that were unable to communicate what,
perhaps without knowing it, they were saying, were exploited – and covered up
again – by clamorous declarations brandishing the flag of the ‘cultural
revolutions’ and by all kinds of ‘communist writing’ or ‘proletarian inscriptions’.
The professionals of society saw in them (and not without reason, even if their
view was shortsighted) nothing more than a bourgeois Parisian or Berliner form
of Proletkult, or else merely the unconscious return of a ‘republic of artists’, the
concept of which had been inaugurated two hundred years earlier by the Jena
romantics. In one way or another, it was a matter of a simple, classical and
dogmatic system of truth: an art: (or a thought) adequate to politics (to the form
or the description of community), a politics adequate to art. The basic
presupposition remained that of a community effectuating itself in the absolute
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of the work, or effectuating itself as work. For this reason, and whatever it may
have claimed for itself, this ‘modernity’ remained in its principle a humanism.
We will have to return to the question of what brought about – albeit at the
cost of a certain naïveté or misconception – the exigency of a literary4 experience
of community or communism. This is even, in a sense, the only question. But the
terms of this question all need to be transformed, to be put back into play in a
space that would be distributed quite differently from one composed of all-toofacile relations (for example, solitude of the writer/collectivity, or
culture/society, or elite/masses – whether these relations be proposed as
oppositions, or, in the spirit of the ‘cultural revolutions’, as equations). And for
this to happen, the question of community must first of all be put back into play,
for the necessary redistribution of space depends upon it. Before getting to this,
and without rescinding any of the resistant generosity or the active restlessness
of the word ‘communism’ and without denying anything of the excesses to
which it can lead, but also without forgetting either the burdensome mortgage
that comes along with it or the usury it has (not accidentally) suffered, we must
allow that communism can no longer be the unsurpassable horizon of our time.
And if in fact it no longer is such a horizon, this is not because we have passed
beyond any horizon. Rather, everything is inflected by resignation, as if the new
unsurpassable horizon took form around the disappearance, the impossibility,
or the condemnation of communism. Such reversals are customary; they have
never altered anything. It is the horizons themselves that must be challenged.
The ultimate limit of community, or the limit that is formed by community, as
such, traces an entirely different line. This is why, even as we establish that
communism is no longer our unsurpassable horizon, we must also establish, just
as forcefully, that a communist exigency or demand communicates with the
gesture by means of which we must go farther than all possible horizons.
The first task in understanding what is at stake here consists in focusing on the
horizon behind us. This means questioning the breakdown in community that
supposedly engendered the modern era. The consciousness of this ordeal
belongs to Rousseau, who figured a society that experienced or acknowledged
the loss or degradation of a communitarian (and communicative) intimacy – a
society producing, of necessity, the solitary figure, but one whose desire and
intention was to produce the citizen of a free sovereign community. Whereas
political theoreticians preceding him had thought mainly in terms of the
institution of a State, or the regulation of a society, Rousseau, although he
borrowed a great deal from them, was perhaps the first thinker of community,
or more exactly, the first to experience the question of society as an uneasiness
directed towards the community, and as the consciousness of a (perhaps
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irreparable) rupture in this community. This consciousness would subsequently
be inherited by the Romantics, and by Hegel in The Phenomenology of Spirit: the
last figure of spirit, before the assumption of all the figures and of history into
absolute knowledge, is that which cleaves community (which for Hegel figures
the split in religion). Until this day history has been thought on the basis of a lost
community – one to be regained or reconstituted.
The lost, or broken, community can be exemplified in all kinds of ways, by all
kinds of paradigms: the natural family, the Athenian city, the Roman Republic,
the first Christian community, corporations, communes or brotherhoods –
always it is a matter of a lost age in which community was woven of tight,
harmonious and infrangible bonds and in which above all it played back to itself,
through its institutions, its rituals and its symbols, the representation, indeed
the living offering, of its own immanent unity, intimacy and autonomy. Distinct
from society (which is a simple association and division of forces and needs) and
opposed to empire (which dissolves community by submitting its peoples to its
arms and to its glory), community is not only intimate communication between
its members, but also its organic communion with its own essence. It is
constituted not only by a fair distribution of tasks and goods, or by a happy
equilibrium of forces and authorities: it is made up principally of the sharing,
diffusion or impregnation of an identity by a plurality wherein each member
identifies himself only through the supplementary mediation of his
identification with the living body of the community. In the motto of the
Republic, fraternity designates community: the model of the family and of love.
But it is here that we should become suspicious of the retrospective
consciousness of the lost community and its identity (whether this
consciousness conceives of itself as effectively retrospective or whether,
disregarding the realities of the past, it constructs images of this past for the sake
of an ideal or a prospective vision). We should be suspicious of this
consciousness first of all because it seems to have accompanied the Western
world from its very beginnings: at every moment in its history, the Occident has
given itself over to the nostalgia for a more archaic community that has
disappeared, and to deploring a loss of familiarity, fraternity and conviviality.
Our history begins with the departure of Ulysses and with the onset of rivalry,
dissension and conspiracy in his palace. Around Penelope, who reweaves the
fabric of intimacy without ever managing to complete it, pretenders set up the
warring and political scene of society – pure exteriority.
But the true consciousnesss of the loss of community is Christian: the
community desired or pined for by Rousseau, Schlegel, Hegel, then Bakunin,
Marx, Wagner or Mallarmé is understood as communion, and communion takes
place, in its principle as in its ends, at the heart of the mystical body of Christ. At
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the same time as it is the most ancient myth of the Western world, community
might well be the altogether modern thought of humanity’s partaking of divine
life: the thought of a human being penetrating into pure immanence.
(Christianity has had only two dimensions, antinomical to one another; that of
the deus absconditus, in which the Western disappearance of the divine is still
engulfed, and that of the god-man, deus communis, brother of humankind,
invention of a familial immanence of humanity, then of history as the
immanence of salvation.)
Thus, the thought of community or the desire for it might well be nothing
other than a belated invention that tried to respond to the harsh reality of
modern experience: namely, that divinity was withdrawing infinitely from
immanence, that the god-brother was at bottom himself the deus absconditus
(this was Hölderlin’s insight), and that the divine essence of community – or
community as the existence of a divine essence – was the impossible itself. One
name for this has been the death of God: this expression remains pregnant with
the possibility if not the necessity of a resurrection that restores both man and
God to a common immanence. (Not only Hegel, but also Nietzsche himself, at
least in part, bear witness to this.) The discourse of the ‘death of God’ also misses
the point that the ‘divine’ is what it is (if it ‘is’) only in as much as it is removed
from immanence, or withdrawn from it – within it, one might say, yet
withdrawn from it: And this, moreover, occurs in the very precise sense that it is
not because there is a ‘divine’ that its share would be subtracted from immanence, but on the contrary, it is only to the extent that immanence itself, here or
there (but is it localizable? Is it not rather this that localizes, that spaces?), is
subtracted from immanence that there can be something like the ‘divine’. (And
perhaps, in the end, it will no longer be necessary to speak of the ‘divine’.
Perhaps we will come to see that community, death, love, freedom, singularity
are names for the ‘divine’ not just because they substitute for it – and neither
sublate nor resuscitate it under another form – but equally because this
substitution is in no way anthropomorphic or anthropocentric and gives way to
no becoming-human of the ‘divine’. Community henceforth constitutes the limit
of the human as well as of the divine. Through God or the gods communion – as
substance and act, the act of communicated immanent substance – has been
definitively withdrawn from community.)
The modern, humanist Christian consciousness of the loss of community
therefore gives every apearance of recuperating the transcendental illusion of
reason when reason exceeds the bounds of all possible experience, which is
basically the experience of concealed immanence. Community has not taken
place, or rather, if it is indeed certain that humanity has known (or still knows,
outside of the industrial world) social ties quite different from those familiar to

Nancy//The Inoperative Community//61

Particip-05-09-06

7/9/06

11:33

Page 62

us, community has never taken place along the lines of our projections of it
according to these different social forms. It did not take place for the Guayaqui
Indians, it did not take place in an age of huts; nor did it take place in the
Hegelian ‘spirit of a people’ or in the Christian agape. No Gesellschaft has come
along to help the State, industry and capital dissolve a prior Gemeinschaft. It
would undoubtedly be more accurate to say, bypassing all the twists and turns
taken by ethnological interpretation and all the mirages of an origin or of
‘bygone days’, that Gesellschaft – ‘society’, the dissociating association of forces,
needs and signs – has taken the place of something for which we have no name
or concept, something that issued at once from a much more extensive communication than that of a mere social bond (a communication with the gods, the
cosmos, animals, the dead, the unknown) and from much more piercing and
dispersed segmentation of this same bond, often involving much harsher effects
(solitude, rejection, admonition, helplessness) than what we expect from a
communitarian minimum in the social bond. Society was not built on the ruins
of a community. It emerged from the disappearance or the conservation of
something – tribes or empires – perhaps just as unrelated to what we call
‘community’ as to what we call ‘society’. So that community, far from being what
society has crushed or lost, is what happens to us – question, waiting, event,
imperative – in the wake of society.
Nothing, therefore, has been lost, and for this reason nothing is lost. We alone
are lost, we upon whom the ‘social bond’ (relations, communication), our own
invention, now descends heavily like the net of an economic, technical, political
and cultural snare. Entangled in its meshes, we have wrung for ourselves the
phantasm of the lost community.
What this community has ‘lost’ – the immanence and the intimacy of a
communion – is lost only in the sense that such a ‘loss’ is constitutive of
‘community’ itself.
It is not a loss: on the contrary, immanence, if it were to come about, would
instantly suppress community, or communication, as such. Death is not only the
example of this, it is its truth. In death, at least if one considers in it what brings
about immanence (decomposition leading back to nature – ‘everything returns
to the ground and becomes part of the cycle’ – or else the paradisal versions of
the same ‘cycle’) and if one forgets what makes it always irreducibly singular,
there is no longer any community or communication: there is only the
continuous identity of atoms.
This is why political or collective enterprises dominated by a will to absolute
immanence have as their truth the truth of death. Immanence, communal
fusion, contains no other logic than that of the suicide of the community that is
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governed by it. Thus the logic of Nazi Germany was not only that of the
extermination of the other, of the subhuman deemed exterior to the communion
of blood and soil, but also, effectively, the logic of sacrifice aimed at all those in
the ‘Aryan’ community who did not satisfy the criteria of pure immanence, so
much so that – it being obviously impossible to set a limit on such criteria – the
suicide of the German nation itself might have represented a plausible
extrapolation of the process: moreover, it would not be false to say that this really
took place, with regard to certain aspects of the spiritual reality of this nation.
The joint suicide or death of lovers is one of the mythico-literary figures of
this logic of communion in immanence. Faced with this figure, one cannot tell
which – the communion or the love – serves as a model for the other in death.
In reality, with the immanence of the two lovers, death accomplishes the infinite
reciprocity of two agencies: impassioned love conceived on the basis of
Christian communion, and community thought according to the principle of
love. The Hegelian State in its turn bears witness to this, for although it certainly
is not established on the basis of love – for it belongs to the sphere of so-called
objective spirit – it nonetheless has as its principle the reality of love, that is to
say the fact ‘of having in another the moment of one’s own subsistence’. In this
State, each member has his truth in the other, which is the State itself, whose
reality is never more present than when its members give their lives in a war
that the monarch – the effective presence-to-self of the Subject-State – has
alone and freely decided to wage.5
Doubtless such immolation for the sake of community – and by it, therefore
– could and can be full of meaning, on the condition that this ‘meaning’ be that
of a community, and on the further condition that this community not be a
‘community of death’ (as has been the case since at least the First World War,
thereby justifying all refusals to ‘die for one’s country’). Now the community of
human immanence, man made equal to himself or to God, to nature, and to his
own works, is one such community of deaths – or of the dead. The fully realized
person of individualistic or communistic humanism is the dead person. In other
words, death, in such a community, is not the unmasterable excess of finitude,
but the infinite fulfilment of an immanent life: it is death itself consigned to
immanence; it is in the end that resorption of death that the Christian
civilization, as though devouring its own transcendence, has come to minister to
itself in the guise of a supreme work. Since Leibniz there has been no death in
our universe: in one way or another an absolute circulation of meaning (of
values, of ends, of History) fills or reabsorbs all finite negativity, draws from each
finite singular destiny a surplus value of humanity or an infinite superhumanity.
But this presupposes, precisely, the death of each and all in the life of the infinite.
Generations of citizens and militants, of workers and servants of the States,
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have imagined their death reabsorbed or sublated in a community, yet to come,
that would attain immanence. But by now we have nothing more than the bitter
consciousness of the increasing remoteness of such a community, be it the
people, the nation or the society of producers. However, this consciousness, like
that of the ‘loss’ of community, is superficial. In truth, death is not sublated. The
communion to come does not grow distant, it is not deferred: it was never to
come; it would be incapable of coming about or forming a future. What forms a
future, and consequently what truly comes about, is always the singular death –
which does not mean that death does not come about in the community: on the
contrary, I shall come to this. But communion is not what comes of death, no
more than death is the simple perpetual past of community.
Millions of deaths, of course, are justified by the revolt of those who die: they
are justified as a rejoinder to the intolerable, as insurrections against social,
political, technical, military, religious oppression. But these deaths are not
sublated: no dialectic, no salvation leads these deaths to any other immanence
than that of … death (cessation, or decomposition, which forms only the parody
or reverse of immanence). Yet the modern age has conceived the justification of
death only in the guise of salvation or the dialectical sublation of history. The
modern age has struggled to close the circle of the time of men and their
communities in an immortal communion in which death, finally, loses the
senseless meaning that it ought to have – and that it has, obstinately.
We are condemned, or rather reduced, to search for this meaning beyond
meaning of death elsewhere than in community. But the enterprise is absurd (it
is the absurdity of a thought derived from the individual). Death is indissociable
from community, for it is through death that the community reveals itself – and
reciprocally. It is not by chance that this motif of a reciprocal revelation has
preoccupied thought informed by ethnology as well as the thinking of Freud and
Heidegger, and at the same time Bataille, that is to say in the time leading from
the First to the Second World War.
The motif of the revelation, through death, of being-together or being-with,
and of the crystallization of the community around the death of its members,
that is to say, around the ‘loss’ (the impossibility) of their immanence and not
around their fusional assumption in some collective hypostasis, leads to a space
of thinking incommensurable with the problematics of sociality or
intersubjectivity (including the Husserlian problematic of the alter ego) within
which philosophy, despite its resistance, has remained captive. Death
irremediably exceeds the resources of a metaphysics of the subject. The
phantasm of this metaphysics, the phantasm that Descartes (almost) did not
dare have but that was already proposed in Christian theology, is the phantasm
of a dead man who says, like Villiers’ Monsieur Waldemar, ‘I am dead’ – ego sum
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… mortuus. If the I cannot say that it is dead, if the I disappears, in effect in its
death, in that death that is precisely what is most proper to it and most
inalienably its own, it is because the I is something other than a subject. All of
Heidegger’s research into ‘being-for (or toward)-death’ was nothing other than
an attempt to state this: I is not – am not – a subject. (Although, when it came to
the question of community as such, the same Heidegger also went astray with
his vision of a people and a destiny conceived at least in part as a subject,6 which
proves no doubt that Dasein’s ‘being-toward-death’ was never radically
implicated in its being-with – in Mitsein – and that it is this implication that
remains to be thought.)
That which is not a subject opens up and opens onto a community whose
conception, in turn, exceeds the resources of a metaphysics of the subject.
Community does not weave a superior, immortal or transmortal life between
subjects (no more than it is itself woven of the inferior bonds of a
consubstantiality of blood or of an association of needs), but it is constitutively,
to the extent that it is a matter of a ‘constitution’ here, calibrated on the death of
those whom we call, perhaps wrongly, its ‘members’ (in as much as it is not a
question of an organism). But it does not make a work of this calibration.
Community no more makes a work out of death than it is itself a work. The death
upon which community is calibrated does not operate the dead being’s passage
into some communal intimacy, nor does community, for its part, operate the
transfiguration of its dead into some substance or subject – be these homeland,
native soil or blood, nation, a delivered or fulfilled humanity, absolute
phalanstery, family, or mystical body. Community is calibrated on death as on
that of which it is precisely impossible to make a work (other than a work of
death, as soon as one tries to make a work of it). Community occurs in order to
acknowledge this impossibility, or more exactly – for there is neither function
nor finality here – the impossibility of making a work out of death is inscribed
and acknowledged as ‘community’.
Community is revealed in the death of others; hence it is always revealed to
others. Community is what takes place always through others and for others. It
is not the space of the egos – subjects and substances that are at bottom
immortal – but of the I’s, who are always others (or else are nothing). If
community is revealed in the death of others it is because death itself is the true
community of I’s that are not egos. It is not a communion that fuses the egos into
an Ego or a higher We. It is the community of others. The genuine community of
mortal beings, or death as community, establishes their impossible communion.
Community therefore occupies a singular place: it assumes the impossibility of
its own immanence, the impossibility of a communitarian being in the form of
a subject. In a certain sense community acknowledges and inscribes – this is its
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peculiar gesture – the impossibility of community. A community is not a project
of fusion, or in some general way a productive or operative project – nor is it a
project at all (once again, this is its radical difference from ‘the spirit of a people’,
which from Hegel to Heidegger has figured the collectivity as project, and
figured the project, reciprocally, as collective – which does not mean that we can
ignore the question of the singularity of a ‘people’).
A community is the presentation to its members of their mortal truth (which
amounts to saying that there is no community of immortal beings: one can
imagine either a society or a communion of immortal beings, but not a
community). It is the presentation of the finitude and the irredeemable excess
that make up finite being: its death, but also its birth, and only the community
can present me my birth, and along with it the impossibility of my reliving it, as
well as the impossibility of my crossing over into my death. […]
Community means, consequently, that there is no singular being without
another singular being, and that there is, therefore, what might be called, in a
rather inappropriate idiom, an originary or ontological ‘sociality’ that in its
principle extends far beyond the simple theme of man as a social being (the zoon
politikon is secondary to this community). For, on the one hand, it is not obvious
that the community of singularities is limited to ‘man’ and excludes, for
example, the ‘animal’ (even in the case of ‘man’ it is not a fortiori certain that this
community concerns only ‘man’ and not also the ‘inhuman’ or the ‘superhuman’,
or, for example, if I may say so with and without a certain Witz, ‘woman’: after
all, the difference befween the sexes is itself a singularity in the difference of
singularities). On the other hand, if social being is always posited as a predicate
of man, community would signify on the contrary the basis for thinking only
something like ‘man’. But this thinking would at the same time remain
dependent upon a principal determination of community, namely, that there is
no communion of singularities in a totality superior to them and immanent to
their common being.
In place of such a communion, there is communication. Which is to say, in
very precise terms, that finitude itself is nothing; it is neither a ground, nor an
essence, nor a substance. But it appears, it presents itself, it exposes itself, and
thus it exists as communication. In order to designate this singular mode of
appearing, this specific phenomenality, which is no doubt more originary than
any other (for it could be that the world appears to the community, not to the
individual), we would need to be able to say that finitude co-appears or
compears, (com-paraît) and can only compear: in this formulation we would need
to hear that finite being always presents itself ‘together’, hence severally; for
finitude always presents itself in being-in-common and as this being itself, and
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it always presents itself at a hearing and before the judgment of the law of
community, or, more originarily, before the judgment of community as law.
Communication consists before all else in this sharing and in this
compearance (com-parution) of finitude: that is, in the dislocation and in the
interpellation that reveal themselves to be constitutive of being-in-common –
precisely in as much as being-in-common is not a common being. The finitebeing exists first of all according to a division of sites, according to an extension
– partes extra partes – such that each singularity is extended (in the sense that
Freud says: ‘The psyche is extended’). It is not enclosed in a form – although its
whole being touches against its singular limit – but it is what it is, singular being
(singularity of being), only through its extension, through the areality that above
all extroverts it in its very being – whatever the degree or the desire of its
‘egoism’ – and that makes it exist only by exposing it to an outside. This outside
is in its turn nothing other than the exposition of another areality, of another
singularity – the same other. This exposure, or this exposing-sharing, gives rise,
from the outset, to a mutual interpellation of singularities prior to any address
in language (though it gives to this latter its first condition of possibility).7
Finitude compears, that is to say it is exposed: such is the essence of community.
Under these conditions, communication is not a bond. The metaphor of the
‘social bond’ unhappily superimposes upon ‘subjects’ (that is to say, objects) a
hypothetical reality (that of the ‘bond’) upon which some have attempted to
confer a dubious ‘intersubjective’ nature that would have the virtue of attaching
these objects to one another. This would be the economic link or the bond of
recognition. But compearance is of a more originary order than that of the bond.
It does not set itself up, it does not establish itself, it does not emerge among
already given subjects (objects). It consists in the appearance of the between as
such: you and I (between us) – a formula in which the and does not imply
juxtaposition but exposition. What is exposed in compearance is the following,
and we must learn to read it in all its possible combinations: ‘you (are/and/is)
(entirely other than) I’ (‘toi [e(s)t] [tout autre que] moi’). Or again, more simply:
you shares me (‘toi portage moi’).
Only in this communication are singular beings given – without a bond and
without communion, equally distant from any notion of connection or joining
from the outside and from any notion of a common and fusional interiority.
Communication is the constitutive fact of an exposition to the outside that
defines singularity. In its being, as its very being, singularity is exposed to the
outside. By virtue of this position or this primordial structure, it is at once
detached, distinguished and communitarian. Community is the presentation of
the detachment (or retrenchment) of this distinction that is not individuation,
but finitude compearing. […]
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This is why community cannot arise from the domain of work. One does not
produce it, one experiences or one is constituted by it as the experience of
finitude. Community understood as a work or through its works would
presuppose that the common being, as such, be objectifiable and producible (in
sites, persons, buildings, discourses, institutions, symbols: in short, in subjects).
Products derived from operations of this kind, however grandiose they might
seek to be and sometimes manage to be, have no more communitarian existence
than the plaster busts of Marianne.
Community necessarily takes place in what Blanchot has called ‘unworking’,
referring to that which, before or beyond the work, withdraws from the work,
and which, no longer having to do either with production or with completion,
encounters interruption, fragmentation, suspension. Community is made of the
interruption of singularities, or of the suspension that singular beings are.
Community is not the work of singular beings, nor can it claim them as its works,
just as communication is not a work or even an operation of singular beings, for
community is simply their being – their being suspended upon its limit.
Communication is the unworking of work that is social, economic, technical and
institutional.8 […]

The reasons for writing a book can be brought back to the desire to modify the
existing relations between a man and his fellow beings. These relations are
judged unacceptable and are perceived as an atrocious misery. (Georges Bataille,
Oeuvres Complètes, vol. 2, 143)

Or else, it is community itself – though it is nothing, it is not a collective
subject – that never stops, in writing, sharing itself.
The anguish which you do not communicate to your fellow being is in some way
scorned and mistreated. It has only to the weakest extent the power to reflect the
glory that comes from the depth of the heavens. (O.C. 5: 444)

In My Mother, Hélène, the mother, writes to her son:
I admire myself for writing to you like this, and I marvel to think that my letter is
worthy of you. (O.C. 4: 260)
But this hand that writes is dying, and through this death promised to it, it
escapes accepted limits by writing. (O.C. 3: 12)

The political, if this word may serve to designate not the organization of society
but the disposition of community as such, the destination of its sharing, must
not be the assumption or the work of love or of death. It need neither find, nor
regain, nor effect a communion taken to be lost or still to come. If the political is
not dissolved in the sociotechnical element of forces and needs (in which, in
effect, it seems to be dissolving under our eyes), it must inscribe the sharing of
community. The outline of singularity would be ‘political’ – as would be the
outline of its communication and its ecstasy. ‘Political’ would mean a
community ordering itself to the unworking of its communication, or destined
to this unworking: a community consciously undergoing the experience of its
sharing. To attain such a signification of the ‘political’ does not depend, or in any
case not simply, on what is called a ‘political will’. It implies being already
engaged in the community, that is to say, undergoing, in whatever manner, the
experience of community as communication: it implies writing. We must not
stop writing, or letting the singular outline of our being-in-common expose
itself.
Not only will this have been written after Bataille, but also to him, just as he
wrote to us – because one always writes to – communicating to us the anguish
of community, writing from a solitude prior to any isolation, invoking a
community that no society contains or precedes, even though every society is
implied in it:
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I would say, rather: it exposes these limits, it never passes beyond them, nor
passes beyond community. But at every instant singular beings share their
limits, share each other on their limits. They escape the relationships of society
(‘mother’ and ‘son’, ‘author’ and ‘reader’, ‘public figure’ and ‘private figure’,
‘producer’ and ‘consumer’), but they are in community, and are unworked.
I have spoken of a community as existing: Nietzsche brought his affirmations to
this, but remained alone … The desire to communicate is born in me out of a
feeling of community binding me to Nietzsche, and not out of an isolated
originality. (O.C. 5: 39)

We can only go farther.
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1

Georges Bataille, Oeuvres Complètes, vol. 1 (Paris: Gallimard, 1970) 332; hereafter ‘O.C.’

2

Considered in detail, taking into account the precise historical conjuncture of each instance, this

Édouard Glissant
Poetics of Relation//1990

is not rigorously exact as regards, for example, the Hungarian Council of 1956, and even more so
the left of Solidarity in Poland. Nor is it absolutely exact as regards all of the discourses held
today: one might, in this respect alone, juxtapose the situationists of not so long ago with
certain aspects of Hannah Arendt’s thought and also, as strange or provocative as the mixture
might appear, certain propositions advanced by Lyotard, Badiou, Ellul, Deleuze, Pasolini and
Rancière. These thoughts occur, although each one engages it in its own particular way (and
sometimes whether they know it or not), in the wake of a Marxist event that I will try to
characterize below and that signifies for us the bringing into question of communist or
communitarian humanism (quite different from the questioning once undertaken by Althusser

Influenced by Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaux (1980), which advocates
an incessant subversion of power via ‘deterritorializing’ gestures, the FrenchCaribbean author Édouard Glissant poetically argues for the active appropriation of
colonial culture by the colonized, particularly on the level of language. In contrast to
the culturally unifying concept of négritude, Glissant’s Poetics of Relation (1990)
advocates a unity understood as diverse and fluctuating.

in the name of a Marxist science). This is also why such propositions communicate with what I
shall name, tentatively and in spite of everything, ‘literary communism’.
3
4

[footnote 5 in source] ‘Le communisme sans heritage’, revue Comité, 1968, Gramma, 3/4 (1976) 32.
[6] For the moment, let us retain simply that ‘literature’, here, must above all not be taken in the
sense Bataille gave to the word when he wrote, for example (in his critique of Inner Experience
and Guilty): ‘I have come to realize through experience that these books lead those who read
them into complacency. They please most often those vague and impotent minds who want to
flee and sleep and satisfy themselves with the escape provided by literature’ (O.C. 8: 583). He
also spoke of the ‘sliding into impotence of thought that turns to literature’ (ibid.).

5

[8] See Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘La juridiction du monarque hégélien’, in Rejouer le politique (Paris:
Galilée, 1981). Translated in The Birth to Presence (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).

6

[9] See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, ‘Transcendence Ends in Politics’, trans. P. Caws, in Typography:
Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics, ed. C. Fynsk (Harvard University Press, 1989) 267–300, and G.
Granel, ‘Pourquoi avoir public cela?’ in De l’université (Toulouse: T.E.R., 1982).

7

[24] In this sense, the compearance of singular beings is anterior even to the preliminary
condition of language that Heidegger understands as prelinguistic ‘interpretation’ (Auslegung),
to which I referred the singularity of voices in ‘Sharing Voices’, in Transforming the Hermeneutic
Context, ed. Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989). Contrary to what
this essay might lead one to think, the sharing of voices does not lead to community; on the
contrary, it depends on this originary sharing that community ‘is’. Or rather, this ‘originary’
sharing itself is nothing other than a ‘sharing of voices’, but the ‘voice’ should be understood not
as linguistic or even prelinguistic, but as communitarian.

8

[26] I do not include the political here. In the form of the State, or the Party (if not the StateParty), it indeed seems to be of the order of a work. But it is perhaps at the heart of the political
that communitarian unworking resists.

Jean-Luc Nancy, La Communauté désoeuvrée (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1986); ed. and trans. Peter
Connor, The Inoperative Community (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991) 1–4; 7–15;
28–9; 31; 40–1.
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Errantry, Exile
Roots make the commonality of errantry and exile, for in both instances roots
are lacking. We must begin with that.
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari criticized notions of the root and even,
perhaps, notions of being rooted. The root is unique, a stock taking all upon itself
and killing all around it. In opposition to this they propose the rhizome, an
enmeshed root system, a network spreading either in the ground or in the air,
with no predatory rootstock taking over permanently. The notion of the rhizome
maintains, therefore, the idea of rootedness but challenges that of a totalitarian
root. Rhizomatic thought is the principle behind what I call the Poetics of
Relation, in which each and every identity is extended through a relationship
with the Other.
These authors extol nomadism, which supposedly liberates Being, in
contrast, perhaps, to a settled way of life, with its law based upon the intolerant
root. Already Kant, at the beginning of Critique of Pure Reason, had seen
similarities between skeptics and nomads, remarking also that, from time to
time, ‘they break the social bond’. He seems thus to establish correlations
between, on the one hand, a settled way of life, truth and society and, on the
other, nomadism, skepticism and anarchy. This parallel with Kant suggests that
the rhizome concept appears interesting for its anti-conformism, but one cannot
infer from this that it is subversive or that rhizomatic thought has the capacity
to overturn the order of the world – because, by so doing, one reverts to
ideological claims presumably challenged by this thought.
But is the nomad not overdetermined by the conditions of his existence?
Rather than the enjoyment of freedom, is nomadism not a form of obedience to
contingencies that are restrictive? Take, for example, circular nomadism: each
time a portion of the territory is exhausted, the group moves around. Its function
is to ensure the survival of the group by means of this circularity. This is the
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nomadism practised by populations that move from one part of the forest to
another, by the Arawak communities who navigated from island to island in the
Caribbean, by hired labourers in their pilgrimage from farm to farm, by circus
people in their peregrinations from village to village, all of whom are driven by
some specific need to move, in which daring or aggression play no part. Circular
nomadism is a not-intolerant form of an impossible settlement.
Contrast this with invading nomadism, that of the Huns, for example, or the
Conquistadors, whose goal was to conquer lands by exterminating their
occupants. Neither prudent nor circular nomadism, it spares no effect. It is an
absolute forward projection: an arrowlike nomadism. But the descendants of the
Huns, Vandals or Visigoths, as indeed those of the Conquistadors, who
established their clans, settled down bit by bit, melting into their conquests.
Arrowlike nomadism is a devastating desire for settlement.
Neither in arrowlike nomadism nor in circular nomadism are roots valid.
Before it is won through conquest, what ‘holds’ the invader is what lies ahead;
moreover, one could almost say that being compelled to lead a settled way of life
would constitute the real uprooting of a circular nomad. There is, furthermore, no
pain of exile bearing down, nor is there the wanderlust of errantry growing
keener. Relation to the earth is too immediate or too plundering to be linked with
any preoccupation with identity – this claim to or consciousness of a lineage
inscribed in a territory. Identity will be achieved when communities attempt to
legitimate their right to possession of a territory through myth or the revealed
word. Such an assertion can predate its actual accomplishment by quite some
time. Thus, an often and long contested legitimacy will have multiple forms that
later will delineate the afflicted or soothing dimensions of exile or errantry.
In Western antiquity a man in exile does not feel he is helpless or inferior,
because he does not feel burdened with deprivation – of a nation that for him
does not yet exist. It even seems, if one is to believe the biographies of numerous
Greek thinkers including Plato and Aristotle, that some experience of voyaging
and exile is considered necessary for a being’s complete fulfilment. Plato was the
first to attempt to base legitimacy not on community within territory (as it was
before and would be later) but on the City in the rationality of its laws. This at a
time when his city, Athens, was already threatened by a ‘final’ deregulation.
In this period identification is with a culture (conceived of as civilization),
not yet with a nation. The pre-Christian West along with pre-Columbian
America, Africa of the time of the great conquerors, and the Asian kingdoms all
shared this mode of seeing and feeling. The relay of actions exerted by arrowlike
nomadism and the settled way of life were first directed against generalization
(the drive for an identifying universal as practised by the Roman Empire). Thus,
the particular resists a generalizing universal and soon begets specific and local
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senses of identity, in concentric circles (provinces then nations). The idea of
civilization, bit by bit, helps hold together opposites, whose only former identity
existed in their opposition to the Other.
During this period of invading nomads the passion for self-definition first
appears in the guise of personal adventure. Along the route of their voyages
conquerors established empires that collapsed at their death. Their capitals
went where they went. ‘Rome is no longer in Rome, it is wherever I am.’ The root
is not important. Movement is. The idea of errantry, still inhibited in the face of
this mad reality, this too-functional nomadism, whose ends it could not know,
does not yet make an appearance. Centre and periphery are equivalent.
Conquerors are the moving, transient root of their people.
The West, therefore, is where this movement becomes fixed and nations
declare themselves in preparation for their repercussions in the world. This
fixing, this declaration, this expansion, all require that the idea of the root
gradually take on the intolerant sense that Deleuze and Guattari, no doubt,
meant to challenge. The reason for our return to this episode in Western history
is that it spread throughout the world. The model came in handy. Most of the
nations that gained freedom from colonization have tended to form around an
idea of power – the totalitarian drive of a single, unique root – rather than
around a fundamental relationship with the Other. Culture’s self-conception was
dualistic, pitting citizen against barbarian. Nothing has ever more solidly
opposed the thought of errantry than this period in human history when
Western nations were established and then made their impact on the world.
At first this thought of errantry, bucking the current of nationalist expansion,
was disguised ‘within’ very personalized adventures – just as the appearance of
Western nations had been preceded by the ventures of empire builders. The
errantry of a troubadour or that of Rimbaud is not yet a thorough, thick (opaque)
experience of the world, but it is already an arrant, passionate desire to go
against a root. The reality of exile during this period is felt as a (temporary) lack
that primarily concerns, interestingly enough, language. Western nations were
established on the basis of linguistic intransigence, and the exile readily admits
that he suffers most from the impossibility of communicating in his language.
The root is monolingual. For the troubadour and for Rimbaud errantry is a
vocation only told via detour. The call of Relation is heard, but it is not yet a fully
present experience.
However, and this is an immense paradox, the great founding books of
communities, the Old Testament, the Iliad, the Odyssey, the Chansons de Geste,
the Islandic Sagas, the Aeneid or the African epics, were all books about exile and
often about errantry. This epic literature is amazingly prophetic. It tells of the
community but, through relating the community’s apparent failure or in any
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case its being surpassed, it tells of errantry as a temptation (the desire to go
against the root) and, frequently, actually experienced. Within the collective
books concerning the sacred and the notion of history lies the germ of the exact
opposite of what they so loudly proclaim. When the very idea of territory
becomes relative, nuances appear in the legitimacy of territorial possession.
These are books about the birth of collective consciousness, but they also
introduce the unrest and suspense that allow the individual to discover himself
there, whenever he himself becomes the issue. The Greek victory in the Iliad
depends on trickery; Ulysses returns from his Odyssey and is recognized only by
his dog; the Old Testament David bears the stain of adultery and murder; the
Chanson de Roland is the chronicle of a defeat; the characters in the Sagas are
branded by an unstemmable fate, and so forth. These books are the beginning of
something entirely different from massive, dogmatic and totalitarian certainty
(despite the religious uses to which they will be put). These are books of
errantry, going beyond the pursuits and triumphs of rootedness required by the
evolution of history.
Some of these books are devoted entirely to the supreme errantry, as in the
Egyptian Book of the Dead. The very book whose function is to consecrate an
intransigent community is already a compromise, qualifying its triumph with
revelatory wanderings.
In both L’lntention poétique (Poetic Intention) and Le Discours antillais
(Caribbean Discourse) – of which the present work is a reconstituted echo or a
spiral retelling – I approached this dimension of epic literature. I began
wondering if we did not still need such founding works today, ones that would
use a similar dialectics of rerouting, asserting, for example, political strength
but, simultaneously, the rhizome of a multiple relationship with the Other and
basing every community’s reasons for existence on a modern form of the sacred,
which would be, all in all, a Poetics of Relation.
This movement, therefore (one among others, equally important, in other
parts of the world), has led from a primordial nomadism to the settled way of
life of Western nations, then to Discovery and Conquest, which achieved a final,
almost mystical perfection in the Voyage.
In the course of this journey, identity, at least as far as the Western peoples
who made up the great majority of voyagers, discoverers and conquerors were
concerned, consolidates itself implicitly at first (‘my root is the strongest’) and
then is explicitly exported as a value (‘a person’s worth is determined by his
root’). The conquered or visited peoples are thus forced into a long and painful
quest after an identity whose first task will be opposition to the denaturing
process introduced by the conqueror. A tragic variation of a search for identity.
For more than two centuries whole populations have had to assert their identity
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in opposition to the processes of identification or annihilation triggered by these
invaders. Whereas the Western nation is first of all an ‘opposite,’ for colonized
peoples identity will be primarily ‘opposed to’ – that is, a limitation from the
beginning. Decolonization will have done its real work when it goes beyond this
limit.
The duality of self-perception (one is citizen or foreigner) has repercussions
on one’s idea of the Other (one is visitor or visited; one goes or stays; one
conquers or is conquered). Thought of the Other cannot escape its own dualism
until the time when differences become acknowledged. From that point on
thought of the Other ‘comprehends’ multiplicity, but mechanically and still
taking the subtle hierarchies of a generalizing universal as its basis.
Acknowledging differences does not compel one to be involved in the dialectics
of their totality. One could get away with: ‘I can acknowledge your difference
and continue to think it is harmful to you. I can think that my strength lies in the
Voyage (I am making History) and that your difference is motionless and silent.’
Another step remains to be taken before one really enters the dialectic of totality.
And, contrary to the mechanics of the Voyage, this dialectic turns out to be
driven by the thought of errantry.
Let us suppose that the quest for totality, starting from a non-universal
context of histories of the West, has passed through the following stages:
– the thinking of territory and self (ontological, dual)
– the thinking of voyage and other (mechanical, multiple)
– the thinking of errantry and totality (relational, dialectical).
We will agree that this thinking of errantry, this errant thought, silently
emerges from the destructuring of compact national entities that yesterday
were still triumphant and, at the same time, from difficult, uncertain births of
new forms of identity that call to us.
In this context uprooting can work towards identity, and exile can be seen as
beneficial, when these are experienced as a search for the Other (through
circular nomadism) rather than as an expansion of territory (an arrowlike
nomadism). Totality’s imaginary allows the detours that lead away from
anything totalitarian.
Errantry, therefore, does not proceed from renunciation nor from frustration
regarding a supposedly deteriorated (deterritorialized) situation of origin; it is
not a resolute act of rejection or an uncontrolled impulse of abandonment.
Sometimes, by taking up the problems of the Other, it is possible to find oneself.
Contemporary history provides several striking examples of this, among them
Frantz Fanon, whose path led from Martinique to Algeria. That is very much the
image of the rhizome, prompting the knowledge that identity is no longer
completely within the root but also in Relation. Because the thought of errantry
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is also the thought of what is relative, the thing relayed as well as the thing
related. The thought of errantry is a poetics, which always infers that at some
moment it is told. The tale of errantry is the tale of Relation.
In contrast to arrowlike nomadism (discovery or conquest), in contrast to the
situation of exile, errantry gives-on-and-with the negation of every pole and
every metropolis, whether connected or not to a conqueror’s voyaging act. We
have repeatedly mentioned that the first thing exported by the conqueror was
his language. Moreover, the great Western languages were supposedly vehicular
languages, which often took the place of an actual metropolis. Relation, in
contrast, is spoken multilingually. Going beyond the impositions of economic
forces and cultural pressures, Relation rightfully opposes the totalitarianism of
any monolingual intent.
At this point we seem to be far removed from the sufferings and
preoccupations of those who must bear the world’s injustice. Their errantry is,
in effect, immobile. They have never experienced the melancholy and
extroverted luxury of uprooting. They do not travel. But one of the constants of
our world is that a knowledge of roots will be conveyed to them from within
intuitions of Relation from now on. Travelling is no longer the locus of power but
rather a pleasurable, if privileged time. The ontological obsession with
knowledge gives way here to the enjoyment of a relation; in its elementary and
often caricatural form this is tourism. Those who stay behind thrill to this
passion for the world shared by all. Or indeed they may suffer the torments of
internal exile.
I would not describe the physical situation of those who suffer the
oppression of an Other within their own country, such as the blacks in South
Africa, as internal exile. Because the solution here is visible and the outcome
determined; force alone can oppose this. Internal exile strikes individuals living
where solutions concerning the relationship of a community to its surroundings
are not, or at least not yet, consented to by this community as a whole. These
solutions, precariously outlined as decisions, are still the prerogative of only a
few who as a result are marginalized. Internal exile is the voyage out of this
enclosure. It is a motionless and exacerbated introduction to the thought of
errantry. Most often it is diverted into partial, pleasurable compensations in
which the individual is consumed. Internal exile tends toward material comfort,
which cannot really distract from anguish.
Whereas exile may erode one’s sense of identity, the thought of errantry –
the thought of that which relates – usually reinforces this sense of identity. It
seems possible, at least to one observer, that the persecuted errantry, the
wandering of the Jews, may have reinforced their sense of identity far more than
their present settling in the land of Palestine. Being exiled Jews turned into a
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vocation of errantry, their point of reference an ideal land whose power may, in
fact, have been undermined by concrete land (a territory), chosen and conquered.
This, however, is mere conjecture. Because, while one can communicate through
errantry’s imaginary vision, the experiences of exiles are incommunicable.
The thought of errantry is not apolitical nor is it inconsistent with the will to
identity, which is, after all, nothing other than the search for a freedom within
particular surroundings. If it is at variance with territorial intolerance, or the
predatory effects of the unique root (which makes processes of identification so
difficult today), this is because, in the Poetics of Relation, one who is errant (who
is no longer traveller, discoverer or conqueror) strives to know the totality of the
world yet already knows he will never accomplish this – and knows that is
precisely where the threatened beauty of the world resides.
Errant, he challenges and discards the universal – this generalizing edict that
summarized the world as something obvious and transparent, claiming for it one
presupposed sense and one destiny. He plunges into the opacities of that part of
the world to which he has access. Generalization is totalitarian: from the world
it chooses one side of the reports, one set of ideas, which it sets apart from others
and tries to impose by exporting as a model. The thinking of errantry conceives
of totality but willingly renounces any claims to sum it up or to possess it.
The founding books have taught us that the sacred dimension consists
always of going deeper into the mystery of the root, shaded with variations of
errantry. In reality errant thinking is the postulation of an unyielding and
unfading sacred. We remember that Plato, who understood the power of Myth,
had hoped to banish the poets, those who force obscurity, far from the Republic.
He distrusted the fathomless word. Are we not returning here, in the
unforeseeable meanders of Relation, to this abyssal word? Nowhere is it stated
that now, in this thought of errantry, humanity will not succeed in transmuting
Myth’s opacities (which were formerly the occasion for setting roots) and the
diffracted insights of political philosophy, thereby reconciling Homer and Plato,
Hegel and the African griot.
But we need to figure out whether or not there are other succulencies of
Relation in other parts of the world (and already at work in an underground
manner) that will suddenly open up other avenues and soon help to correct
whatever simplifying, ethnocentric exclusions may have arisen from such a
perspective. […]
Dictate, Decree
[…] Summarizing what we know concerning the varieties of identity, we arrive
at the following:
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Root identity
– is founded in the distant past in a vision, a myth of the creation of the world;
– is sanctified by the hidden violence of a filiation that strictly follows from this
founding episode;
– is ratified by a claim to legitimacy that allows a community to proclaim its
entitlement to the possession of a land, which thus becomes a territory;
– is preserved by being projected onto other territories, making their
conquest legitimate – and through the project of a discursive knowledge. Root
identity therefore rooted the thought of self and of territory and set in motion
the thought of the other and of voyage.
Relation identity
– is linked not to a creation of the world but to the conscious and contradictory
experience of contacts among cultures;
– is produced in the chaotic network of Relation and not in the hidden violence
of filiation;
– does not devise any legitimacy as its guarantee of entitlement, but circulates,
newly extended;
– does not think of a land as a territory from which to project toward other
territories but as a place where one gives-on-and-with rather than grasps.
Relation identity exults the thought of errantry and of totality. The shock of
relating, hence, has repercussions on several levels. When secular cultures come
into contact through their intolerances, the ensuing violence triggers mutual
exclusions that are of a sacred nature and for which any future reconciliation is
hard to foresee. When a culture that is expressly composite, such as the culture
of Martinique, is touched by another (French) that ‘entered into’ its composition
and continues to determine it, not radically but through the erosion of
assimilation, the violence of reaction is intermittent and unsure of itself. For the
Martinican it has no solid rootstock in any sacred territory or filiation. This,
indeed, is a case in which specificity is a strict requirement and must be defined
as closely as possible. For this composite culture is fragile in the extreme,
wearing down through contact with a masked colonization. […]
Édouard Glissant, Poétique de la Relation (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1990); trans. Betsy Wing, Poetics
of Relation [footnotes not included] (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997) 11–21; 143–4.
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Félix Guattari
Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm//1992

Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm (1992) is the last book written by
French psychoanalyst and philosopher Félix Guattari. In it he turns to aesthetics as
the model for a new ethical behaviour opposed to capitalist rationality. For Guattari,
art is a process of ‘becoming’: a fluid and partially autonomous zone of activity that
works against disciplinary boundaries, yet which is inseparable from its integration
in the social field. Chaosmosis is an important reference for the final essay in Nicolas
Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics.
[…] Artistic cartographies have always been an essential element of the
framework of every society. But since becoming the work of specialized
corporate bodies, they may have appeared to be side issues, a supplement of the
soul, a fragile superstructure whose death is regularly announced. And yet from
the grottoes of Lascaux to Soho, taking in the dawn of the cathedrals, they have
never stopped being a vital element in the crystallization of individual and
collective subjectivities.
Fabricated in the socius, art, however, is only sustained by itself. This is
because each work produced possesses a double finality: to insert itself into a
social network which will either appropriate or reject it, and to celebrate, once
again, the Universe of art as such, precisely because it is always in danger of
collapsing.
What confers it with this perennial possibility of eclipse is its function of
rupturing with forms and significations circulating trivially in the social field.
The artist and, more generally, aesthetic perception, detach and deterritorialize
a segment of the real in such a way as to make it play the role of a partial
enunciator. Art confers a function of sense and alterity to a subset of the
perceived world. The consequence of this quasi-animistic speech effect of a
work of art is that the subjectivity of the artist and the ‘consumer’ is reshaped.
In short, it is a matter of rarefying an enunciation which has too great a tendency
to become entangled in an identificatory seriality which infantilizes and
annihilates it. The work of art, for those who use it, is an activity of unframing,
of rupturing sense, of baroque proliferation or extreme impoverishment, which
leads to a recreation and a reinvention of the subject itself. A new existential
support will oscillate on the work of art, based on a double register of
reterritorialization (refrain function) and resingularization. The event of its
encounter can irreversibly date the course of an existence and generate fields of
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the possible ‘far from the equilibria’ of everyday life.
Viewed from the angle of this existential function – namely, in rupture with
signification and denotation – ordinary aesthetic categorizations lose a large
part of their relevance. Reference to ‘free figuration’, ‘abstraction’ or
‘conceptualism’ hardly matters! What is important is to know if a work leads
effectively to a mutant production of enunciation. The focus of artistic activity
always remains a surplus-value of subjectivity or, in other terms, the bringing to
light of a negentropy at the heart of the banality of the environment – the
consistency of subjectivity only being maintained by self-renewal through a
minimal, individual or collective, resingularization.
The growth in artistic consumption we have witnessed in recent years
should be placed, nevertheless, in relation to the increasing uniformity of the life
of individuals in the urban context. It should be emphasized that the quasivitaminic function of this artistic consumption is not univocal. It can move in a
direction parallel to uniformization, or play the role of an operator in the
bifurcation of subjectivity (this ambivalence is particularly evident in the
influence of rock culture). This is the dilemma every artist has to confront: ‘to go
with the flow’, as advocated, for example, by the Transavantgarde and the
apostles of postmodernism, or to work for the renewal of aesthetic practices
relayed by other innovative segments of the Socius, at the risk of encountering
incomprehension and of being isolated by the majority of people.
Of course, it’s not at all clear how one can claim to hold creative singularity
and potential social mutations together. And it has to be admitted that the
contemporary Socius hardly lends itself to experimentation with this kind of
aesthetic and ethico-political transversality. It nonetheless remains the case that
the immense crisis sweeping the planet – chronic unemployment, ecological
devastation, deregulation of modes of valorization, uniquely based on profit or
State assistance – open the field up to a different deployment of aesthetic
components. It doesn’t simply involve occupying the free time of the
unemployed and ‘marginalized’ in community centres! In fact it is the very
productions of science, technology and social relations which will drift towards
aesthetic paradigms. It’s enough to refer to the latest book by Ilya Prigogine and
Isabelle Stengers, where they evoke the necessity of introducing into physics a
‘narrative element’ as indispensable to a genuine conception of evolution.1
Today our societies have their backs up against the wall; to survive they will
have to develop research, innovation and creation still further – the very
dimensions which imply an awareness of the strictly aesthetic techniques of
rupture and suture. Something is detached and starts to work for itself, just as it
can work for you if you can ‘agglomerate’ yourself to such a process. Such
requestioning concerns every institutional domain; for example, the school.
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How do you make a class operate like a work of art? What are the possible paths
to its singularization, the source of a ‘purchase on existence’ for the children who
compose it?2 And on the register of what I once called ‘molecular revolutions’,
the Third World conceals treasures which deserve to be explored.3
A systematic rejection of subjectivity in the name of a mythical scientific
objectivity continues to reign in the University. In the heyday of structuralism
the subject was methodically excluded from its own multiple and
heterogeneous material of expression. It is time to re-examine machinic
productions of images, signs of artificial intelligence, etc., as new materials of
subjectivity. In the Middle Ages, art and technique found refuge in the
monasteries and convents which had managed to survive. Perhaps artists today
constitute the final lines along which primordial existential questions are folded.
How are the new fields of the possible going to be fitted out? How are sounds
and forms going to be arranged so that the subjectivity adjacent to them remains
in movement, and really alive?
The future of contemporary subjectivity is not to live indefinitely under the
regime of self-withdrawal, of mass-mediatic infantilization, of ignorance of
difference and alterity – both on the human and the cosmic register. Its modes
of subjectivation will get out of their homogenetic ‘entrapment’ only if creative
objectives appear within their reach. What is at stake here is the finality of the
ensemble of human activities. Beyond material and political demands, what
emerges is an aspiration for individual and collective reappropriation of the
production of subjectivity. In this way the ontological heterogenesis of value
becomes the focus of political concerns which at present lack the site, the
immediate relation, the environment, the reconstitution of the social fabric and
existential impact of art … And at the end of a slow recomposition of
assemblages of subjectivation, the chaosmic explorations of an ecosophy –
articulating between them scientific, political, environmental and mental
ecologies – ought to be able to claim to replace the old ideologies which
abusively sectorized the social, the private and the civil, and which were
fundamentally incapable of establishing transversal junctions between the
political, the ethical and the aesthetic.
It should, however, be clear that we are in no way advocating an
aestheticization of the Socius, for, after all, promoting a new aesthetic paradigm
involves overthrowing current forms of art as much as those of social life! I hold
out my hand to the future. My approach will be marked by mechanical
confidence or creative uncertainty, according to whether I consider everything
to be worked out in advance or everything to be there for the taking – that the
world can be rebuilt from other Universes of value and that other existential
Territories should be constructed towards this end. The immense ordeals which
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the planet is going through – such as the suffocation of its atmosphere – involve
changes in production, ways of living and axes of value. The demographic
explosion which will, in a few decades, see the population of Latin America
multiply by three and that of Africa by five4 does not proceed from an inexorable
biological malediction. The key factors in it are economic (that is, they relate to
power) and in the final analysis are subjective – cultural, social and massmediatic. The future of the Third World rests primarily on its capacity to
recapture its own processes of subjectivation in the context of a social fabric in
the process of desertification. (In Brazil, for example, Wild West capitalism,
savage gang and police violence coexist with interesting attempts by the
Workers’ Party movement at recomposing social and urbanistic practices.)
Among the fogs and miasmas which obscure our fin de millénaire, the
question of subjectivity is now returning as a leitmotiv. It is not a natural given
any more than air or water. How do we produce it, capture it, enrich it, and
permanently reinvent it in a way that renders it compatible with Universes of
mutant value? How do we work for its liberation, that is, for its
resingularization? Psychoanalysis, institutional analysis, film, literature, poetry,
innovative pedagogies, town planning and architecture – all the disciplines will
have to combine their creativity to ward off the ordeals of barbarism, the mental
implosion and chaosmic spasms looming on the horizon, and transform them
into riches and unforeseen pleasures, the promises of which, for all that, are all
too tangible.
1

[footnote 2 in source] ‘For mankind today, the “Big Bang” and the evolution of the Universe are
part of the world in the same way as, in prior times, the myths of origin.’ Entre le temps et
l’éternité (Paris: Fayard, 1988) 65.

2

[3] Among the many works on institutional pedagogy, see René Lafitte, Une journée dans une
classe coopérative: le désir retrouvé (Paris: Syros, 1985).

3

[4] On the networks of solidarity subsisting amongst those ‘defeated’ by modernity in the Third
World: Serge Latouche, La Planète des naufragés. Essai sur l’après-développement (Paris: La
Découverte, 1991).

4

[5] Jacques Vallin (de l’INED), Transversales Science/Culture, no. 9, June 1991 (29, rue Marsoulin,
75012 Paris). La population mondiale, la population française (Paris: La Découverte, 1991).

Félix Guattari, Chaosmose (Paris: Éditions Galilée, 1992); trans. Paul Bains and Julian Pefanis,
Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995) 130–5.
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Jacques Rancière
Problems and Transformations in Critical Art//2004

The French philosopher Jacques Rancière has written extensively on the relationship
between aesthetics and politics as a partage du sensible – the sharing/division of
what is visible, sayable and thinkable. In this extract from Malaise dans l’esthétique
(2004), Rancière addresses the limitations of didactic critical art, as well as the
spectacularization of relational art that seeks to repair the social bond.
In its most general formula, critical art intends to raise consciousness of the
mechanisms of domination in order to turn the spectator into a conscious agent
in the transformation of the world. We know the dilemma that weighs upon this
project. On the one hand, understanding alone can do little to transform
consciousness and situations. The exploited have rarely had the need to have the
laws of exploitation explained to them. Because it’s not a misunderstanding of
the existing state of affairs that nurtures the submission of the oppressed, but a
lack of confidence in their own capacity to transform it. Now, the feeling of such
a capacity assumes that they are already engaged in a political process that
changes the configuration of a given situation (données sensibles), and which
constructs the forms of a world to come within the existing world. On the other
hand, the work of art that ‘makes you understand’, and that breaks up
appearances, thereby kills the strangeness of an appearance of resistance that
bears witness to the non-necessary or intolerable character of a world. Critical
art that invites you to see the signs of Capital behind everyday objects and
behaviours risks inscribing itself into the perpetuation of a world where the
transformation of things into signs redoubles the very excess of interpretative
signs that make all resistance disappear.
In this vicious circle of critical art we generally see proof that aesthetics and
politics can’t go together. It would be more fair, however, to recognize the
plurality of ways in which they are linked. On the one hand, politics is not a
simple sphere of action that comes after the ‘aesthetic’ revelation of the state of
things. It has its own aesthetic: its ways of dissensually inventing scenes and
characters, of manifestations and statements different from the inventions of art
and sometimes even opposed to them. On the other hand, aesthetics has its own
politics, or rather its own tension between two opposed politics: between the
logic of art that becomes life at the price of abolishing itself as art, and the logic
of art that does politics on the explicit condition of not doing it at all. The
difficulty of critical art is not that of having to negotiate between politics and art.
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It is having to negotiate the relation between the two aesthetic logics that exist
independently of it, because they belong to the logic of the aesthetic regime
itself. Critical art must negotiate the tension that pushes art towards ‘life’ and
which, conversely, separates aesthetic sensoriality from other forms of sensible
experience. It must borrow the connections that provoke political intelligibility
from the blurry zone between art and other spheres. And it must borrow the
sense of sensible heterogeneity that feeds the political energies of refusal from
the isolation of the work of art. It’s this negotiation between the forms of art and
those of non-art that permits the formation of combinations of elements
capable of speaking twice: from their readability and from their unreadability.
Therefore, the combination of these two forces necessarily takes the form of
a realignment of heterogeneous logics. If collage has been one of the great
techniques of modern art, it is because its technical forms obey a more
fundamental aesthetico-political logic. Collage, in the most general sense of the
term, is the principle of a ‘third’ aesthetic politics. Prior to mixing paintings,
newspapers, oilcloth or clock parts, it mixes the strangeness of the aesthetic
experience with the becoming-life of art and the becoming-art of ordinary life.
Collage can be carried out as a pure encounter of heterogeneities, testifying
wholesale to the incompatibility of two worlds. It’s the surrealist encounter of
the umbrella and the sewing machine, showing the absolute power of desire and
dreams against the reality of the everyday world, but using its objects.
Conversely, collage can be seen as evidence of the hidden link between two
apparently opposed worlds: thus do the photomontages of John Heartfield,
revealing the reality of capitalist gold in the throat of Adolf Hitler, or those of
Martha Rosler, mixing photographs of the horror of Vietnam with advertising
images of American comfort. In this case, it’s not any longer the heterogeneity of
the two worlds that should nourish a sense of the intolerable but, on the
contrary, the making evident of the causal connection that links one to the other.
But the politics of collage finds its balancing point where it can combine the
two relations and play on the line of indiscernability between the force of
readability of sense and the force of strangeness of non-sense. So do, for
example, the stories of cauliflowers in Brecht’s Arturo Ui. They play an exemplary
double game between denouncing the law of the market and using ways of
deriding high art borrowed from the market debasement of culture. They
simultaneously play on the readability of an allegory of Nazi power as the power
of capital, and on a buffoonery that reduces all grand ideals, political or
otherwise, to the insignificant business of vegetables. Behind this grand
discourse, the secret of the market is thus equated with its absence of secret,
with its triviality or radical non-meaning or non-sense. But this possibility of
playing simultaneously on sense and on non-sense assumes another, which is
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that one may play at once on the radical separation between the world of art and
that of cauliflowers and on the permeability of the border that separates them.
It’s necessary that the cauliflowers be without any relation to art or politics and
that they be already linked, that the border be always there yet already crossed.
In fact, when Brecht tries to put vegetables in the service of critical
distanciation, they already have a long artistic history. Think of their role in
impressionist still lifes. Think also of the way in which a novelist, Émile Zola, in
Le Ventre de Paris (The Belly of Paris, also trans. The Fat and the Thin, 1874), elevated
vegetables in general – and cabbages in particular – to the dignity of artistic and
political symbols. This novel, written just after the fall of the Paris Commune, is
in effect constructed on the polarity of two characters: on the one hand, the
revolutionary who returns from deportation to the new Paris des Halles and
finds himself crushed by the accumulation of commodities that materializes a
new world of mass consumption; on the other hand, the impressionist painter
who sings an epic of cabbages, of the new beauty, opposing the iron architecture
of Les Halles and the piles of vegetables that it shelters to the old beauty
henceforth deprived of life, symbolized by the neighbouring gothic church.
This Brechtian double game with the political and the apolitical character of
cauliflowers is possible because there already exists a relationship between
politics, the new beauty and market displays. We can generalize the meaning of
this vegetable allegory. Critical art – art which plays on the union and tension of
different aesthetic politics – is possible thanks to a movement of translation that
has, for a long time now, crossed the border in both directions between the
world of art and the prosaic world of the commodity. There’s no need to imagine
a ‘postmodern’ rupture blurring the border that separated high art from the
forms of popular culture. The blurring of boundaries is as old as ‘modernity’
itself. Brechtian distanciation is clearly indebted to surrealist collages that
brought into the domain of art the obsolete consumer goods from the arcades,
the magazine illustrations, or the outmoded catalogues. But the process goes
back much further. The moment when high art is constituted – by declaring its
own end, according to Hegel – is also the moment when it started to be
banalized in magazine reproductions and be corrupted in the bookshop trade
and in the ‘industrial’ literature of newspapers. But this is also the time when
commodities started to travel in the opposite direction, to cross the border that
separates it from the world of art, to repopulate and re-materialize this art that
Hegel believed to have exhausted its forms.
This is what Balzac shows us in Illusions perdues (Lost Illusions, 1837). The
dilapidated and muddy stalls of the Galeries du bois, where the fallen poet
Lucien de Rubempré goes to sell his prose and his soul among the trade of the
Stock Exchange and of prostitution, instantly become the place of a new poetry:
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a fantastical poetry made from the abolition of frontiers between the ordinary of
the market and the extraordinary of art. The heterogeneous sensible from which
art of the aesthetic age feeds can be found anywhere, and especially on the very
terrain from which the purists wanted to eliminate it. Any commodity or useful
object can, by becoming obsolete and unfit for consumption, become available to
art in different ways, separate or linked: as an object of disinterested pleasure, a
body encoded with a story, or as witness to a strangeness impossible to assimilate.
While some dedicated art-life to the creation of furniture for a new world,
and others denounced the transformation of art products into the décor of
aestheticized commodities, others seized this double movement that blurred
the simple opposition of two great aesthetic politics: if art products do not cease
to cross into the domain of commodities, then commodities and functional
goods do not stop crossing the border in the other direction, leaving the sphere
of utility and value to become hieroglyphs carrying their history on their body,
or mute disaffected objects carrying the splendour of what no longer bears any
project or will. This is what the idleness of the Juno Ludovisi could communicate
to all obsolete functional objects and advertising imagery.1 This ‘dialectical work
in things’ that renders them available to art and for subversion – by breaking the
uniform run of time, by introducing a temporality within another, by changing
the status of objects and the relationship between exchange signs and art forms
– is what Walter Benjamin discovered in his reading of Aragon’s Le Paysan de
Paris (Paris Peasant, 1926) which transformed a shop of old walking sticks in the
Passage de l’Opera into a mythological landscape and legendary poem. And
‘allegorical’ art, which so many contemporary artists claim, inscribes itself in
this long-term filiation.
It is because of this crossing of the borders and status changes between art
and non-art that the radical strangeness of the aesthetic object and the active
appropriation of the common world have been able to come together and
constitute the ‘third way’ of a micro-politics of art, between the opposed
paradigms of art becoming life and art as resistant form. This process underpins
the performances of critical art, and can help us to understand its contemporary
transformations and ambiguities. If there is a political question about
contemporary art, it is not to be grasped in the grid of the opposition
modern/postmodern. It is in the analysis of the changes affecting this ‘third’
politics, the politics founded on a game of exchanges and displacements
between the world of art and that of non-art.
The politics of the mix of heterogeneous elements took a dominant form,
from dadaism up to the diverse forms of anti-establishment art in the 1960s: the
polemical form. The game of exchanges between art and non-art served to
construct collisions between heterogeneous elements, dialectical oppositions
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between form and content, that themselves denounced social relations and the
place was allocated for art there. The stichomythic form that Brecht gave to a
discussion in verse on the matter of cauliflowers denounced the hidden interests
behind fine words.2 Dadaist canvases glued with bus tickets, clock parts and
other accessories ridiculed the pretensions of an art cut off from life. Warhol’s
introduction of soup cans and Brillo boxes into the museum denounced high
art’s pretensions to isolation. Wolf Vostell’s blending of celebrity images and war
images showed the dark side of the American dream; Krzysztof Wodiczko’s
projections of homeless figures onto American monuments denounced the
expulsion of the poor from public space; Hans Haacke’s little labels placed
alongside museum works revealed them to be objects of financial investment,
and so on. Heterogeneous collage generally takes the form of a shock, which
reveals one world hidden beneath another: capitalist violence behind the
happiness of consumption; market interests and violent class struggle behind
the apparent serenity of art. Art’s self-criticism thus blended with criticism of
the mechanisms of state and market domination.
This polemical function of the shock of the heterogeneous is always
mentioned in the legitimation of works, installations and exhibitions. However,
the continuity of this discourse conceals significant transformations that a
simple example can allow us to grasp. In 2000, in Paris, an exhibition called Bruit
de fond (Background Noise) put 1970s and contemporary works on view.
Amongst the former were Martha Rosler’s photomontages from the series
Bringing the War Home (1967–72), juxtaposing advertising images of domestic
American happiness with images of the war in Vietnam. Nearby was another
work devoted to the hidden side of American happiness. Made by Wang Du, it
comprised two elements: on the left, the Clinton couple, represented as two
mannequins from a wax museum; on the other, another kind of wax figure: a
sculpture of Courbet’s L’Origine du monde (The Origin of the World, 1866), which,
as we know, explicitly presents the female sexual organs. The two works played
on the relationship between an image of happiness or greatness and its hidden
side of violence or profanity. But the currency of the Lewinsky affair was not
enough to confer political stakes to the representation of the Clinton couple. To
be precise, currency was of little importance. We were witnessing the automatic
functioning of canonical procedures of delegitimation: the wax figure that turns
the politician into a puppet; sexual profanation that is the little dirty
hidden/exposed secret of all forms of sublimity. These procedures always work.
But they work by turning on themselves, like the denigration of power in general
taking the place of political denunciation. Or rather, their function is to make us
sensitive towards this automatic-ness itself, of delegitimizing the procedures of
delegitimation at the same time as delegitimizing their object. Humorous
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distance then replaces provocative shock.
I’ve chosen this significant example, but you could cite many others that
witness, beneath the apparent continuity of mechanisms and of their textual
legitimations, the same slide of yesterday’s dialectical provocations towards new
figures of the composition of the heterogeneous. And you could range these
multiple slidings under four major types of contemporary exhibitions: the game,
the inventory, the encounter and the mystery.
First of all the game, which is to say a double-game. Elsewhere I have
mentioned an exhibition presented at Minneapolis under the title Let’s
Entertain, and renamed, in Paris, Au-delà du spectacle.3 The American title
already played a double game, winking towards a criticism of the entertainment
industry, and also towards pop’s denunciation of the separation between high
art and a popular culture of consumption. The Parisian title introduced a further
turn. On the one hand, the reference to Guy Debord’s book [La Société du
spectacle] reinforced the rigour of the critique of entertainment. But on the other
hand, it recalled that his antidote to spectacle’s passivity is the free activity of
the game. This play on the titles brings us back, of course, to the undecidability
of the works themselves. The menagerie of Charles Ray or the huge footballtable of Maurizio Cattelan could indifferently symbolize pop derision, a critique
of market entertainment, or the positive power of games. And all the conviction
of the exhibition curators was needed in order to prove to us that manga, adverts
and disco sounds as reprocessed by the other artists offered us a radical critique
of the alienated consumption of leisure by their very reduplication. Rather than
a Schillerian suspension of the relations of domination, the games invoked here
mark the suspension of meaning in the collages presented. Their value as
polemic revelations has become undecidable. And it’s the production of this
undecidability that is at the heart of the work of many artists and exhibitions.
Where the critical artist once painted clashing images of market domination or
imperialist war, the contemporary video artist lightly détournes video-clips and
manga; where giant puppets once made contemporary history into an epic
spectacle, balls and toys now ‘interrogate’ our ways of life. A redoubling of the
spectacles, props and icons of ordinary life, flimsily displaced, no longer invites
us to read signs in objects in order to understand the jurisdictions of our world.
They claim both to sharpen our perception of the play of signs, our
consciousness of the fragility of the procedures for the reading of those signs,
and our pleasure at playing with the undecidable. The virtue that these artists
most willingly reclaim for themselves today is humour: well, humour as a flimsy
displacement that it’s possible not even to notice in their way of presenting a
sequence of signs or an assemblage of objects.
These procedures of delegitimation, passed from a critical to a ludic register,
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become, if pushed, indistinguishable from those produced by power and the
media, or by the market’s own forms of presentation. Humour itself becomes the
dominant mode of exhibiting commodities, and advertising increasingly plays
on the undecidability of a product’s use value and its value as a support for
images or signs. The only remaining subversion is, then, to play on this
undecidability; to suspend, in a society working towards the accelerated
consumption of signs, the meaning of the protocols of reading those signs.
Consciousness of this undecidability favours a displacement of artistic
propositions towards the second form, that of the inventory. The meeting of
heterogeneous objects no longer aims to provoke a critical shock, nor to play on
the undecidability of this shock. The same materials, images and messages that
were interrogated according to the rules of an art of suspicion are now
summoned to the reverse operation: to repopulate the world of things, to reseize their collective historical potential that critical art dissolved into
manipulable signs. Assembling heterogeneous materials becomes a positive
memory, in a double form. Primarily it’s an inventory of historical traces:
objects, photographs or simply lists of names that witness a shared history or a
shared world. Four years ago in Paris, an exhibition called Voilà – Le monde dans
la tête thus set out to recapitulate the twentieth century. Through photographic
displays and diverse installations, it was about gathering experiences, about
making displays of any old objects, names or anonymous faces speak, about
being introduced into these welcoming mechanisms. The visitor was first
welcomed by the sign of a game (Robert Filliou’s pattern of multicoloured dice),
then walked through a Christian Boltanski installation, Les Abonnés du téléphone,
comprising directories from different years and countries that you could, if you
liked, take off the shelves and browse on the tables placed at your disposal. Then
a sound installation by On Kawara that evoked, for him, some of ‘the last forty
thousand years gone by’. Hans-Peter Feldmann then presented photographs of
one hundred people aged from one to one hundred years old. Peter Fischli and
David Weiss’s display of photographs under vitrines exposed a Visible World
resembling holiday photos from family albums, while Fabrice Hybert showed a
collection of bottles of mineral water, etc.
In this logic, the artist is at once an archivist of collective life and the
collector, witness to a shared ability. Because the inventory, which evidences the
potential of objects’ and images’ collective history, by bringing closer the art of
the sculptor and that of the rag-and-bone man, shows in this way the
relationship between the inventive gestures of art and the multiplicity of
inventions of the arts of doing and arts of living that constitute a shared world:
DIY, collecting, language games, props for manifestations, etc. The artist takes it
upon himself to make visible, in art’s reserved space, these arts of doing that exist
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throughout society.4 Through this double vocation of the inventory, critical art’s
political/polemical vocation tends to become a social/communitarian vocation.
This slippage is shown by the third form. I’ve called it the encounter. You
could also call it the invitation. The artist-collector institutes a space of reception
to engage the passer-by in an unexpected relationship. Thus Boltanski’s
installation invites the visitor to take a directory from the shelves and sit at a
table to consult it. A little further along in the same exhibition, Dominique
Gonzalez-Foerster invited us to take a volume from a pile of pocket books and to
sit down and read them on a carpet depicting a desert island typical of children’s
dreams. In another exhibition, Rirkrit Tiravanija put at the visitor’s disposal
packets of food, camping gas and cooking pans so that he could prepare a
Chinese soup for himself, sit down and engage in discussion with the artist or
with other visitors. Parallel to these transformations in the exhibition space are
many forms of intervention in urban space: a modified sign in a bus shelter
transforms the necessity of everyday life into an adventure (Pierre Huyghe); an
illuminated text in Arabic or a loudspeaker in Turkish reverses the relations
between the local and the foreign (Jens Haaning); an empty pavilion is offered
to the social desires of the residents of a neigbourhood (Group A12). Relational
art thus intends to create not only objects but situations and encounters. But this
too simple opposition between objects and situations operates a short-circuit.
What is at stake is the transformation of these problematic spaces that
conceptual art had opposed to art’s objects/commodities. Yesterday’s distance
towards commodities is now inverted to propose a new proximity between
entities, the institution of new forms of social relations. Art no longer wants to
respond to the excess of commodities and signs, but to a lack of connections. As
the principle theorist of this school writes: ‘by offering small services, the artist
repairs the weaknesses in the social bond’.5
The loss of the ‘social bond’, and the duty incumbent on artists to work to
repair it, are the words on the agenda. But an acknowledgement of this loss can
be more ambitious. It’s not only the forms of civility that we will have lost, but
the very sense of the co-presence of beings and things that constitutes a world.
This is what the fourth type proposes to mend, the mystery. Applying it to
cinema, Jean-Luc Godard honoured this category that, since Mallarmé,
designates a certain way of linking heterogeneous elements: in the latter, for
example, the poet’s thought, the steps of a dancer, the unfolding of a fan, the
foam of a wave or the movement of a curtain lifted by the wind; in Godard, the
rose of Carmen, a Beethoven quartet, the foam of waves on the beach evoking The
Waves by Virginia Woolf, and the surge of bodies in love. This sequence of
Prénom Carmen that I’m summarizing really shows the passage from one logic to
another. The choice of elements put into relation in effect restores a tradition of
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détournement: the Andalusian mountains become a weekend beach; romantic
smugglers become crazy terrorists; the discarded flower of which Don José sings
is only a plastic rose, and Micaela massacres Beethoven instead of singing Bizet
arias. But the détournement no longer has the function of a political critique of
high art. On the contrary, it effaces the picturesque imagery to which the critique
appeals in order to let the Bizet characters be reborn as the pure abstraction of
a Beethoven quartet. It makes gypsies and toreadors disappear in the melting
music of images that unites, in the same breath, the sound of strings, of waves
and of bodies. In opposition to the dialectical practice that accentuates the
heterogeneity of elements to provoke a shock, bearing witness to a reality
marked by antagonisms, mystery emphasises the kinship of the heterogeneous.
It constructs a game of analogies in which they witness a common world, where
the most distant realities appear as if cut from the same sensible fabric and can
always be linked by what Godard calls the ‘fraternity of metaphors’.
‘Mystery’ was the central concept of symbolism. And certainly, symbolism is
once again on the agenda. By that I’m not referring to certain spectacular and
slightly nauseous forms, like the resurrection of symbolist mythology and
Wagnerian fantasies of the total work of art in Matthew Barney’s Cremaster cycle
(1997–99). I’m thinking of the more modest, sometimes imperceptible way in
which assemblages of objects, images and signs presented by contemporary
installations have, over the last few years, slid the logic of provocative dissensus
into that of a mystery that bears witness to a co-presence. Elsewhere I have
mentioned the photographs, videos and installations of the exhibition ‘Moving
Pictures’, presented at the Guggenheim Museum in New York in 2002.6 It
affirmed contemporary art’s continuity with an artistic radicality born in the
1970s as a critique of both artistic autonomy and dominant representations. But
– in the image of Vanessa Beecroft’s videos presenting nude and inexpressive
female bodies in the museum space, in the photographs of Sam Taylor-Wood,
Rineke Dijkstra or Gregory Crewdson showing bodies of ambiguous identity in
undefined spaces, or in Christian Boltanski’s dark room with lightbulbs
illuminating walls covered in anonymous photographs – the interrogation of
perceptual stereotypes, which was always invoked, slid towards a completely
different interest in the vague borders between the familiar and the strange, the
real and the symbolic, that fascinated painters at the time of symbolism,
metaphysical painting and magic realism. However, on the upper level of the
museum, a video installation by Bill Viola was projected onto four walls of a dark
room: flames and deluges, slow processions, urban wanderings, a wake, or
casting off a ship, simultaneously symbolizing the four elements and the whole
cycle of birth, life, death and resurrection. The experimental art of video thus
came to manifest the latent tendency of many mechanisms of today that mimic,
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in their own ways, the great frescoes of human destiny that the symbolist and
expressionist period had a liking for.
Of course these categorizations are schematic. Contemporary exhibitions
and installations confer on the couple ‘to exhibit/to install’ several roles at once;
they play on the fluctuating border between critical provocation and the
undecidability of its meaning, between the form of an exhibited work and that
of the appointed space of interaction. The mechanisms of contemporary
exhibitions often cultivate this polyvalence or submit to its effect. The exhibition
Voilà thus presented an installation by Bertrand Lavier, Salle des Martin, which
gathered together about fifty paintings, from the collections of provincial
museums, that had as their only shared element the name of their author,
Martin – the most common surname in France. The initial idea set this
installation in relation to a questioning of the meanings of a work and of the
signature that is characteristic of conceptual art. But in this new memorial
context it took on a new meaning, attesting to the multiplicity of more or less
ignored pictorial abilities, and inscribing a lost world of painting in the memory
of the century. This multiplicity of meanings attributed to the same mechanisms
is sometimes presented as bearing witness to art’s democracy, refusing to
disentangle a complexity of standpoints and a fluidity of borders that
themselves reflect the complexity of a world.
The contradictory attitudes shown by the main aesthetic paradigms today
express a more fundamental undecidability about the politics of art. This
undecidability is not the effect of a postmodern turn. It is constitutive: aesthetic
suspension lets itself be interpreted in two ways. The singularity of art is linked
to the identification of its autonomous forms with the forms of life and with
possible politics. These possible politics are only ever realized in full at the price
of abolishing the singularity of art, the singularity of politics, or the two
together. Being conscious of this undecidability today leads to opposed feelings:
in some, a melancholy with regard to the shared world that art carried within
itself, if this had not been betrayed by political enrolment or commercial
compromises; in others, an awareness of its limits, the tendency to play on the
limitation of its powers and the very uncertainty of its effects. But the paradox
of our present is perhaps that this art, so uncertain of its politics, might be
invited to a higher degree of intervention by the very deficit of politics proper.
It’s as if the shrinking of public space and the effacement of political
inventiveness in a time of consensus gave a substitutive political function to the
mini-demonstrations of artists, to their collections of objects and traces, to their
mechanisms of interaction, to their provocations in situ or elsewhere. Knowing
if these ‘substitutions’ can recompose political spaces, or if they must be content
to parody them, is certainly one of the questions of today.
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1

The Junon Ludovisi is a statue described by Schiller in the fifteenth of his Letters on the Aesthetic
Education of Man (1794), and which is key to Rancière’s elucidation of the aesthetic regime of
art. For a fuller discussion see Jacques Rancière, ‘The Aesthetic Revolution and its Outcomes’,
New Left Review, March/April 2002. [Translator]

2

Stichomythic, from stychomathia – dialogue in alternate lines of verse, usually in disputation.
From Greek drama. [Translator]

3

Cf. Jacques Rancière, Le Destin des images (Paris: La Fabrique, 2003) 33.

4

Reference is made here to Michel de Certeau’s book Les Arts de faire (Paris: UGE, 1980).

5

Nicolas Bourriaud, Esthétique rélationnelle (Dijon: Les presses du réel, 1998) 37.

6

Jacques Rancière, Le Destin des images, op cit., 74–5.

Jacques Rancière, ‘Problems and Transformations in Critical Art’, Malaise dans l’esthétique (Paris:
Editions Galilée, 2004) 65–84. Translated by Claire Bishop, assisted by Pablo Lafuente, 2006.
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IT
IS
NOT
A
QUESTION
OF
KNOWING WHETHER
THIS
INTERESTS YOU
BUT
RATHER
OF
WHETHER YOU YOURSELF
COULD BECOME INTERESTING
UNDER NEW CONDITIONS
OF
CULTURAL CREATION
Guy Debord, Towards a Situationist International, 1957
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Guy Debord
Towards a Situationist International//1957

Shortly before abandoning visual art for film and literature, Guy Debord outlined his
theory of ‘constructed situations’ – participatory events using experimental behaviour
to break the spectacular bind of capitalism. Constructed situations, in which the
audience is an active participant, have been an ongoing point of reference for
contemporary artists working with live events.
Our central purpose is the construction of situations, that is, the concrete
construction of temporary settings of life and their transformation into a higher,
passionate nature. We must develop an intervention directed by the complicated
factors of two great components in perpetual interaction: the material setting of
life and the behaviours that it incites and that overturn it.
Our prospects for action on the environment lead, in their latest development,
to the idea of a unitary urbanism. Unitary urbanism first becomes clear in the use
of the whole of arts and techniques as means cooperating in an integral
composition of the environment. This whole must be considered infinitely more
extensive than the old influence of architecture on the traditional arts, or the
current occasional application to anarchic urbanism of specialized techniques or
of scientific investigations such as ecology. Unitary urbanism must control, for
example, the acoustic environment as well as the distribution of different varieties
of drink or food. It must take up the creation of new forms and the détournement
of known forms of architecture and urbanism – as well as the détournement of the
old poetry and cinema. Integral art, about which so much has been said, can only
materialize at the level of urbanism. But it can no longer correspond with any
traditional definitions of the aesthetic. In each of its experimental cities, unitary
urbanism will work through a certain number of force fields, which we can
temporarily designate by the standard expression district. Each district will be able
to lead to a precise harmony, broken off from neighbouring harmonies; or rather
will be able to play on a maximum breaking up of internal harmony.
Secondly, unitary urbanism is dynamic, i.e., in close touch with styles of
behaviour. The most reduced element of unitary urbanism is not the house but the
architectural complex, which is the union of all the factors conditioning an
environment, or a sequence of environments colliding at the scale of the
constructed situation. Spatial development must take the affective realities that
the experimental city will determine into account. One of our comrades has
promoted a theory of states-of-mind districts, according to which each quarter of
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a city would tend to induce a single emotion, to which the subject will consciously
expose herself or himself. It seems that such a project draws timely conclusions
from an increasing depreciation of accidental primary emotions, and that its
realization could contribute to accelerating this change. Comrades who call for a
new architecture, a free architecture, must understand that this new architecture
will not play at first on free, poetic lines and forms – in the sense that today’s
‘lyrical abstract’ painting uses these words – but rather on the atmospheric effects
of rooms, corridors, streets, atmospheres linked to the behaviours they contain.
Architecture must advance by taking as its subject emotionally moving situations,
more than emotionally moving forms, as the material it works with. And the
experiments drawn from this subject will lead to unknown forms.
Psychogeographical research, ‘study of the exact laws and precise effects of the
geographical environment, consciously organized or not, acting directly on the
affective deportment of individuals’, thus takes on its double meaning of active
observation of today’s urban areas and the establishment of hypotheses on the
structure of a situationist city. Psychogeography’s progress depends to a great
extent on the statistical extension of its methods of observation, but principally on
experimentation through concrete interventions in urbanism. Until this stage, the
objective truth of even the first psychogeographical data cannot be ensured. But
even if these data should turn out to be false, they would certainly be false
solutions to a genuine problem.
Our action on deportment, in connection with other desirable aspects of a
revolution in customs, can be defined summarily as the invention of a new species
of games. The most general aim must be to broaden the non-mediocre portion of
life, to reduce its empty moments as much as possible. It may thus be spoken of as
an enterprise of human life’s quantitative increase, more serious than the
biological processes currently being studied. Even there, it implies a qualitative
increase whose developments are unforeseeable. The situationist game stands out
from the standard conception of the game by the radical negation of the ludic
features of competition and of its separation from the stream of life. In contrast,
the situationist game does not appear distinct from a moral choice, deciding what
ensures the future reign of freedom and play. This is obviously linked to the
certainty of the continual and rapid increase of leisure, at a level corresponding to
that of our era’s productive forces. It is equally linked to the recognition of the fact
that a battle over leisure is taking place before our eyes whose importance in the
class struggle has not been sufficiently analyzed. To this day, the ruling class is
succeeding in making use of the leisure that the revolutionary proletariat
extracted from it by developing a vast industrial sector of leisure that is an
unrivaled instrument for bestializing the proletariat through by-products of
mystifying ideology and bourgeois tastes. One of the reasons for the American
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working class’s incapacity to become politicized should likely be sought amidst
this abundance of televised baseness. By obtaining through collective pressure a
slight rise in the price of its labour above the minimum necessary for the
production of that labour, the proletariat not only enlarges its power of struggle
but also widens the terrain of the struggle. New forms of this struggle then occur
parallel with directly economic and political conflicts. Revolutionary propaganda
can be said until now to have been constantly dominated in these forms of
struggle in all countries where advanced industrial development has introduced
them. That the necessary transformation of the base could be delayed by errors
and weaknesses at the level of superstructures has unfortunately been proven by
some of the twentieth century’s experiences. New forces must be hurled into the
battle over leisure, and we will take up our position there.
A first attempt at a new manner of deportment has already been achieved with
what we have designated the dérive, which is the practice of a passionate
uprooting through the hurried change of environments, as well as a means of
studying psychogeography and situationist psychology. But the application of this
will to ludic creation must be extended to all known forms of human relationships,
and must, for example, influence the historical evolution of emotions like
friendship and love. Everything leads to the belief that the main insight of our
research lies in the hypothesis of constructions of situations.
A man’s life is a sequence of chance situations, and if none of them is exactly
similar to another, at the least these situations are, in their immense majority, so
undifferentiated and so dull that they perfectly present the impression of
similitude. The corollary of this state of affairs is that the singular, enchanting
situations experienced in life strictly restrain and limit this life. We must try to
construct situations, i.e., collective environments, ensembles of impressions
determining the quality of a moment. If we take the simple example of a gathering
of a group of individuals for a given time, and taking into account acquaintances
and material means at our disposal, we must study which arrangement of the site,
which selection of participants, and which incitement of events suit the desired
environment. Surely the powers of a situation will broaden considerably in time
and in space with the realizations of unitary urbanism or the education of a
situationist generation. The construction of situations begins on the other side of
the modern collapse of the idea of the theatre. It is easy to see to what extent the
very principle of the theatre – non-intervention – is attached to the alienation of
the old world. Inversely, we see how the most valid of revolutionary cultural
explorations have sought to break the spectator’s psychological identification with
the hero, so as to incite this spectator into activity by provoking his capacities to
revolutionize his own life. The situation is thus made to be lived by its
constructors. The role of the ‘public’, if not passive at least a walk-on, must ever
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diminish, while the share of those who cannot be called actors but, in a new
meaning of the term, ‘livers’,1 will increase.
Let us say that we have to multiply poetic objects and subjects (unfortunately
so rare at present that the most trifling of them assumes an exaggerated emotional
importance) and that we have to organize games of these poetic subjects among
these poetic objects. There is our entire programme, which is essentially
ephemeral. Our situations will be without a future; they will be places where
people are constantly coming and going. The unchanging nature of art, or of
anything else, does not enter into our considerations, which are in earnest. The
idea of eternity is the basest one a man could conceive of regarding his acts.
Situationist techniques have yet to be invented, but we know that a task
presents itself only where the material conditions necessary for its realization
already exist, or are at least in the process of formation. We must begin with a
small-scale, experimental phase. Undoubtedly we must draw up blueprints for
situations, like scripts, despite their unavoidable inadequacy at the beginning.
Therefore, we will have to introduce a system of notation whose accuracy will
increase as experiments in construction teach us more. We will have to find or
confirm laws, like those that make situationist emotion dependent upon an
extreme concentration or an extreme dispersion of acts (classical tragedy providing
an approximate image of the first case, and the dérive of the second). Besides the
direct means that will be used toward precise ends, the construction of situations
will require, in its affirmative phase, a new implementation of reproductive technologies. We could imagine, for example, live televisual projections of some
aspects of one situation into another, bringing about modifications and interferences. But, more simply, cinematic ‘news’ reels might finally deserve their name if
we establish a new documentary school dedicated to fixing the most meaningful
moments of a situation for our archives, before the development of these elements
has led to a different situation. The systematic construction of situations having to
generate previously non-existent feelings, the cinema will discover its greatest
pedagogical role in the diffusion of these new passions.
Situationist theory resolutely asserts a non-continuous conception of life. The
idea of consistency must be transferred from the perspective of the whole of a life
– where it is a reactionary mystification founded on the belief in an immortal soul
and, in the last analysis, on the division of labour – to the viewpoint of moments
isolated from life, and of the construction of each moment by a unitary use of
situationist means. In a classless society, it might be said, there will be no more
painters, only situationists who, among other things, make paintings.
Life’s chief emotional drama, after the never-ending conflict between desire
and reality hostile to that desire, certainly appears to be the sensation of time’s
passage. The situationist attitude consists in counting on time’s swift passing,
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unlike aesthetic processes which aim at the fixing of emotion. The situationist
challenge to the passage of emotions and of time will be its wager on always
gaining ground on change, on always going further in play and in the
multiplication of moving periods. Obviously, it is not easy for us at this time to
make such a wager; however, even were we to lose it a thousand times, there is no
other progressive attitude to adopt.
The situationist minority was first formed as a trend within the lettrist left
wing, then within the Lettrist International, which it eventually controlled. The
same objective impulse is leading several contemporary avant-garde groups to
similar conclusions. Together we must discard all the relics of the recent past. We
deem that today an agreement on a unified action among the revolutionary
cultural avant-garde must implement such a programme. We do not have formulas
nor final results in mind. We are merely proposing an experimental research that
will collectively lead in a few directions that we are in the process of defining, and
in others that have yet to be defined. The very difficulty of arriving at the first
situationist achievements is proof of the newness of the realm we are entering.
What alters the way we see the streets is more important than what alters the way
we see painting. Our working hypotheses will be reconsidered at each future
upheaval, wherever it may come from.
We will be told, chiefly by revolutionary intellectuals and artists who for
reasons of taste put up with a certain powerlessness, that this ‘situationism’ is
quite disagreeable, that we have made nothing of beauty, that we would be better
off speaking of Gide, and that no one sees any clear reason to be interested in us.
People will shy away by reproaching us for repeating a number of viewpoints that
have already caused too much scandal, and that express the simple desire to be
noticed. They will become indignant about the conduct we have believed
necessary to adopt on a few occasions in order to keep or to recover our distances.
We reply: it is not a question of knowing whether this interests you, but rather of
whether you yourself could become interesting under new conditions of cultural
creation. Revolutionary artists and intellectuals, your role is not to shout that
freedom is abused when we refuse to march with the enemies of freedom. You do
not have to imitate bourgeois aesthetes who try to bring everything back to what
has already been done, because the already-done does not make them
uncomfortable. You know that creation is never pure. Your role is to search for
what will give rise to the international avant-garde, to join in the constructive
critique of its programme, and to call for its support.

for fighting, on the level of the passions, the influence of the propaganda methods
of late capitalism: to concretely contrast, at every opportunity, other desirable
ways of life with the reflections of the capitalist way of life; to destroy, by all
hyperpolitical means, the bourgeois idea of happiness. At the same time, taking
into account the existence among the ruling social class of elements who have
always cooperated, through boredom and need of novelty, in that which finally
entails the disappearance of these societies, we must urge persons who hold
certain of the vast resources that we lack to give us the means to carry out our
experiments, through an account analogous to what might be employed in
scientific research and might be quite profitable as well.
We must introduce everywhere a revolutionary alternative to the ruling
culture; coordinate all the enquiries that are happening at this moment without a
general perspective; orchestrate, through criticism and propaganda, the most
progressive artists and intellectuals of all countries to make contact with us with
a view to a joint action.
We must declare ourselves ready to resume discussion on the basis of this
platform with all those who, having taken part in a prior phase of our action, are
again capable of rejoining us.
We must advance the keywords of unitary urbanism, of experimental
behaviour, of hyperpolitical propaganda, and of the construction of environments.
The passions have been interpreted enough: the point now is to discover others.
1

In French, viveurs, a theatrical pun. Typically, the word means ‘rake’ or ‘playboy’, and was thus
commonly linked with the dubious morality of the theatrical world; here, Debord assigns it a new
meaning that recalls its roots in vivre, to live. [Translator]

Guy Debord, Rapport sur la construction des situations et sur les conditions de l’organisation et de l’action
de la tendence situationniste internationale (Paris: Internationale lettriste, July 1957), first presented by
Guy Debord to the founding conference of the Situationist International at Cosio d’Arroscia, July
1957; translated in Guy Debord and the Situationist International: Texts and Documents, ed. Tom
McDonough (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2002) 44–50.

Our Immediate Tasks
We must support, alongside the workers’ parties or extremist tendencies existing
within these parties, the necessity of considering a consistent ideological action
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Allan Kaprow
Notes on the Elimination of the Audience//1966

The emergence of Happenings in New York in the late 1950s was in part a response
to the gestural expressionism of Jackson Pollock’s paintings. Allan Kaprow sought
from the Happenings a heightened experience of the everyday, in which viewers
were formally fused with the space-time of the performance and thereby lost their
identity as ‘audience’.
Although the Assemblages’ and Environments’ free style was directly carried
into the Happenings, the use of standard performance conventions from the
very start tended to truncate the implications of the art. The Happenings were
presented to small, intimate gatherings of people in lofts, classrooms,
gymnasiums and some of the offbeat galleries, where a clearing was made for
the activities. The watchers sat very close to what took place, with the artists and
their friends acting along with assembled environmental constructions. The
audience occasionally changed seats as in a game of musical chairs, turned
around to see something behind it, or stood without seats in tight but informal
clusters. Sometimes, too, the event moved in and amongst the crowd, which
produced some movement on the latter’s part. But, however flexible these
techniques were in practice, there was always an audience in one (usually static)
space and a show given in another.
This proved to be a serious drawback, in my opinion, to the plastic
morphology of the works, for reasons parallel to those which make galleries
inappropriate for Assemblages and Environments. But it was more dramatically
evident. The rooms enframed the events, and the immemorial history of cultural
expectations attached to theatrical productions crippled them. It was repeatedly
clear with each Happening that in spite of the unique imagery and vitality of its
impulse, the traditional staging, if it did not suggest a ‘crude’ version of the
avant-garde Theatre of the Absurd, at least smacked of night club acts, side
shows, cock fights and bunkhouse skits. Audiences seemed to catch these
probably unintended allusions and so took the Happenings for charming
diversions, but hardly for art or even purposive activity. Night club acts can of
course be more than merely diverting, but their structure of ‘grammar’ is
unusually hackneyed and, as such, is detrimental to experimentation and change.
Unfortunately, the fact that there was a tough nut to crack in the Happenings
seems to have struck very few of its practitioners. Even today, the majority
continues to popularize an art of ‘acts’ which often is well-done enough but

102//ARTISTS’ WRITINGS

fulfils neither its implications nor strikes out in uncharted territory.
But for those who sensed what was at stake, the issues began to appear. It
would take a number of years to work them out by trial and error, for there is
sometimes, though not always, a great gap between theory and production. But
gradually a number of rules-of-thumb could be listed: […]
(F) It follows that audiences should be eliminated entirely. All the elements –
people, space, the particular materials and character of the environment, time –
can in this way be integrated. And the last shred of theatrical convention
disappears. For anyone once involved in the painter’s problem of unifying a field
of divergent phenomena, a group of inactive people in the space of a Happening
is just dead space. It is no different from a dead area of red paint on a canvas.
Movements call up movements in response, whether on a canvas or in a
Happening. A Happening with only an empathic response on the part of a seated
audience is not a Happening but stage theatre.
Then, on a human plane, to assemble people unprepared for an event and say
that they are ‘participating’ if apples are thrown at them or they are herded
about is to ask very little of the whole notion of participation. Most of the time
the response of such an audience is half-hearted or even reluctant, and
sometimes the reaction is vicious and therefore destructive to the work (though
I suspect that in numerous instances of violent reaction to such treatment it was
caused by the latent sadism in the action, which they quite rightly resented).
After a few years, in any case, ‘audience response’ proves to be so predictably
pure cliché that anyone serious about the problem should not tolerate it, any
more than the painter should continue the use of dripped paint as a stamp of
modernity when it has been adopted by every lampshade and Formica
manufacturer in the country.
I think that it is a mark of mutual respect that all persons involved in a
Happening be willing and committed participants who have a clear idea what
they are to do. This is simply accomplished by writing out the scenario or score
for all and discussing it thoroughly with them beforehand. In this respect it is
not different from the preparations for a parade, a football match, a wedding or
religious service. It is not even different from a play. The one big difference is
that while knowledge of the scheme is necessary, professional talent is not; the
situations in a Happening are lifelike or, if they are unusual, are so rudimentary
that professionalism is actually uncalled for. Actors are stage-trained and bring
over habits from their art that are hard to shake off; the same is true of any other
kind of showman or trained athlete. The best participants have been persons not
normally engaged in art or performance, but who are moved to take part in an
activity that is at once meaningful to them in its ideas yet natural in its methods.
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There is an exception, however, to restricting the Happenings to participants
only. When a work is performed on a busy avenue, passers-by will ordinarily
stop and watch, just as they might watch the demolition of a building. These are
not theatre-goers and their attention is only temporarily caught in the course of
their normal affairs. They might stay, perhaps become involved in some
unexpected way, or they will more likely move on after a few minutes. Such
persons are authentic parts of the environment.
A variant of this is the person who is engaged unwittingly with a performer
in some planned action: a butcher will sell certain meats to a customerperformer without realizing that he is a part of a piece having to do with
purchasing, cooking, and eating meat.
Finally, there is this additional exception to the rule. A Happening may be
scored for just watching. Persons will do nothing else. They will watch things,
each other, possibly actions not performed by themselves, such as a bus stopping
to pick up commuters. This would not take place in a theatre or arena, but
anywhere else. It could be an extremely meditative occupation when done
devotedly; just ‘cute’ when done indifferently. In a more physical mood, the idea
of called-for watching could be contrasted with periods of action. Both normal
tendencies to observe and act would now be engaged in a responsible way. At
those moments of relative quiet the observer would hardly be a passive member
of an audience; he would be closer to the role of a Greek chorus, without its
specific meaning necessarily, but with its required place in the overall scheme.
At other moments the active and observing roles would be exchanged, so that by
reciprocation the whole meaning of watching would be altered, away from
something like spoon-feeding, towards something purposive, possibly intense
[…]
Allan Kaprow, Assemblages, Environments and Happenings (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1966) 187–8;
195–8.
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Hélio Oiticica
Dance in My Experience (Diary Entries)//1965–66

No account of collective production and reception in art is complete without
reference to the work and writings of the Brazilian artist Hélio Oiticica. By the mid1960s, Oiticica was collaborating with participants from the samba schools of the Rio
favelas to produce disruptive events based around dancing in parangolé capes (see
footnote below). The emphasis was on a Dionysian loss of self in social fusion.
Before anything else I need to clarify my interest in dance, in rhythm, which in
my particular case came from a vital necessity for disintellectualization. Such
intellectual disinhibition, a necessary free expression, was required since I felt
threatened by an excessively intellectual expression. This was the definite step
towards the search for myth, for a reappraisal of this myth and a new foundation
in my art. Personally, it was therefore an experience of the greatest vitality –
indispensable, particularly in the demolition of preconceived ideas and
stereotypification, etc. As we will see later, there was a convergence of this
experience with the form that my art took in the Parangolé1 and all that relates
to this (since the Parangolé influenced and changed the trajectory of the Nuclei,
Penetrables and Bólides).2 Moreover, it was the beginning of a definitive social
experience; I am still unaware of the direction which this will take.
Dance is par excellence the search for a direct expressive act; it is the
immanence of the act. Ballet dance, on the contrary, is excessively
intellectualized through the presence of choreography that searches to
transcend this act. However, the ‘Dionysian’ dance, which is born out of the
interior rhythm of the collective, exteriorizes itself as a characteristic of popular
groupings, nations, etc. In these, improvisation reigns, as opposed to organized
choreography; in fact the freer the improvisation the better. It is as if an
immersion into rhythm takes place, a flux where the intellect remains obscured
by an internal mythical force that operates at an individual and collective level
(in fact, in this instance one cannot establish a distinction between the collective
and the individual). The images are mobile, rapid, inapprehensible – they are the
opposite of the static icon that is characteristic of the so-called fine arts. In
reality, dance, rhythm, is the actual aesthetic act in its essential raw state –
implied here is the direction towards the discovery of immanence. Such an act,
the immersion into rhythm, is a pure creative act, it is an art. It is the creation of
the actual act, of continuity, and also, like all acts of creative expression, it is a
producer of images. Actually, for me it provided a new discovery of the image, a
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recreation of the image, encompassing unavoidably the aesthetic expression in
my work.
The collapse of social preconceived ideas, of separations of groups, social
classes etc., would be inevitable and essential in the realization of this vital
experience. I discovered here the connection between the collective and
individual expression – the most important step towards this – which is the
ability not to acknowledge abstract levels, such as social ‘layers’, in order to
establish a comprehension of a totality. The bourgeois conditioning which I had
been submitted to since I was born undid itself as if by magic – I should mention,
in fact, that the process was already under way even before I was aware of it. The
unbalance that was entailed by this social dislocation, from the continuous
discrediting of the structures that rule our life in this society, specifically here in
Brazil, was both inevitable and charged with problems. These, far from being
overcome, renew themselves every day. I believe that the dynamics of the social
structures were at this moment revealed to me in all their crudity, in their most
immediate expression, precisely due to my process of discrediting the so-called
social layers. Not that I consider their existence but that, for me, they have
become schematic, artificial, as if all of a sudden I gazed from a vantage point
onto their map, their scheme, being ‘external’ to them. Marginalization,
naturally an already present characteristic of the artist, has become fundamental
for me. This position represents a total ‘lack of social place’, at the same time as
being the discovery of my own ‘individual place’ as a total man in the world, as
a ‘social being’ in the total sense, as opposed to being included in a particular
social layer or ‘elite’ – not even in the artistic marginal elite, but that exists (I
speak of the true artists, and not of the habitués of art). No, the process here is
more profound: it is a process in society as a whole, in practical life, in the
objective world of being, in the subjective lived experience – it would be the will
for an integral position, social in its most noble meaning, free, total. What
interests me is the ‘total act of being’, which is what I experiment with here –
not partial total acts, but a ‘total act of life’, irreversible, an unbalance for the
equilibrium of being.
The old position with regards to the work of art has stagnated – even in those
works that today do not demand spectator participation, what they propose is
not a transcendental contemplation but a ‘being’ in the world. Dance too does
not propose an ‘escape’ from this immanent world, but reveals it in all its
plenitude – what for Nietzsche would be the ‘Dionysian drunkenness’ is in
reality the ‘expressive lucidity of the act’s immanence’, an act itself not
characterized by any partiality but by its totality as such – a total expression of
the self. Would this not be the philosopher’s stone of art? The Parangolé for
instance, when it demands participation through dance, is a mere adaptation of
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this structure and vice-versa with regard to this structure in dance – this is
simply a transformation of this ‘total act of the self’. The gesture, the rhythm,
take on a new form which is determined by the demands of the Parangolé’s
structure, being that pure dance is a trace of this structural participation – it is
not a question of determining value levels in terms of one or another expression,
since they are both (pure dance and dance in the Parangolé) total expressions.
What has been conventionally described as ‘interpretation’ also suffers a
transformation today – it is not a question of repeating, in some cases, of course,
a creation (a song for example), giving it greater or lesser expression according
to the interpreter.3 Today an interpreter can reach such an important level that
the actual song (or any other form) is surpassed. It is not a case of individual
‘celebrity’, although this also occurs, but of a real expressive valorization. In the
old days ‘celebrity status’ served the purpose of immortalizing interpreters
according to their creation based upon famous works (in opera and theatre).
Today the issue is different: even if the works that are interpreted are not great
creations, fantastic musicals (in the field of popular music for example) the
interpreter reaches a high expressive level – a singer such as Nat King Cole for
example, creates a ‘vocal expressive structure’ that is independent from the
songs he interprets. This is a creation that is not simply interpretative but
pertains to a highly expressive vocalist. An actor such as Marilyn Monroe for
example, due to her all-encompassing interpretative presence, possesses above
all else a creative quality, which is structurally expressive. Her presence in
certain mediocre films makes these films uncommonly interesting, a fact that is
due to her action as interpreter. What is interesting here is the vocalization of
Nat and the interpretative act of Marilyn, independent of the quality of the
interpreted score or script, even if these possess, of course, a value that is
relative and not absolute as before.
10 April 1966 (continuation)
The experience of dance (of samba) therefore gave me the exact idea of what
creation through the corporal act may be, a continuous transformability. On the
other hand however, it revealed what I call the ‘being’ of things, that is, the static
expression of objects, their expressive immanence, which in this case is the
immanence of the corporal expressive act, which transforms itself continuously.
The opposite, the non-transformability, is not exactly the fact of ‘not
transforming oneself in time and space’ but in the immanence that is revealed
in its structure, founding within the world, in the objective space that it
occupies, its unique place, and this too is a Parangolé-structure. I cannot consider
today the Parangolé as a structure that is kinetically-transformable by the
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spectator but neither can I consider it as its opposite; that is, the things or, better
still, the objects that are create a different relation with objective space: they
‘dislocate’ the environmental space away from obvious, already known,
relations. Here is the key to what I will call ‘environmental art’: the eternally
mobile, the transformable, which is structured by both the action of the
spectator and that which is static. The latter is also transformable in its own way,
depending on the environment in which it is participating as a structure. It will
be necessary to create ‘environments’ for these works – the actual concept of
‘exhibition’ in its traditional sense, is changed, since to ‘exhibit’ such work does
not make sense (this would be a lesser partial interest) – structural spaces that
are free both to the participation and to the creative inventions of spectators. A
pavilion, one of those used these days for industrial exhibitions (how more
interesting they are than anaemic little art shows!), would be ideal for such a
purpose – it would be an opportunity for a truly efficient experience with the
people, throwing them into the creative participatory notion, away from the
‘elite exhibitions’ so fashionable today. This experience should range from the
‘givens’ that have already been produced, the ‘livings’ that structure as if
architecturally the routes to be traced, to the ‘transformable givens’ that demand
whatever inventive participation from the spectator (be it to dress and unfold or
dance) and the ‘givens to be made’, that is, the raw material that would be
supplied so that each person can construct or create whatever they like, since
motivation, the stimulus, is born from the simple fact of ‘being there for that’.
The execution of such a plan is complex, demanding rigorous prior
organization, and obviously a team. The varied and multiple categories to be
explored (elsewhere I will explain what I consider to be the structural categories
in this new concept of mine, ‘environmental art’) in fact being and indeed
requiring the collaboration of various artists with differing ideas, solely
concentrated on this general idea of a ‘total participatory creation’ – to which
would be added works created through the anonymous participation of the
spectators, who actually would be better described as ‘participants’.
1

invited to walk through the tonal differentiations stepping on the gravel that surrounds the
structure. The first in the series of Penetrables that Oiticica would develop was PN1 (1960). Here
the viewer enters an orange/yellow cabin with sliding walls, literally entering into colour. The
Penetrables vary in material and complexity. They remain in the artist’s repertoire throughout
his transition from concerns with colour into his late 1960s experiments, which he would define
environmental art. Bólides could be loosely translated as ‘fireballs’; they are generally vessels
that vary greatly in dimensions, materials and functions. Oiticica’s early Bólides were boxes
made of wood, and/or glass containing pigment or fabric that would be manipulated by the
viewer such as Box-Bólide 9 (1964) and Glass Bólide 1 (1963). Bólides soon acquired a readymade
element such as in Glass Bólide 10. Homage to Malevich (1965) in which two bottles (one opaque
yellow, the other translucent) would be placed side by side. [Translator]
3

Interpreter is here used as the term for a musician who plays or sings a song composed by
someone else. [Translator]

Hélio Oiticica, ‘Dance in my Experience’, Diary entry, 12 November 1965; reprinted in Figueiredo, L.,
Pape, L., Salomao, W., eds, Hélio Oiticica: Aspiro ao Grande Labirinto (Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 1986)
72–5; and ‘continuation 10 April 1966’ (ibid.) 75–6. Translated by Michael Asbury, 2006.

The Parangolés (a slang term meaning ‘an animated situation and sudden confusion and/or
agitation between people’) were strangely weighted capes made from unusual fabrics that
encouraged wearers to move and dance, and forged a circular relationship between watcher and
wearer.

2

Hélio Oiticica used generic terms that defined groups of works such as the Parangolés. His
Núcleus installations comprised ‘floating panels’ (acrylic on wood) that hung from latticed
structures. Each panel would contain a particular variation in colour, yellow or orange being the
predominant tones. With Núcleo NC1 (1960) the viewer gazes through the structure, directly or
indirectly through the mirror placed on the floor. With Grande Núcleo (1960) the viewer is
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Lygia Clark and Hélio Oiticica
Letters//1968–69

Hélio Oiticica and Lygia Clark shared an intense artistic dialogue throughout their
careers. Excerpts of their correspondence below trace the evolution of their thinking,
from interactive sculptural objects to group events that addressed external relations
(Oiticica) and interior psychological states (Clark). For both artists, a key term was
vivências, or lived experience: the body’s heightened sensory presence as authentic,
immediate, and resistant to ideological capture.
26 October 1968
Dearest HéliCaetaGério,1
[…]
Since Caminhando [Walking, 1963], the object for me has lost its significance, and
if I still use it, it is so that it becomes a mediator for participation. With the
sensorial gloves, for example, it gives the measure of the act and the miraculous
character of the gesture, with its spontaneity, which seems to have been
forgotten. In all that I do, there really is the necessity of the human body, so that
it expresses itself or is revealed as in a first [primary] experience. For me it
doesn’t matter whether I am avant-garde or placed within new theories. I can
only be what I am and I still intend to produce those films in which man is at the
centre of the event. For me, the stones that I come across, or the plastic bags, are
one and the same: they are there only to express a proposition. I don’t see why
we should negate the object simply because we have constructed it. It is
important that it should be expressive. If I feel in my life today the state that you
feel and define as hallucinatory, it is because through these propositions I have
learnt to feel these same moments, and if I had not done so, perhaps I would
have never discovered these same moments that are fantastic. What I want is to
avoid schematizing anything, and each day eat a new ‘pear’, to see if it’s good or
not. Mario’s [Pedrosa] term, as always is excellent, but for me it is not about the
moment of chance but the ‘fruit’ of the moment. Fruit in the fruit sense, such is
the flavour and the sensuality of eating, of living this moment. I also found it
very good when you said that already in the rudimentary element the open
structures are liberated despite the fact that we use it precisely because we no
longer believe in the aesthetic concept. At the end your text is splendid with
regard to the poetic lived experience [vivência poética] and the subjective charge,
only I do not believe, as I mentioned above, in the marginality of who proposes;
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what’s great is this diversity of positions, since as long as there is contradiction
and negation there is also confirmation of a reality.
[…]
Thousand of kisses to this new HélioCaetaGério!
Clark
8 November 1968
Lygia, my Dear
[…]
Your letter, as always, was fantastic. This issue of being deflowered by the
spectator is the most dramatic thing: in fact everyone is, since beyond the action
there is the moment-consciousness of each action, even if this consciousness is
modified later on, or incorporates other lived experiences [vivências]. This
business of participation is really terrible since it is what is actually
inconceivable that manifests itself in each person, at each moment, as if taking
possession: like you, I also felt this necessity of killing the spectator or
participator, which is a good thing since it creates an interior dynamic with
regard to the relation. Contrary to what has been happening a lot lately, it shows
that there is no aestheticization of participation: the majority creates an
academicism of the relation or of the idea of spectator participation, to such an
extent that it has left me with doubts about the idea itself. The other day with
[Mário] Schemberg I discussed this issue a lot over here: he thinks in fact that
there is no participation, or this issue, which is perhaps due to his exaggerated
generalization with regard to this. What I think is that the formal aspect of this
issue was overcome some time ago, by the ‘relation in itself’, its dynamic, by the
incorporation of all the lived experiences of precariousness, by the nonformulated; and sometimes what appears to be participation is a mere detail of
it, because the artist cannot in fact measure this participation, since each person
experiences it differently. This is why there is this unbearable experience
[vivência] of ours, of being deflowered, of possession, as if he, the spectator,
would say: ‘Who are you? What do I care if you created this or not? Well, I am
here to modify everything, this unbearable shit that proposes dull experiences,
or good ones, libidinous, fuck you, and all of this because I devour you, and then
I shit you out; what is of interest only I can experience and you will never
evaluate what I feel and think, the lust that devours me.’ And the artist comes
out of it in tatters. But it is good. It is not, as one could imagine, a question of
masochism, it’s just the true nature of the business. It’s funny, something I
experienced the other day has, to a certain extent, a relation to all of this, I’m not
sure if you’ll agree: the idol, the artist person who uses himself in order to
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express. Caetano [Veloso] for example, when he sings and does all of that, is
totally devoured, in an almost physical sense: once coming out from Chacrinha
[music show recorded for TV], I saw in the corridors millions of students,
adolescents, in an incredible fury, grabbing him to ask for autographs, but in
reality it was not only that. The true, profound meaning of all of that was of a
veritable coitus – Caetano reacted passively, relax [originally in English], as you
would say, but the whole thing scared me profoundly, such a collective fury in
contrast with the noble and delicate intentions of Caetano: a poet, ultrasensitive, all of a sudden is thrown into an arena of wild beasts, but beasts not in
the sense of animals from which you have to defend yourself physically more
than psychologically, but human-beasts, like me and you, children almost, each
one projecting their own psychological charge in a terrible manner. Something
worse happened: at that crap song festival, during the São Paulo preliminaries
that I watched on TV, the fury of the organized fan-clubs in the audience
functioned as acclamation, equal but in reverse, but ultimately booing and
applause become identified with devouring. The audience screamed, booed like
I have never seen before, to the point that it was no longer possible to sing.
When the song was selected to go on to the next stage, then it was even worse:
it was as if the intellectual intention of destruction became conscious of itself. If
Caetano had been at people’s reach he would have been destroyed in a
horrendous manner: everyone shouted queer, queer, queer, and threw objects,
bits of wood at him and the Mutantes [pop/rock band inspired by the Beatles
and psychedelia] and then they turned their backs to the stage. Then the
Mutantes also turned their backs to the audience and Caetano stopped singing
and said the most dramatic and profound things I have ever seen, not due to the
words themselves but in the sense of their closure and what they represented at
that moment. It was incredible, and do you know what it reminded me of? The
scene with Abel Gance’s Napoleon in front of the tribunal with that travelling
that Gance made, imitating the movement of the sea, remember? This is what is
terrible: the disjunction between the always noble, etc., intentions of the artist
and the fury of the participatory relation. I believe that that moment revealed
many things for me, especially the ‘well nourished’ appearance of people, of the
destructive fury, as if that moment of lack of repression was a chance for
destruction, which to an extent it always is. But it is a good test of the validity of
the proposition: to not accept passively is more important than to accept
everything, and in this dynamic of the relation new possibilities arise which,
even if painful, are essential. I believe that perhaps in Venice you experienced
this in relation to the work-spectator-creator, and the will to kill him, to push
aside people’s unbearable lust; this is important within the dialectics of the
issue: because giving does not push aside the taking; on the contrary, it
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stimulates it, in an erotic way too. As Marcuse would say, it liberates the Eros
that is repressed by repressive activities: the relax in participation is a nonrepressive activity, which confuses and liberates truly unpredictable forces, and
in this, I believe, you base yourself on your own experience, which is also highly
revolutionary; this is the great current issue.
I believe that our great innovation is precisely the form of participation, that is,
its meaning, which is where we differ from what is proposed in super-civilized
Europe or in the USA: we have here a far rougher scene, perhaps, because we
have reached these issues in a more violent manner. For example, your black
with white line phase, or even the one before that, even the breaking of the
frame, this type of painting contains a sui generis dramaticality that did not occur
even in Argentina, since the Argentines, to a certain extent, are more civilized,
more European than us: Brazil is a form of synthesis of the peoples, races, habits,
where the European speaks but does not speak so loudly, except in the
universalist, academic fields, which are not those of ‘cultural creation’ but those
of closure. Creation, even in Tarsila [do Amaral] and especially in Oswaldo de
Andrade,2 possesses a subjective charge that differs extremely from the
rationalism of the European, this is our ‘thing’,3 that Guy Brett was able to
understand so well and that the Europeans will have to swallow, in fact with
appetite since they are fed up with everything and it looks as if that saturated
civilization is drying their imagination.
[…]
Kiiiisses,
Hélio
14 November 1968
Dear Hélio
[…]
As far as the idea of participation is concerned, as always there are weak artists
who cannot really express themselves through thought, so instead they
illustrate the issue. For me this issue does indeed exist and is very important. As
you say, it is exactly the ‘relation in itself’ that makes it alive and important. For
example, this has been the issue in my work since the sixties; if we go back even
further to 1955, I produced the maquette for the house: ‘build your own living
space’. But it is not participation for participation’s sake and it is not a fact of
saying, like [Julio] Le Parc’s group [GRAV: Groupe de recherche d’art visuel] does,
that art is an issue for the bourgeoisie. It would be too simple and linear. There
is no depth in this simplicity and nothing is truly linear. They negate precisely
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what is important: thought. I think that now we are those who propose, and
through the proposition there should be thought, and when the spectator
expresses this proposition, he is in reality gathering the characteristic of a work
of art of all times: thought and expression. And for me all of this is connected.
From the option, the act, to immanence as a means of communication, and the
lack of any myth exterior to man and more so, in my fantasy, it connects itself
with the anti-universe where things are there because it happens now. It would
be perhaps the first occasion in which consciousness of the actual absolute is
achieved in the now. Another thing that I am very impressed with is today’s
youth who, like us, want to give themselves meaning from the inside towards
the outside as opposed to, as it has always been, from the outside towards the
inside. True participation is open and we will never be able to know what we
give to the spectator-author. It is precisely because of this that I speak of a well,
from inside which a sound would be taken, not by the you-well but by the other,
in the sense that he throws his own stone… My experience of deflowering is not
quite the same as yours. It is not myself who is deflowered but the proposal
itself. And when I cry about this phenomenon it is not because I feel wounded in
my personal integrity, but because they ruin everything and I have to start
constructing the work all over again. On the contrary, I don’t even put on my
masks and clothes, but I hope someone will come along and give meaning to the
formulation. And the more diverse the lived experiences are, the more open is the
proposition and it is therefore more important. In fact, I think that now I am
proposing the same type of issue that before was still achieved via the object:
the empty-full, the form and its own space, the organicity… Only now, with
these new sensorial masks, it is man who discovers himself in all his plenitude,
and even when he fills the plastic bags (what is important now is also to make
the mask) he feels that he is casting himself (in the sense that he exhales the air
and the bag takes shape). This same space that comes out of him, as he becomes
conscious of his own bodily space that goes beyond him, takes a form that would
fill the actual space around him. I for instance, feel that after formulating these
large plastic bags with my own lungs, when lying down on the floor in my flat I
could touch, with a simple gesture, the ceiling, which is no less than 6 metres
high… It is as if I had created an egg of space that belongs to me and that
embraces me. It would be the most organic Breathe with me [1966] yet less
illustrative! Man when putting on these masks turns himself into an authentic
beast, since the mask is his appendix, not like the first ones where there was in
fact a real mask. They turn themselves into monsters like elephants or enormous
birds with great crops. More and more [Mário] Pedrosa’s sentence functions for
my work: ‘man as the object of himself’. As you see, participation is increasingly
greater. There no longer is the object to express any concept but the spectator
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who reaches, more and more profoundly, his own self. He, man, is now a ‘beast’
and the dialogue is now with himself, to the extent of the organicity and also the
magic that he is able to borrow from within himself. As far as Caetano’s problem
is concerned, it is different since he is affected as a person but is an idol; he is the
opposite of myself, who no longer possesses anything, not even as a creative
artist who provides what is still a total oeuvre that in the end is my self. Each day
I loose more of my apparent personality, entering into the collective in search of
a dialogue and accomplishing myself through the spectator. And the crises,
when they arrive, appear in a more brutal manner, much more painful, yet they
pass by quicker than before…
[…]
Thousand of kisses and do write!
Clark
27 June 1969
Lygia, my love
[…]
Your letter:
I very much liked the ideas and incredible relations concerning you, that I wrote
about in another part of the enormous text that I prepared for the symposium I
mentioned. I’ll translate a section and I am sure you will love it, since, in fact
after I wrote it, I discovered in Marcuse’s most recent book a chapter in which he
proposes a ‘biological society’ that would be unrepressed and based upon a
direct chain of communication, the same thing I had thought about when
writing about your issues; see below in a certain passage of the text:
‘… the most recent experiences of Lygia Clark have led her to fascinating
proposals as she discovered that certainly her communication will have to be
more of an introduction to a practice that she calls cellular: From person to
person, this is an improvised corporal dialogue that can expand into a total chain
creating something of an all encompassing biological entity or what I would call a
crepractice.4 The idea of creating such relations goes beyond that of a facile
participation, such as in the manipulation of objects: there is the search for what
could be described as a biological ritual, where interpersonal relations are
enriched and establish a communication of growth at an open level. I say open
level, because it does not relate to an object-based communication, of subjectobject, but to an interpersonal practice that leads towards a truly open
communication: a me-you relation, rapid, brief as the actual act; no corrupted
benefit, of interest, should be expected – observations such as “this is nothing”
or “what is it about?”, etc., should be expected; an introduction as initiation is
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necessary. The elements that are used in all of these process-based experiences,
a vital process, are those that are a part of it instead of being isolated objects:
they are orders in a totality…’
[…]
A Kiss for you,
Hélio
1

HéliCaetaGério – composite name for Hélio Oiticica, Caetano Veloso and Rogério Duarte,
suggesting that Hélio was at that moment immersed in his ideas and activities respectively with
the singer/composer and the graphic designer/poet/composer [Translator]. For further reading
on the collaboration between Oiticica, Veloso, Duarte and others see Tropicália: A Revolution in

Graciela Carnevale
Project for the Experimental Art Series, Rosario//1968

1968 saw an irruption of politicized participatory practice in many countries, and
took a particularly dramatic form in Argentina. The Experimental Art Cycle was a
series of actions in Rosario, many of which worked on the audience as a privileged
artistic material. Graciela Carnevale’s project represents the most extreme example
of this approach. In the years that followed, Carnevale, like many of the artists
involved in the Cycle, abandoned art for teaching.

Brazilian Culture, ed. Carlos Basualdo (Chicago: Museum of Contemporary Art/São Paulo: Cosac
Naify, 2005).
2

The modernist poet Oswaldo de Andrade (1890–1954) was the author of polemical texts on
Brazilian cultural identity which influenced these artists, particularly his notion of ‘cultural
cannibalism’ in the ‘Anthropophagite Manifesto’ published in Revista de Antropofagia, No. 1 (São
Paulo, May 1928), translated in Dawn Adès, Art in Latin America: The Modern Era, 1820–1980
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

3

‘Pla’: slang meaning approximately ‘context’. [Translator]

4

‘Cre’ from create, see: Oiticica’s concept of Creleisure. [Translator]

Letters between Lygia Clark and Hélio Oiticica, reprinted in Luciano Figueiredo (ed), Lygia Clark -Hélio
Oiticica: Cartas (1964-74) (Rio de Janeiro: Editora UFRJ, 1996) 61–2, 69–73, 83–6, 121–2. Translated
by Michael Asbury, 2006.
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The work consists of first preparing a totally empty room, with totally empty
walls; one of the walls, which was made of glass, had to be covered in order to
achieve a suitably neutral space for the work to take place. In this room the
participating audience, which has come together by chance for the opening, has
been locked in. The door has been hermetically closed without the audience
being aware of it. I have taken prisoners. The point is to allow people to enter
and to prevent them from leaving. Here the work comes into being and these
people are the actors. There is no possibility of escape, in fact the spectators have
no choice; they are obliged, violently, to participate. Their positive or negative
reaction is always a form of participation. The end of the work, as unpredictable
for the viewer as it is for me, is nevertheless intentioned: will the spectator
tolerate the situation passively? Will an unexpected event – help from the
outside – rescue him from being locked in? Or will he proceed violently and
break the glass?
Through an act of aggression, the work intends to provoke the viewer into
awareness of the power with which violence is enacted in everyday life. Daily we
submit ourselves, passively, out of fear, or habit, or complicity, to all degrees of
violence, from the most subtle and degrading mental coercion from the
information media and their false reporting, to the most outrageous and
scandalous violence exercised over the life of a student.
The reality of the daily violence in which we are immersed obliges me to be
aggressive, to also exercise a degree of violence – just enough to be effective – in
the work. To that end, I also had to do violence myself. I wanted each audience
member to have the experience of being locked in, of discomfort, anxiety, and
ultimately the sensations of asphyxiation and oppression that go with any act of
unexpected violence. I made every effort to foresee the reactions, risks and
dangers that might attend this work, and I consciously assumed responsibility
for the consequences and implications. I think an important element in the
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conception of the work is the consideration of the natural impulses that get
repressed by a social system designed to create passive beings, to generate
resistance to action, to deny, in sum, the possibility of change.
The ‘lock up’ has already been incorporated in the verbal image (literature)
and in the visual image (film). Here the gambit is not filtered through anything
imaginary; rather it is experienced, at once vitally and artistically. I consider that
materializing an aggressive act on the aesthetic level as an artistic event
necessarily implies great risk. But it is precisely this risk that clarifies the art in
the work, that gives a clear sense of art, relegating to other levels of meaning
whatever psychological or sociological sense the work might have.
Graciela Carnevale, statement originally published as part of a series of brochures accompanying the
‘Cido de Me Experimental’. Carnevale’s exhibition took place in Rosario, 7–19 October 1968; trans.
Marguerite Feitlowitz, in Andrea Jiunta and Ines Katzenstein, eds, Listen, Here, Now! Argentine Art of
the 1960s (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 2004) 299–301.
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These people
are the actors.
There is no
possibility
of escape.
In fact the
spectators
have no
choice. They
are obliged
violently
to participate.
Graciela Carnevale, Project for the Experimental Art Series, Rosario, 1968
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Joseph Beuys and Dirk Schwarze
Report on a Day’s Proceedings at the Bureau
for Direct Democracy//1972
Joseph Beuys’ concept of ‘Social Sculpture’ remains an important reference for
contemporary artists such as Thomas Hirschhorn. The following report on Beuys’
Bureau for Direct Democracy (1972), a 100-day live installation at Documenta 5,
records in candid detail the type of relational encounters generated by his activist
approach. It is followed by ‘I am searching for field character’ (1973), Beuys’ most
concise statement on Social Sculpture.
30 June to 8 October 1972: Joseph Beuys runs an office of information for the
‘Organization for Direct Democracy through Referendum’ at Documenta 5.
Beuys’ participation in the Documenta was instituted with the intention of
representing and making known his expanding art concept through an office of
information at this internationally respected and visited art forum. During the
100 days of the Documenta, Beuys was present daily at this information office
and discussed with visitors the idea of direct democracy through referendum
and its possibilities for realization.
Report of a day’s proceedings in the office of Joseph Beuys, Fridericianum,
written by Dirk Schwarze:
10:00 a.m. The Documenta opens; Beuys, in a red fishing vest and felt hat, is
in his office. He has two co-workers. On the desk is a long-stemmed rose, next
to it are piles of handbills. On the wall with the window is a blue neon sign that
says ‘Office of the Organization for Direct Democracy through Referendum’.
Besides this, there are several blackboards on the walls. On each is written the
word ‘man’.
11:00 a.m. Until now about 80 visitors in the office. Half, however, remain
standing in the doorway and look around, others walk past the blackboards and
then remain longer in the office. Some only come to the door and leave in fright,
as if they had come into the wrong restroom.
11:07 a.m. The room fills up. Beuys offers a young man material and initiates
the first discussion. A young man asks about Beuys’ goal and thinks that at a
referendum 90 per cent would declare themselves in favour of the present
system. Beuys explains the present party structure, which is ruled from top to
bottom. He wants a system that is ruled from bottom to top. Still, if 60 per cent
voted for the present system in a referendum, it would be a success because
through it a new awareness could be created.
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11:20 a.m. The discussion expands: five listeners. A man who says he is a
member of a party takes part in the talk. Beuys explains his concept: ‘We do not
want to be a power factor, but an independent free school.’ The goal would be to
establish a whole network of offices as schooling places which would contribute
to consciousness formation. One must start with the present possibilities.
Referendum is provided for in the constitution of North Rhine-Westphalia. For a
vote of the Federal Diet Beuys recommends a vote of abstinence, linked to a
‘counter-demonstration’, to make clear why one is not voting. The party member
accepts the material: ‘This is very interesting to me.’
11:45 a.m. Up to now 130 visitors. The discussion continues, with eight
listeners. A young Swiss asks whether Beuys wants nationalization of industry.
The answer: ‘No, I have no use for nationalization, but I do want socialization.’
The state, whether east or west, appears to him as evil. He quotes Bishop
Dibelius, who describes the state as ‘the animal from underground’.
12:20 a.m. Up to now 210 visitors. A vigorous argument begins between
Beuys and a young man who designates himself a member of the German
Communist Party. Sixteen listeners. The young man calls Beuys’ activities
‘nonsense’, a waste of energy. ‘What have you accomplished?’ he asks, and
invites Beuys to join the workers’ movement rather than to lead an organization
that is financed by industrialists. Beuys replies: ‘You cannot think straight. I
cannot work with the concept of class. What is important is the concept of man.
One must straightforwardly realize what has not yet appeared in history,
namely, democracy.’
12:35 a.m. In the meantime 22 listeners. An elderly man joins in: ‘Can we talk
about the Documenta here and not just about politics?’ Beuys: ‘Politics and the
creativity of all are dealt with here.’ When the man speaks of the failure of the
exhibition because no one here is directly interested, Beuys asserts, ‘It is also a
failure on the part of the visitors, because they are not more capable of giving of
themselves.’
1:00 p.m. Until now 360 visitors. The vigorous talk with the Communist
Party member continues, 22 listeners. Beuys energetically defends himself
against the reproach that he indulges in a utopia, replying: ‘I am against a
revolution in which one drop of blood flows.’ Marxists, he says, are, for him,
devout fetishists in this connection.
1:05 p.m. A young woman: ‘Mr Beuys, your artworks are an ingredient in the
system – they can be bought.’ Beuys: ‘Everyone who lives in the system
participates in it. I make use of it through the sale of my work.’
1:30 p.m. Until now 450 visitors. At present thirty listeners. A middle-aged
man addresses Beuys regarding the possibilities of change through art. Beuys
wards it off: ‘Art is not there to overthrow the state. According to my concept of
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art, I want to affect all areas of life. What I practice here is my concept of art.’ He
admits, ‘I believe in man.’
2:00 p.m. Until now 535 visitors. After the distribution of materials a quiet
period sets in. Beuys fortifies himself: coffee and yogurt. He explains his models
to a young girl: Rudolph Steiner, Schiller, and Jean Paul.
2:30 p.m. A young man: ‘I don’t see the connection between your theories
and your felt objects.’ Beuys: ‘Many have seen only my objects, but not my
concepts, which belong to them.’
3:00 p.m. Until now 560 visitors. A young girl comes to Beuys and asks: ‘Is
this art?’ Answer: ‘A special type of art. One can think with it, think with it.’
4:05 p.m. Until now 625 visitors. Two Italians want to know whether Beuys
could be called a non-violent anarchist. Beuys says ‘yes.’
4:15 p.m. The office fills up again. A teacher asks: ‘Whom do you represent?
Democracy, what does that mean? What models do you have?’ Beuys: ‘I have no
historical model apart from reality and want to better these realities for the
well-being of all.’ An argument starts over whether direct or only representative
government is possible.
4:30 p.m. Until now 670 visitors. At present twenty listeners. An elderly man:
‘One is entertained too little here, there is so much at the Documenta that is
boring. Documenta is still too elite.’ Beuys: ‘Art is experiencing a crisis. All fields
are in a state of crisis.’
4:40 p.m. A young man: ‘You are a big earner on the German art market.
What do you do with the money?’ Beuys: ‘The money goes into this
organization.’
4:45 p.m. Eighteen listeners. Beuys suggests to a teacher that he resign his
civil service status; a lively discussion beings. The teacher argues that only Beuys
could accomplish such a thing, because he is a famous artist. The teacher: ‘My
situation is fairly bad. It’s easy for you to stand there with your moral
declarations.’
5:15 p.m. Until now 720 visitors. After a discussion of the role of the art
market as a middle market, another quiet period. The sale of the bags with the
schematic representation of ‘direct democracy’ is flourishing. For the first time
today a visitor asks for Beuys’ autograph on the bag.
6:00 p.m. Visitors slacken noticeably. Until now about 780 visitors.
7:40 p.m. A total of 811 visitors, of which 35 asked questions or discussed.
8:00 p.m. Beuys’ office closes.
Question To what extent do you believe an exhibition can be the most suitable
forum for passing on to the public the impulses which you hope to attain?
Beuys The place is relatively unimportant. I have thought this over for a long
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Beuys, in a red
fishing vest and
felt hat, is in his
office. He has two
co-workers. On the
desk is a long-stemmed
rose, next to it are
piles of handbills.
On the wall with the
window is a blue neon
sign that says ‘Office
of the Organization
for Direct Democracy
through Referendum’.
Besides this, there
are several blackboards
on the walls.
On each is written
the word ‘man’.
Joseph Beuys and Dirk Schwarze, Report on a Day’s Proceedings at the Bureau for Direct Democracy, 1972
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time. For example, I have the office here; it is a copy of my office in Düsseldorf,
which gives onto the street. This is so that people can come in right off the street.
It looks exactly like our office, exactly. And there anyone can come in. I have
thought about which is more effective: if I remain in Düsseldorf or if I climb onto
this platform and reach men here. I came very simply to the conclusion that it is
vacation time now in Düsseldorf; there we would have perhaps one visitor a day,
and here we can reach more people. Here I can reach people from all over the
world. Here I can establish international contacts. This is very important.
Question Do you see yourself as an individualist and do you see your office here
as an isolated department?
Beuys No, in no way. I do not see myself as being isolated here. I have all kinds
of possibilities here. I can speak freely with everyone. No one has prevented me
yet. Whether someone will try to in the future, that we will find out. (Laughing)
Yes, that we will find out, won’t we?
Question You have set up your office here at the fifth Documenta, and with it
you pursue not only political intentions but also artistic ones …
Beuys Because real future political intentions must be artistic. This means that
they must originate from human creativity, from the individual freedom of man.
For this reason here I deal mostly with the problem of education, with the
pedagogical aspect. This is a model of freedom, a revolutionary model of
freedom. It begins with human thought and with the education of man in this
area of freedom. And there must also be free press, free television, and so on,
independent of state influence. Just as there must be an educational system
independent of state influence. From this I attempt to develop a revolutionary
model which formulates the basic democratic order as people would like it,
according to the will of the people, for we want a democracy. It is part of the
fundamental law: all state power comes from the people.
The area of freedom – not a free area – I want to emphasize this, because they
are always being interchanged; people say Beuys wants a free area. I do not want
a free area, an extra area, but I want an area of freedom that will become known
as the place where revolution originates, changed by stepping through the basic
democratic structure and then restructuring the economy in such a way that it
would serve the needs of man and not merely the needs of a minority for their
own profit. That is the connection. And that I understand as art.
Joseph Beuys/Dirk Schwarze, report on a day’s proceedings at the Informationsbüros der

Joseph Beuys
I Am Searching for Field Character//1973

Only on condition of a radical widening of definition will it be possible for art and
activities related to art to provide evidence that art is now the only evolutionaryrevolutionary power. Only art is capable of dismantling the repressive effects of
a senile social system that continues to totter along the deathline: to dismantle
in order to build A SOCIAL ORGANISM AS A WORK OF ART.
This most modern art discipline – Social Sculpture/Social Architecture – will
only reach fruition when every living person becomes a creator, a sculptor or
architect of the social organism. Only then would the insistence on participation
of the action art of Fluxus and Happening be fulfilled; only then would democracy be fully realized. Only a conception of art revolutionized to this degree can
turn into a politically productive force, coursing through each person and
shaping history,
But all this, and much that is as yet unexplored, has first to form part of our
consciousness: insight is needed into objective connections. We must probe
(theory of knowledge) the moment of origin of free individual productive
potency (creativity). We then reach the threshold where the human being
experiences himself primarily as a spiritual being, where his supreme
achievements (work of art), his active thinking, his active feeling, his active will,
and their higher forms, can be apprehended as sculptural generative means,
corresponding to the exploded concepts of sculpture divided into its elements –
indefinite – movement – definite (see theory of sculpture), and are then
recognized as flowing in the direction that is shaping the content of the world
right through into the future.
This is the concept of art that carries within itself not only the
revolutionizing of the historic bourgeois concept of knowledge (materialism,
positivism), but also of religious activity.
EVERY HUMAN BEING IS AN ARTIST who – from his state of freedom – the
position of freedom that he experiences at first hand – learns to determine the
other positions in the TOTAL ARTWORK OF THE FUTURE SOCIAL ORDER. Selfdetermination and participation in the cultural sphere (freedom); in the structuring of laws (democracy); and in the sphere of economics (socialism). Selfadministration and decentralization (threefold structure) occurs: FREE
DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM.

Organisation für direkte Demokratie durch Volksabstimmung, Documenta 5 (Kassel, 1972);
translated in Adriani Götz, et al., Joseph Beuys: Life and Work (New York: Barron’s, 1979) 244–9.
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THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL is born
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Communication occurs in reciprocity: it must never be a one-way flow from the
teacher to the taught. The teacher takes equally from the taught. So oscillates –
at all times and everywhere, in any conceivable internal and external
circumstance, between all degrees of ability, in the work place, institutions, the
street, work circles, research groups, schools – the master/pupil,
transmitter/receiver, relationship. The ways of achieving this are manifold,
corresponding to the varying gifts of individuals and groups. THE
ORGANIZATION FOR DIRECT DEMOCRACY THROUGH REFERENDUM is one such
group. It seeks to launch many similar work groups or information centres, and
strives towards worldwide cooperation.
Joseph Beuys, ‘I am Searching for Field Character’ (1973), in Carin Kuoni, ed., Energy Plan for the

Collective Actions
Ten Appearances//1981

The five-person Collective Actions group, working in Moscow from the mid-1970s to
the mid-1980s, represent a particularly poetic and cerebral approach to
participation. Ten Appearances is typical of their work in taking place in fields
outside the city, with a small number of participants who took an active part in the
action and then contributed to its analysis. These gestures differ from Western
equivalents of this period in being preoccupied with art’s internal reception and
circulation, rather than in its relationship to social institutions.

Western Man: Joseph Beuys in America (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1990) 21–3.

In the middle of a large, snowed-over field surrounded by a forest, together with
the action’s organizers strode ten participants, knowing neither the name of that
in which they were about to participate, nor what was to happen.
Ten spools on vertical nails were affixed to a board (60 x 90 cm) which was
laid upon the snow. Each of the spools was wound with two to three hundred
metres of strong, white thread. Each of the participants was required to take the
end of a thread from one of the spools and, unravelling the thread from the
spool, move in a straight line into the forest surrounding the field. Thus the ten
participants were to have dispersed from the centre of the field in the following
directions:
I. Pivovarova
N. Kozlov

A. Zhigalov

V. Skersisi

L. Talochkin

Y. Albert

I.Chuikov
O. Vasiliev

V. Nekrasov
I. Kabakov

The participants were instructed to move in a straight line as far as the forest and
then, entering the forest, to continue on into the depths of the forest for about
another fifty to one hundred metres, or to the point where the field could no
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longer be seen. Each of the participants travelled three to four hundred metres.
Walking in the field and forest entailed a considerable physical effort, as the
snow ranged from half a metre to a metre in depth. Having completed his trek,
each participant (also according to prior instructions) was to pull to himself the
other end of the thread (which was not attached to the spool), to which a piece
of paper with factographic text (the last names of the organizers, time and place
of the action) was affixed.
In so far as no further instructions had been given, each participant, having
extracted his factography, was left to his own discretion as to further action;
they could return to the field’s centre, where the organizers remained, or, not
returning, leave this place behind, moving on further through the forest.
Eight participants came back to the centre of the field within an hour;
moreover, seven of them returned along their own paths, and one (N. Kozlov)
along a neighbour’s path. Two participants – V. Nekrasov and A. Zhigalov – did
not return.
The returning participants received photographs (30 x 40 cm), glued to
cardboard, from the organizers. Each photograph depicted the portion of the
forest into which the participant receiving that photo had walked at the
beginning of the action, and the scarcely distinguishable figure of a man
emerging from the forest. The photographs were outfitted with label/signatures
upon which were written the last names of the action’s authors, the action’s
name Ten Appearances, and the event ‘represented’ in the photograph; for
example, ‘The appearance of I. Chuikov on the first of February, 1981’, and so on.
These photographs were taken within the week before the action: the action’s
organizers photographed in a ‘zone of indifferentiation’ in the very same
directions in which the participants had been directed and from whence they
had returned.
Thus the name of the action and its full significance became clear to the
participants only at the moment when they received the photographs, and not
when they pulled the factographic documents, which signified only the
completion of the first stage of the action – the distancing of the participants
into portions of the forest visually isolated one from another (at the terminal
points of their paths out from the centre of the field, in the depths of the forest,
the participants could not see each other, as the interstices between these points
measured no less than four hundred metres). During the action, photographs
were taken of the actual appearances from the forest. These photographs could
be distinguished from those handed to the participants at the conclusion of the
action by the differing conditions of the forest (snow which had covered the
branches of the trees a week before the action had melted away), and by the
absence of the quotation marks, which on the first photographs had been placed
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around the names of the events depicted on them, i.e., in the given
circumstances the simple appearance of I. Chuikov, I. Kabakov, I. Pivovarova and
so on. The figures of the participants emerging from the forest were practically
indistinguishable from the figures in the first ‘metaphorical’ photographs, owing
to the fact that they were taken from equal distances (in the ‘zone of
indifferentiation’). The function of these ‘metaphorical’ photographs was, in the
case of the participants’ return, to indicate only the fact of their return (which
was utterly volitional, as no instruction to return had been given), without
adding any supplementary meaning to their prior acts of walking off and
dispersing into the depths of the forest. At the same time these ‘metaphorical’
photographs were signs of time extrademonstrational (for the participants) to
the event and were included in the structure of the action and served as its
‘empty act’. In other words, they were signs of the time between the ‘end’ of the
action and the moment when they were handed the photographs indicating
their appearance (or return) from the forest, which the participants did not
recognize and could not have recognized as the signified and culminating event
in the structure of the action.
The fact that of the ten possible appearances only eight, and not all ten, came
to pass, represents in our view not a failing of the action but, on the contrary,
underscores the realization of zones of psychic experience of the action as
aesthetically sufficient on the plane of the demonstrational field of the action as
a whole. This is to say that the planned appearance in reality turned out to lie
entirely in the extrademonstrational time of the event – the participant
appeared from a non-artistic, non-artificially-constructed space.
Collective Actions (Andrei Monastyrsky, Georgii Kizevalter, Sergei Romashko, Nikita Alekseev, Igor
Makarevich, Elena Elagina, Nikolai Panitkov), Ten Appearances (‘Kievi-Gorky’, Savel, Moscow
Province, February 1981); translated in David A. Ross, et al., eds, Between Spring and Summer – Soviet
Conceptual Art in the Era of Late Communism (Boston: Institute of Contemporary Art/Cambridge,
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1990) 157–8.
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Adrian Piper
Notes on Funk, I–II//1985/83

Adrian Piper’s Funk Lessons (1982–84), were a series of participatory social events
in which the artist taught white participants about black funk music and how to
dance to it. Her four essays entitled ‘Notes on Funk’ present a thoughtful analysis of
her intentions, experiences and of feedback from her collaborators.
Notes on Funk I
From 1982 to 1984, I staged collaborative performances with large or small
groups of people, entitled Funk Lessons. The first word in the title refers to a
certain branch of black popular music and dance known as ‘funk’ (in contrast, for
example, to ‘punk’, ‘rap’ or ‘rock’). Its recent ancestor is called ‘rhythm and blues’
or ‘soul’, and it has been developing as a distinctive cultural idiom, within black
culture since the early 1970s. Funk constitutes a language of interpersonal
communication and collective self-expression that has its origins in African
tribal music and dance and is the result of the increasing interest of
contemporary black musicians and the populace in those sources elicited by the
civil rights movement of the 1960s and early 1970s (African tribal drumming by
slaves was banned in the United States during the nineteenth century, so it
makes sense to describe this increasing interest as a ‘rediscovery’).
This medium of expression has been largely inaccessible to white culture, in
part because of the different roles of social dance in white as opposed to black
culture. For example, whereas social dance in white culture is often viewed in
terms of achievement, social grace or competence, or spectator-oriented
entertainment, it is a collective and participatory means of self-transcendence
and social union in black culture along many dimensions, and so is often much
more fully integrated into daily life. Thus it is based on a system of symbols,
cultural meanings, attitudes and patterns of movement that one must directly
experience in order to understand fully. This is particularly true in funk, where
the concern is not how spectacular anyone looks but rather how completely
everyone participates in a collectively shared, enjoyable experience.
My immediate aim in staging the large-scale performance (preferably with
sixty people or more) was to enable everyone present to
GET DOWN AND PARTY. TOGETHER.
This helps explain the second word in the title, that is, ‘Lessons’. I began by
introducing some of the basic dance movements to the audience, and discussing
their cultural and historical background, meanings, and the roles they play in
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black culture. This first part of the performance included demonstrating some
basic moves and then, with the audience, rehearsing, internalizing, re-rehearsing,
and improvising on them. The aim was to transmit and share a physical language
that everyone was then empowered to use. By breaking down the basic
movements into their essentials, these apparently difficult or complex patterns
became easily accessible to everyone. Needless to say, no prior training in or
acquaintance with dance was necessary. Because both repetition and individual
self-expression are both important aspects of this kind of dance, it was only a
matter of a relatively short time before these patterns became second nature.
However, sometimes this worked more successfully than others, depending on
the environment and the number and composition of the audience-participants.
(See my videotape, Funk Lessons with Adrian Piper, produced by Sam Samore and
distributed by The Kitchen, for a record of one of the more successful
performances.) Also, the large-scale performance compressed a series of lessons
that might normally extend over a period of weeks or months.
As we explored the experience of the dance more fully, I would gradually
introduce and discuss the music (which had, up to this point, functioned
primarily as a rhythmic background) and the relation between the dance and the
music: Because of the participatory and collective aspects of this medium, it is
often much easier to discern the rhythmic and melodic complexities of the music
if one is physically equipped to respond to it by dancing. Thus the first part of
the performance prepared the audience for the second. Here I concentrated on
the structural features that define funk music, and on some of its major themes
and subject matter, using representative examples. I would discuss the relation
of funk to disco, rap, rock, punk and new wave, and illustrate my points with
different selections of each. During this segment, except for brief pauses for
questions, dialogue and my (short) commentaries, everyone was refining their
individual techniques, that is, they were LISTENING by DANCING. We were all
engaged in the pleasurable process of self-transcendence and creative
expression within a highly structured and controlled cultural idiom, in a way
that attempted to overcome cultural and racial barriers. I hoped that it also
overcame some of our culturally and racially influenced biases about what ‘High
Culture’ is or ought to be. Again, this didn’t always work out (see ‘Notes on Funk III’).
The ‘Lessons’ format during this process became ever more clearly a kind of
didactic foil for collaboration: Dialogue quickly replaced pseudo-academic
lecture/demonstration, and social union replaced the audience-performer
separation. What I purported to ‘teach’ my audience was revealed to be a kind of
fundamental sensory ‘knowledge’ that everyone has and can use.
The small-scale, usually unannounced and unidentified spontaneous
performances consisted in one intensive dialogue or a series of intensive
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GET
DOWN

AND

PARTY
TOGETHER
Adrian Piper, Notes on Funk I, 1985

dialogues with anywhere from one to seven other people (more than eight
people tend to constitute a party, the interpersonal dynamics of which are very
different). I would have people over to dinner, or for a drink, and, as is standard
middle-class behaviour, initially select my background music from the Usual
Gang of Idiots (Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Brahms, etc.). I would then interpose
some funk and watch people become puzzled, agitated or annoyed, and then I
would attempt to initiate systematic discussion of the source of their dismay (in
fact these reactions to my unreflective introduction of the music into this social
context were what initially alerted me to the need to confront the issues
systematically and collaboratively in the performance context). This usually
included listening to samples of funk music and analyzing their structures, content
and personal connotations for each listener, in a sympathetic and supportive
atmosphere. Occasionally, it also included dance lessons of the kind described
previously, though this usually worked better with party-size or larger groups.
The intimate scale of the dialogue permitted a more extensive exploration of
individual reactions to funk music and dance, which are usually fairly intense
and complex. For example, it sometimes elicited anxiety, anger or contempt
from middle-class, college-educated whites: anxiety, because its association
with black, working-class culture engenders unresolved racist feelings that are
then repressed or denied rather than examined; anger; because it is both
sexually threatening and culturally intrusive to individuals schooled exclusively
in the idiom of the European-descended tradition of classical, folk, and/or
popular music; contempt, because it sounds ‘mindless’ or ‘monotonous’ to
individuals who, through lack of exposure or musicological training, are unable
to discern its rhythmic, melodic and topical complexity.
Alternately, funk sometimes elicited condescension or embarrassment from
middle-class, college-educated blacks: condescension, because it is perceived as
black popular culture, that is, relatively unsophisticated or undeveloped by
comparison with jazz as black high culture; embarrassment, because funk’s
explicit and aggressive sexuality and use of Gospel-derived vocal techniques
sometimes seem excessive by comparison with the more restrained, subdued,
white- or European-influenced middle-class lifestyle. Often this music is also
associated with adolescent popularity traumas concerning dancing, dating or
sexual competence. These negative associations linger into adulthood and inhibit
one’s ability even to listen to this genre of music without painful personal feelings.
These and other intense responses were sympathetically confronted,
articulated and sometimes exorcised in the course of discussing and listening to
the music. The result was often cathartic, therapeutic and intellectually
stimulating: to engage consciously with these and related issues can liberate one
to listen to and understand this art form of black, working-class culture without
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fear or shame, and so to gain a deeper understanding of the cultural and political
dimensions of one’s social identity. What follows are notes I took after having
staged the performance at different times. They are the fruit of my dialogues
with participants and of my observations of their responses to the performance.

Group Material
On Democracy//1990

Notes on Funk II
[…] I suppose that what finally vindicates the performances in my own eyes (as
well as the effort to continue engaging with very different kinds of people in
doing them) is the undeniable experience people seem to get, almost invariably,
from participating in them, including me: It just seems to be true that most of
my white friends feel less alienated from this aesthetic idiom after having
participated in it directly, and discussed their feelings about it in a receptive
context, regardless of their reservations about whether what I’m doing is ‘art’ or
not, whether funk deserves the legitimation of ‘high culture’ or not, and so on.
For me what it means is that the experiences of sharing, commonality and selftranscendence turn out to be more intense and significant, in some ways, than
the postmodernist categories most of us art-types bring to aesthetic experience.
This is important to me because I don’t believe those categories should be the
sole arbiters of aesthetic evaluation.
But perhaps the real point of it for me has to do with the ways in which it enables me to overcome my own sense of alienation, both from white and black
culture. As a Woman of Colour (I think that’s the going phrase these days; as my
parents often complain, ‘What’s the matter with ‘coloured’? Or ‘coloured
woman’? That was a good, serviceable, accurate description forty years ago!’)
who is often put in the moral dilemma of being identified as white and hence
subject to the accusation of ‘passing’, it gives me the chance to affirm and
explore the cultural dimensions of my identity as a black in ways that illuminate
my personal and political connection to other (more identifiably) black people,
and celebrate our common cultural heritage. At the same time, the piece enables
me to affirm and utilize the conventions and idioms of communications I’ve
learned in the process of my acculturation into white culture: the analytical
mode, the formal and structural analysis, the process of considered and
constructive rational dialogue, the pseudo-academic lecture/demonstration/
group participation style, and so on. These modes of fluency reinforce my sense
of identification with my audience and ultimately empower all of us to move
with greater ease and fluidity from one such mode to another. It also reinforces
my sense of optimism that eventually the twain shall meet!

The US collective Group Material began working in the late 1970s, producing
collaborative exhibitions with residents of their neighbourhood in Manhattan.
Throughout the 1980s their projects grew more critical of the Republican
government, particularly its policy on AIDS. The following text introduces
Democracy, a conference and installation project they organized at the Dia Arts
Foundation, New York, in 1988.

Adrian Piper, ‘Notes on Funk I (1985)’, ‘Notes on Funk II’ (1983), Out of Order, Out of Sight, Volume 1:
Selected Writings in Meta-Art, 1968–1992 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996) 195–8; 204.
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Participating in the system doesn’t mean that we must identify with it, stop
criticizing it, or stop improving the little piece of turf on which we operate.
– Judge Bruce Wright, Justice, New York State Supreme Court.

Ideally, democracy is a system in which political power rests with the people: all
citizens actively participate in the process of self-representation and selfgoverning, an ongoing discussion in which a multitude of diverse voices
converge. But in 1987, after almost two terms of the Reagan presidency and with
another election year at hand, it was clear that the state of American democracy
was in no way ideal. Access to political power was obstructed in complex ways,
participation in politics had degenerated into passive and symbolic involvement,
and the current of ‘official’ politics precluded a diversity of viewpoints. When
the Dia Art Foundation approached us with the idea of doing a project, it was
immediately apparent to us that democracy should serve as the theme.
The subject of democracy not only became our content but influenced our
method of working. This theme prompted a greater awareness of our own
process. One of the first questions we asked was: ‘Why are they asking us?’ To
us, the Dia Art Foundation signified ‘exclusive’, ‘white’, ‘esoteric’, and ‘male’,
whereas we had always attempted to redefine culture around an opposing set of
terms: ‘inclusive’, ‘multicultural’, ‘nonsexist’, and ‘socially relevant’. In general,
we see ourselves as the outspoken distant relative at the annual reunion who
can be counted on to bring up the one subject no one wants to talk about.
The subject that no one in the art world wants to talk about is usually politics.
Yet, because every social or cultural relationship is a political one, we regard an
understanding of the link between politics and culture as essential. ‘Politics’
cannot be restricted to those arenas stipulated as such by professional politicians.
Indeed, it is fundamental to our methodology to question every aspect of our
cultural situation from a political point of view, to ask, ‘What politics inform

Group Material//On Democracy//135

Particip-05-09-06

7/9/06

11:33

Page 136

accepted understandings of art and culture? Whose interests are served by such
cultural conventions? How is culture made, and for whom is it made?’
In conceptualizing this project, therefore, we proposed a structure that
differed from the conventional art exhibitions, lectures and panels that Dia had
previously sponsored. We identified four significant areas of the crisis in
democracy: education, electoral politics, cultural participation and AIDS. For
each topic, we collaboratively organized a round table discussion, an exhibition
and a town meeting. For each round table we invited individual speakers from
diverse professions and perspectives to participate in an informal conversation.
These discussions helped us to prepare the installations and provided important
information for planning the agendas for the town meetings.
Each of the four exhibitions that we installed at 77 Wooster Street reiterated
the interrelatedness of our subjects and the necessity of our collaborative
process. Our working method might best be described as painfully democratic:
because so much of our process depends on the review, selection and critical
juxtaposition of innumerable cultural objects, adhering to a collective process is
extremely time-consuming and difficult. However, the shared learning and ideas
produce results that are often inaccessible to those who work alone.
Our exhibitions and projects are intended to be forums in which multiple
points of view are represented in a variety of styles and methods. We believe, as
the feminist writer bell hooks has said, that ‘we must focus on a policy of
inclusion so as not to mirror oppressive structures’. As a result, each exhibition
is a veritable model of democracy. Mirroring the various forms of representation
that structure our understanding of culture, our exhibitions bring together socalled fine art with products from supermarkets, mass-cultural artefacts with
historical objects, actual documentation with homemade projects. We are not
interested in making definitive evaluations or declarative statements, but in
creating situations that offer our chosen subject as a complex and open-ended
issue. We encourage greater audience participation through interpretation.
One form of participation was the town meeting held for each exhibition.
These meetings were well publicized and were open to the public at large. In
selecting the town meeting format, we meant not only to allude to the
prototypical democratic experience but also to eliminate the demarcation
between experts and the public so evident at most public lectures. For the town
meetings all audience members were potential participants. Beyond the desire
to erode such traditional categories, our expectations for these discussions were
somewhat undefined. In the end, each town meeting had a life of its own,
determined not only by the moderator, but by who was in the audience and who
among them had the courage to speak up. Much of the public discussion built on
issues raised in the round table meetings, and it was gratifying to hear different
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people discussing their relation to those issues.
The final part of ‘Democracy’, and perhaps the most important, is this book.
Through this book we tried to encapsulate many of the ideas that went into and
came out of the Democracy Project in order to make them available to a far
wider public than could attend the events. We organized this publication very
much as we organize our exhibitions, bringing together a variety of voices and
points of view to address the issues. In this case, we hope that the results
provide a strong analysis of the current situation of democracy in America and
suggest possible means for responding to its challenges. […]
Group Material (Doug Ashford, Julie Ault, Felix Gonzalez-Torres), Democracy: A Project by Group
Material (Seattle: Bay Press, 1990) 1–3.
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Eda Cufer
Transnacionala/A Journey from the East to the
West//1996
The five-man Slovenian collective IRWIN are arguably the relational artists par
excellence of Eastern Europe. Their live installation NSK Embassy Moscow (1992)
addressed social and political relations in the post-Communist period, and the
construction of Eastern European identity. The following text by their frequent
collaborator, the artist Eda Cufer, is typical of their approach: a wry selfinterrogation and poignant analysis of the limitations of a discussion-based road
trip across the US, which the group undertook in 1996.
How to conceptualize post festum, an artistic event which, as such, took place
within individual and collective thought, in a flow of thoughts and emotions
largely determined by the very corporeity and directness of events, vanishing in
time as the journey progressed from mile to mile, from city to city, from meeting
to meeting?
The non-differentiated, subjective material of Transnacionala which the
journey’s participants brought home from this experience is a kind of amalgam
of images, impressions, memories and realizations. The banalities of everyday
life, which range from sleeping, eating, the cleaning of the crowded living
environment and self, to psychological tensions and attempts to relax – all
intertwine with more sublime impressions of unforgettable landscapes, wide
expanses and people; with reflections physically linked to these different banal
or exhaled states; with memories of conversations and memories of towns and
the atmospheres in which they took place; as well as with tentative syntheses
occasioned by thought-shifts between different time-space and existential
zones – between America, Europe and the world, between memories of local life
situations in Ljubljana, Moscow, New York and Chicago – all caught up in the dull
gaze and the monotonous image that defined, for hours and hours, the content
and basic situation of the motor homes.
Although it is difficult to part from this non-differentiated image, impression
and experience of Transnacionala, the three months that have elapsed since the
project ended in Seattle on 28 July 1996 provide a sufficient time-distance to
produce at least a rough reckoning of what the direct experience of the project
signifies, in respect to its initial conceptual points of departure.
One of these fundamental points, which specifically enabled the later
physical and metaphysical framework of the journey, was the positive
experience of the Apt Art project, more precisely, the NSK Embassy Moscow
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project which took place in 1993. The primary motive for Transnacionala was to
organize an international art project to take place outside the established
international institutional networks, without intermediaries, without a curatorformulated concept, and without any direct responsibility towards its sponsors.
In short, to organize a project as a direct network of individuals brought together
by a common interest in particularly open aesthetic, ethical, social and political
questions, all of whom would travel together for one month, exchange views,
opinions and impressions, meet new people in their local environments, and try
to expand the network based on the topicality of questions posed –
spontaneously and without any predetermined, centralized aesthetic,
ideological or political objective.
The second methodological point of departure, also based on the positive
experience of Moscow in 1992, was to create conditions for a kind of
experimental existential situation. Like the one-month stay in an apartment at
12 Leninsky Prospekt, Moscow, in 1992, the one-month cohabitation of ten
individuals in two motor homes, in barely ten square metres of physical space,
also should have enabled a questioning of the myth of the public and intimate
aspects of artist and art – that is, of the split forming the basis of the system of
representation.
The next research-oriented point of departure was to analyse the problems
of the global art system; the system of values, of existential, linguistic and
market models contained therein. The aesthetic and ethical point of departure
was the very implementation of the project itself – an attempt to establish a
complex personal and group experience, the creation of a time-space module
living within the multitudes of linguistically indefinable connections.
On the surface, the Transnacionala project may seem yet another attempt to
establish or reaffirm the myth of communication. Its mission could be defined
as an attempt to bridge personal, cultural, ideological, political, racial and other
differences. It was in this positive, optimistic spirit that the first letters to
prospective participants and hosts were composed, and quite frequently such an
agit-prop discourse was also used in the process of establishing communication
with the public in the five US cities we visited. It’s more difficult, however, to
define how and with what complications this communication really took place.
The success of communication by individuals largely coming from spaces and
times separate, as to both culture and experience, depends primarily on the skill
of the individuals and groups wishing to communicate – their skill at playing a
role within the structure of the dialogue. In the context of contemporary art and
theory, the role of the engineers of such a communication structure is largely
played by various international institutions, intermediaries who have
successfully maintained, for the entire century, the illusion that despite cultural,
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political, economic and individual differences the contemporary art community
speaks the same language. Since the collapse in the seventies of what could be
termed the option of the left, an option which determined the system of values
and the consistency of language on which the above illusion was based, this
institutionalized communication framework has been showing its cracks and
fissures. It has shown itself inadequate, yet at the same time it remains the only
model linking separate individuals and groups. It protects them from sinking
back into more or less primitive national and local communities.
By trying to circumvent the institutional framework, and to ignore the
potential of skilful professionals who would inevitably try to place the event
within an established context of reception, the Transnacionala project
deliberately provoked what could be called a communication noise. It placed the
event in a certain margin – a margin that was constantly bringing up questions
about the point of the participants’ own activity, about what makes the project
different from a tourist trip abusing art as an excuse for stealing national and
international funds in the interest of structuring pleasure, as well as various selfaccusatory images in which the participants saw themselves as a bunch of
demoralized, neurotic individuals in pursuit of some abstract private utopias,
non-existent relations, and deficiencies that cannot be compensated for. These
feelings gradually took on the status of a unique experience, of a state we had
deliberately provoked. They became the subject and theme of the journey.
The problem of the structure and dominion of the public is specifically that
power which decides whether a particular individual or collective art production
is a real part of the public exchange of values – or merely what could be termed
the hyper-production of an alienated subject, to be stuck in the cellar or attic of
a private house, in the inventory of a bankrupt gallery, in a collection that has
lost its value overnight, or in some other of history’s many dumping grounds.
In view of the prevailing East European provenance of the artists who had
embarked on the adventure of discovering America – the central myth of the
West – we repeatedly posed a basic question to the American public present at
our public events: what does the American cultural public understand by the
notions of the East – of Eastern art, of Eastern societies? What already exists in
the minds of our interlocutors? On the other hand, we were faced with the
question of how to present our real historical, existential and aesthetic
experience in such a way as to transcend the cultural, ideological and political
headlines linked to the collapse of the Eastern political systems and the wars in
ex-Yugoslavia and the ex-Soviet Union. How to define historical, cultural and
existential differences in the context of global, transnational capitalism? And
finally, how to transcend sociological discourse and establish conditions for
aesthetic discourse? Communicating and associating with various American art
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and intellectual communities revealed a certain similarity between the
psychological relation or attitude – even frustration – of various American
minority groups (national, cultural, racial, sexual, religious, ideological) towards
the activity of central social institutions, and the frustration of East European
cultures in relation to their economically stronger West European and North
American counterparts. In other words, the relation of the margin to the centre.
When mentioning this psychological relationship or attitude, or simply
frustration, towards the constant of the world order as a point of potential
identification within the context of difference, I have in mind primarily the
semi-conscious, ambivalent and non-structured nature of the languages used in
the structure of public dialogue in connection with this question. Who are we,
whom and what do we represent? Who am I, whom and what do I represent?
Being the fil rouge of private conversations among the participants in the trip,
this question was gradually gaining in importance, giving the project a kind of
ontological stamp precisely because of its ambivalence and insolubility, which
grew with time. None of the so-called East European artists identified
themselves with the East in the sense of representing its political or even
cultural, messianic role. Our common attitude to this question could be defined
as an attempt to take a different view, to formulate a different question: ‘How
does the East see itself from the outside, from the point of view of another
continent, and what consumed its role and place in the structure of the global
world order?’ What remains of ourselves and our conceptual and aesthetic
points of departure, once we are transposed into a foreign cultural and historical
context? Who are we by ourselves? Can art really conceptualize and interpret
itself through itself? From where do form and content derive? Does autonomy –
freedom of art and the individual – exist? If it does, on what values it is based?
These seemingly clear, even worn-out and abused questions, brought about
numerous conflicts, deadlocked discussions, retreats into silence and reflection,
depressions, exalted visions of solutions, utopian impulses, feelings of absurdity,
emptiness and exposure to the mechanisms of life, which in the desert between
Chicago and San Francisco looked wonderful, yet totally incomprehensible and
indifferent to the symbolical and value games playing themselves out in our
mental spaces. In the middle of the desert, where all points of the universe seem
equally close to, and equally distant from, man as its centre, we were discovering
that as East European artists we were not defined so much by the form and
content of our mental spaces as by their symbolical exchange value. The
previously mentioned frustration of Eastern cultures and societies vis à vis
Western ones, which grew even bigger after the collapse of socialism, is manifest
in the field of art primarily as the problem of the non-existence of a system of
contemporary art in the territory of the East – that is, of a system of symbolic
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and economic exchange which would take place in countries sharing the
common historical experience of socialism, paving the way to integration into
the global contemporary art system. But why would we regret the non-existence
of something suppressing the individual and their artistic freedom, at least
according to the romantic, utopian definition of art? Which even today is still
formally advocated by a great number of ideologues and users of the existing
(and virtually the only) West European and North American system of
contemporary art? In fact, this is not a regret but a realization that – without a
system of institutions which by definition represents the field of contemporary
art – there is no broader intellectual and creative production; without a broader
intellectual and creative production there are no differences; without
differences there is no hierarchy of values; without a hierarchy of values there is
no critical reflection; without critical reflection there is no theory; and without
theory there is no universally-understood referential language, capable of
communicating on an equal footing with other referential languages in other
places and times of the existing world.
Despite bringing up problems that promise no imminent solutions, and
despite a communication that lacked colloquial smoothness (and which was in
fact at times full of clashes and thorns), the Transnacionala project achieved its
conceptual objective precisely by objectivizing itself in the sphere of intimacy and
closeness, which in the process in the journey took on the form of a micro volume
of public space. A public space, furthermore, in which views that are still
considered taboo in most public contexts of contemporary art could be expressed.
Among the participants in the journey, and among some other individuals
met along the way, relationships were established forming a direct, living
network. A network in which a sum of problems and realizations constituting
the germ of a referential language were caught up and articulated, in order to be
further developed.
1

is documented in the book Transnacionala: Highway Collisions Between East and West at the
Crossroads of Art, edited by Eda Cufer (Ljubljlana: Koda, 1999).

Eda Cufer, edited version of text written in Ljubljlana, October 1996; first published in IRWIN
Transnacionala Barcelona (Barcelona: Fundacio la Caixa, 1997). Translated from Slovenian by Jasna
Hrastnik.

Transnacionala: A Journey from the East to the West was an art project initiated by the Ljubljanabased visual art group IRWIN in the summer of 1996. The project took the form of a journey in
real time from the East to the West Coast of the USA. The participants, an international group of
artists comprising Alexander Brener, Vadim Fishkin, Yuri Leiderman, Goran Dordevic, Michael
Benson, Eda Cufer and the five-member IRWIN group set out on a one-month journey across
the United States in two recreational vehicles. The aim, quite simply, was for citizens of Eastern
Europe to experience the mythology of the American highway Route 66, and to engage each
other and the people they would meet along the way in informal and formal discussions about
art, theory, politics and life itself. During organized stops in Atlanta, Richmond, Chicago, San
Francisco and Seattle, a number of artistic events, presentations and discussions with local art
communities took place. The Transnacionala journey – its talks, discussions and atmospheres –
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Carsten Höller
The Baudouin/Boudewijn Experiment.
A Deliberate, Non-Fatalistic Large Scale Group
Experiment in Deviation//2000
Originally trained as a phytopathologist, Carsten Höller often creates experiments in
which human participants are subject to behavioural situations. The
Baudouin/Boudewijn Experiment: A Deliberate, Non-Fatalistic, Large-Scale
Group Experiment in Deviation was originally planned for the Brussels City of
Culture 2000, but was banned after the Queen of Belgium (Baudouin’s widow)
objected to Höller’s proposal. The project finally took place the following year, and
proposes collective action as a form of radical inactivity. It has no visual
documentation.

from providing a programme or methods to entertain (people are free to bring
what they like). Basically, the experiment will be to see what happens under
these conditions; people are freed from their usual constraints, and yet confined
to a space and a time.
The Baudouin/Boudewijn Experiment will not be recorded by means of film,
video or otherwise (and thus is contrary to any Big-Brother-like set up); the only
‘recordings’ will be the memories of the participants, and they will be ‘broadcast’
by the stories they are willing to tell. The experiment will thus be a very
unscientific one, as objectivity is not the aim. It will rather be a unique
opportunity to experience with others the possibility of getting away from what
you usually are.
Carsten Höller, ‘The Baudouin/Boudewijn Experiment. A Deliberate, Non-Fatalistic, Large-Scale
Group Experiment in Deviation’ (2000), De Witte Raaf, No. 9 (Brussels, May–June, 2001).

The late king of Belgium, Baudouin or Boudewijn, found a remarkable solution to
a personal dilemma. As a king, he was supposed to sign every new law
established by the parliament. His contribution to the actual formulation of the
law, however, was null, thus producing a purely formalistic act in signing the
document. At a certain time, the parliament was working out a law which would
liberalize abortion. Baudouin/Boudewijn, being a confessed catholic, had moral
problems signing the paper; on the other hand, he did not want to obstruct the
implementation of a new law. When the time came and his signature was
requested, he resigned from being a king for one day. Another king was elected
for this one day, who signed the new law. The following day, Baudouin/Boudewijn
was king again.
The solution to this dilemma is ingeniously simple. It is a short-term
deviation from your usual behaviour, a shift in character for the sake of avoiding
producing something you don’t want to produce, a refusal in time to be the
professional you usually are. It is as if you would cut off a continuous line of
being. Stop, and start again? Not a change in what you do, but to include an alien
moment of not doing. A deviation, a negative deviation even, since the way is
shortened by including a moment of motionlessness.
The experiment planned here will be as follows: a space is provided to
accommodate 200 people, willing to step out of their ‘usual life’ for 24 hours (the
amount of time during which the king was not king). The space will be closed
from the outside world and mobile phones, radios or TVs will not be allowed.
This is to emphasize the group aspect of the experiment and to create a structure
in which the ‘step-out’ can be done commonly. The necessary infrastructure
(furniture, food, sanitary installations, safety) will be provided, but it is refrained
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Jeremy Deller
The Battle of Orgreave//2002

from the outset because there seemed to be an instinctive understanding of
what the reenactment was about.
Jeremy Deller, ‘The Battle of Orgreave’, in James Lingwood, Michael Morris, eds, Off Limits: 40 Artangel
Projects, (London: Merrell Publishers Limited, 2002) 90–95.

The British artist Jeremy Deller often collaborates with specific social constituencies
to realize event-based projects. In 2001 he organized the reenactment of a key event
from the English miners’ strike of 1984, a violent clash between miners and police in
the town of Orgreave. The event was undertaken with former participants in the
strike and a number of historical reenactment societies. Documentation of Deller’s
work became the premise for Mike Figgis’ political documentary The Battle of
Orgreave (Channel 4/Artangel, 2001).
On 18 June 1984 I was watching the evening news and saw footage of a picket at
the Orgreave coking plant in South Yorkshire in which thousands of men were
chased up a field by mounted police. It seemed a civil war between the north
and south of the country was taking place in all but name. The image of this
pursuit up the hill stuck in my mind, and for years I have wanted to find out what
exactly happened on that day with a view to reenacting or commemorating it in
some way.
When I started to do proper research, the consequences of that day took on
a much larger historic perspective. After over a year of archive reading, listening
and interviewing many of those involved - the reenactment finally did take place
on, or as close to as possible, the original site, with over 800 participants. Many
of these participants were former miners (and a few former policemen) who
were reliving events from 1984 that they themselves took part in. The rest were
members of Battle reenactment societies from all over the country.
I wanted to involve members of these societies for mainly two reasons: first
of all, they are well trained in recreating combat and in obeying orders. More
importantly, I wanted the reenactment of The Battle of Orgreave to become part
of the lineage of decisive battles in English history.
I was also interested in the term ‘living history’ that is frequently used in
relation to reenactments, and I thought it would be interesting for reenactors to
work alongside veterans of a battle from recent history, who are a
personification of the term.
Also, as an artist I was interested in how far an idea could be taken, especially
an idea that is on the face of it a contradiction in terms ‘a recreation of
something that was essentially chaos’.
Of course I would never have undertaken the project if people locally felt it
was unnecessary or in poor taste. As it was, we encountered a lot of support
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We c a n s m e l l t h e s c e n t
of a steaming pot of
jasmine rice...
Sunlight pours in
f r om an October
afternoon, and
al ready we feel the
compression of the
gallery lifted from
our shoulders...
As one sits down
for the bowl (white
enamel with blue
rims) of food, one
begins to r ealize that
this is a distinctively
different experience
f r om others we have
had in an art gallery
or with art.
Rirkrit Tiravanija, No Ghosts in the Wall, 2004

Rirkrit Tiravanija
No Ghosts in the Wall//2004

Rirkrit Tiravanija has been at the centre of debates about relational art. In the
following text, used as the script for an audioguide to accompany his retrospective
at the Museum Boijmans Van Beuningen (2004), Tiravanija presents a discussion of
his work in the third person. The narrative offers insights into his motivations for
working with ‘lots of people’, and represents an innovative solution to the problem
of presenting a retrospective of participatory art. The museum did not show any of
his past works, just empty spaces that related to the original venues.
[The Docent turns away from the window and leads the group into the partitioned
room to the left of the space… it is the replicated approximation of a space which is
the project room of the Paula Allen gallery… the Docent lines everyone up against
the wall as if there was an installation in the middle of the room and proceeds to
talk…] Docent: The relative success of pad thai from nineteen ninety and the
perplexed confusion following his first one man exhibition untitled blind, put
Tiravanija on the radar of the New York art world, where one exhibition can
make or break an artist overnight. We now move forward to the year nineteen
ninety two and Tiravanija’s second solo exhibition in New York, with the work
untitled in parenthesis free. Once again the reintroduction of food as the key
element in the approach of the work is central. In tandem with this element
Tiravanija makes references to the core ideas of conceptual art that question the
idealism behind the relevance of authorship and authenticity. There are two
parts to the exhibition; we enter to find an exhibition space which is full to the
brim with an eclectic mix of objects. The overall view is that of the overpacked
storage space of a gallery. It is full of artworks in frames (many are photographs,
since the gallery, 303, concentrated very strongly on photography), some
paintings and parts and pieces of sculptures. When you enter from the elevator
you can see a painted black cartwheel belonging to a Karen Kilimnik installation.
Behind this is a curiously tall woodchip crate standing upright forming a column
but not quite reaching the ceiling; there are drawers for drawings, cardboard
boxes full of unknown contents and some boxes with tennis shoes and a
toothbrush – all have been dragged out from all corners of the gallery and put
on display, as if to make an exhibition of the entire contents of the gallery.
There is an aisle running around and through the room and we can make our
way though the storage and behind the pile of art etc. Once we make our way to
the back of the gallery we are surprised to discover the desk of the gallery owner,
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and her assistants sitting there amongst this pile. They are working as if it was
just another day. Here the intimacy of the gallery has been exposed: walls,
cupboards, storage racks of art and even the toilet were stripped bare, without
doors to hinder the view of all possible corners of the rooms in the gallery.
We can smell the scent of a steaming pot of jasmine rice, with its very
distinct combination of water and the perfume of jasmine. It’s enough to make
one curious with hunger, and as we make our way though the space we come to
the room at the end of the hallway, well lit, with windows at the corner of the
building. Sunlight pours in from an October afternoon, and already we feel the
compression of the gallery lifted from our shoulders. There are people sitting
around round tables and on stools; they are talking, reading the guide for
galleries, weighing their next move. The 303 Gallery is at the corner of Spring
and Greene Streets in Soho, New York, formerly the main art district of the city.
There is a mess of doors leaning against the walls in this room; doors
presumably of the gallery. They are unhinged and stacked. To the right as we
enter is a makeshift table made from sawhorses, and yet another door from the
space. A couple of people seem to busying themselves with the preparation of
some vegetables – the chopping and cutting; opening gallon cans of bamboo
shoots. In the middle of the room there are two pots cooking on camping rings.
One seems to have been prepared already, the other is on its way. People are
helping themselves to the rice from a cooker large enough to feed the whole
Island of Manhattan. Right next to the low gas cookers is an old used refrigerator,
white, with hints of age around the edges. As one sits down for the bowl (white
enamel with blue rims) of food, one begins to realize that this is a distinctively
different experience from others we have had in an art gallery or with art. There
are also many milky white cylindrical buckets which seem to be sloshing with
waste food, all that is left over. In the refrigerator there are Thai long beans, Thai
roundish green eggplants, as well as the mini pea eggplants, looking rather
green, with a strong bitterness to their taste. Bitter and stronger. And some
packets of green curry.
This exhibition came at an economically depressed moment in New York
that provided fertile grounds to establish it as the cornerstone of Tiravanija’s
practice. We don’t use the word ‘practice’ lightly – it’s as if the artist were a
doctor administering the viewer with a dose of opiate to cure all maladies.
Tiravanija described his work at this time as comparable to reaching out,
removing Marcel Duchamp’s ‘Urinal’ from its pedestal, reinstalling it back on the
wall, and then, in an act of return to its original use, pissing into it.
Interest in the identity of the artistic has now fully recovered to the point
that the work simply is the artist or simply by the artist. Yet there is a prevalent
sensibility to his endeavour, one of which a) resists artifice, b) resists the time
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and space continuum which has been imposed on the ontological structure of
art making, c) resists unnecessary staging of a reality which does not exist. [The
ghost has been shifting around now… we can hear him going on and on about works
which do not necessarily correlate to what the Docent has been speaking about.]
[The Docent leads the group over to the windows of untitled free, and crosses the
hall into the space of the Kölnischer Kunstverein.] Docent: In nineteen ninety-six
Tiravanija, having won the prize from the Köln-based Central Insurance
Company (which is comprised of a six month stay in the city of Cologne,
Germany), was commissioned by the company to produce a work for an
exhibition at the Kölnischer Kunstverein. What we are looking at is a structural
replica in full scale of Tiravanija’s apartment in New York. Tiravanija had lived in
this apartment for almost twenty years up to that point. It is a four-flight walkup
in a tenement building. The original apartment is very old. The apartment
number is twenty-one, actually a lucky number for Tiravanija, as he was also
born on the twenty-first day. The actual title of the exhibition is untitled in
parenthesis tomorrow is another day. The phrase ‘tomorrow is another day’ came
from the director of the Kunstverein himself, Udo Kittelmann – an utterance
often used as an expression of relief and resignation. But for Tiravanija it was
about the inevitability of daily life. tomorrow is another day was for Tiravanija a
work where all his essential ideas came together. Tiravanija has often said that
his work was ‘about use, and through this use meaning is constructed’. Here we
see the apartment which was opened for three months and was open twentyfour hours a day, six days a week (it would have been seven days but German
labour laws prohibited the work being open on Sundays). This was perhaps the
first and only time an exhibition space was left open with full access. For the
three months it was open people came and stayed in the apartment; they
cooked, they ate, they bathed (everything functioned in the apartment replica as
in a normal habitat), they slept, got married, had birthdays, many, many
performances of music and otherwise; the space surrounding the apartment
became a garden. Many, many people spent a lot of time in and around the
apartment, and they shared their time and space together. They drew and wrote
notes, comments, drawings, young and old. It was an open house and, against
expectations, nothing terrible happened. Tiravanija left Köln soon after the
apartment opened. He left everything he had brought (house-wares, TV, stereo,
kitchenware… etc.) for his stay at the residency… nothing went missing and in
fact people left more things behind, things of value and useful things. [The
Docent takes the group through to the next and last space… while walking the
Docent continues with the dialogue…] Docent: Similarly to untitled in parenthesis
tomorrow is another day… now at this point you may have all noticed that
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Tiravanija most often if not always leaves both his exhibitions and works
untitled… however, also always within the parenthesis, from the very first work,
we can see that Tiravanija wants to direct our attention to the subtext, or
subtitle, of how we can direct our thoughts and ideas towards the experience we
are having with his works …
Yes, untitled in parenthesis he promised from two thousand and two. It is the
last work we will focus on. As I was saying: similarly to tomorrow…, he promised
is another full-scale architectural representation. In this case it is the house of an
Austrian architect who lived in exile in Los Angeles by the name of Rudolph
Schindler. Perhaps little known to the lay world, Schindler was a very
inspirational figure for a lot of architects and artists due to his quiet but studied
ideas concerning the philosophical conditions of living and architecture.
Obviously Tiravanija found him so, and in this work, which was made for Vienna
at the Secession exhibition space… he made a replica of part of the house which
Schindler had designed and built for himself. (This is very similar to Philip
Johnson’s Glass House, which was also designed and built as the residence of the
architect himself.)
This house was in Los Angeles on King’s Road (hence it is known as the King’s
Road House). Tiravanija has replicated in full scale Schindler’s own studio, which
is one of five sections of the house. We are not looking at the complete
representation of the house, as Tiravanija wanted us to focus on this particular
space as an idea, as an ideal space. We can sense what life in the structure was
like, and is, as we pass through this building. Schindler was highly influenced by
Frank Lloyd Wright (having worked for him), as well as by the natural
environment, vegetation and climate of Southern Californa. The house was very
open, with a great deal of Eastern, Oriental feel, blurring of the interior and
exterior – merging also the functions of life inside and out. In this replication,
however, all parts of the architecture are made from chromed and mirrored
stainless steel. The entire structure is cloaked in the reflection of its
environment. It shimmers as if to disappear, camouflaged by the white of the
space… and unlike tomorrow…, he promised… was not open-ended – it was only
open all day and night one day of the week. It was not meant to function twentyfour hours a day. However, time and space would be an important aspect of the
work – usage was still primal. But rather than keeping it open-ended, it was
programmed. There was a series of different events in which the house acted as
a platform and as a lived space, hosting different discussions, exhibitions, films
and musical events, Thai massage and of course a barbecue. The process, which
we say at the beginning of all Tiravanija’s work, was very clear and almost
extreme in this situation. The house was fabricated in Guadalajara, Mexico, and
since there was not enough time and too much distance, the parts of the house
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were slowly shipped to Vienna. As the parts arrived, the house was put up.
During the course of the exhibition, which lasted about two and a half months,
the house was only completed two days before the exhibition closed. Pictures
were taken of the slow process of, amongst other things, what went on in the
space, as well as that of the construction process in Mexico. Visitors in Vienna
could buy one ticket and return to the space at a later date to keep up with the
construction of the house as well as participate in the daily events offered.
Tiravanija never did participate in the process of the exhibition or see the
completion of the house itself… but, like all this work, Tiravanija was much
more interested in the people and how they came and went, how they may have
had different views and memories of what they had passed through.
Thank you for joining us, for walking through with us and giving your
attention to this ‘retrospective’. You may have wondered all this time why we are
not in the presence of the work itself and are instead just given a story about or
descriptions of the work or event. Tiravanija and the curators believed that this
is one of the possible ways this body of work could be represented. There is no
object, no picture, no moment, no space and even perhaps no time, but in this
void of representation we hope you have heard and have imagined a picture of
your own, a memory of your own, and that in the end it was an experience of its
own making… [The Docent shows everyone out… ]
THE END
Rirkrit Tiravanija, ‘No Ghosts in the Wall’, Rirkrit Tiravanija: A Retrospective (Rotterdam: Museum
Boijmans Van Beuningen, 2004) 51–92
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Thomas Hirschhorn
24h Foucault//2004

Unlike many artists who work collaboratively in order to fuse art and social praxis,
Thomas Hirschhorn has always asserted the importance of art’s autonomy. Projects
such as the Bataille Monument (2002) and Musée Précaire (2004) involved
collaborations with largely working-class and immigrant communities. 24h
Foucault transferred this collaborative approach to philosophers, poets and
musicians at the Palais de Tokyo.
24h Foucault is the avant-garde of the Foucault Art Work. The Foucault Art Work is
the project that I have developed following meetings with Daniel Defert and
Philippe Artières on the invitation of Nicolas Bourriaud at the Palais de Tokyo in
October 2003. Foucault Art Work is a project (like other projects I have) that
remains to be realized in the years to come. It depends on me finding the time,
energy, places, partners and money to show the Foucault Art Work. This is my
objective and I don’t want to lose sight of it. This is why the 24h Foucault is
basically the same Foucault Art Work project condensed and speeded up. I want
the 24h Foucault to affirm and prove that it’s necessary to work as an artist with
precision and with excess. I want this project to be precise and exaggerated! For
me, the Foucault Art Work will not change, only speed up. The 24h Foucault
comprises 1. an auditorium 2. a library/documentation centre 3. a sound library
4. a video library 5. an exhibition 6. the Merve Verlag archives 7. a Toolbox bar 8.
a souvenir shop 9. a newspaper 10. a Foucault studio. 24h Foucault is an
autonomous work made collectively. 24h Foucault is a work of art!

24h Foucault, the pre-project
I want to try here to express my wish for the Foucault Art Work. This is the title
of the work and at the same time it’s the Michel Foucault exhibition programme.
It’s the programme because it’s not about doing an exhibition on Michel
Foucault. For me it’s about showing, affirming, giving form to the fact that
Michel Foucault was an artist. That his life and his work were a work of art. It’s
also about giving form to this affirmation that I share with Marcus Steinweg:
philosophy is art! Pure philosophy, true, cruel, pitiless philosophy, philosophy
that affirms, acts, creates. The philosophy of Spinoza, of Nietzsche, of Deleuze, of
Foucault. I don’t know Foucault’s philosophy, but I see his work of art. It permits
me to approach it, to not understand it but to seize it, to see it, to be active with
it. I don’t have to be a historian, a connoisseur, a specialist to confront myself
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with works of art. I can seize their energy, their urgency, their necessity, their
density. Michel Foucault’s work of art is charged. It’s a battery. I can seize this
charged battery. I want to give form to this. In the Foucault Art Work project,
there is more than a vision: there is a singular commitment. There is the
commitment to make a work of art. There is the affirmation that the work of art
is philosophy, and that philosophy is a work of art. We must free ourselves from
exhibitions. I hate and never use the term show in English; I hate and I never use
the term piece. I never use and I hate the term installation. But I want to make a
work, a work of art! I want to become what I am. I want to become an artist! I
want to appropriate what I am. This is my work as an artist.
Foucault Art Work is not documentation. Documentation, documentary films
have been overtaken by fiction and by reality of all types. Because documentation
wants to place itself in the middle. I don’t want to place myself in the middle. I
want to overtake the document, the documentary. I want to make an experience.
An experience is something from which I emerge changed. An experience
transforms me. I want the public to be transformed by the experience of Foucault
Art Work. I want the public to appropriate Michel Foucault’s work of art. I want
the public to be active, participate. Evidently the most important participation is
activity, the participation of reflexion, questioning, making your brain work. I
want the public of Foucault Art Work to seize the energy, the strength, the
necessity of Foucault’s work. I want the public to confront what is important in
the work of Foucault; I want the public to seize the range and the power of
Foucault’s philosophy. I don’t want the public to understand. I want the public to
seize the power. The power of art, the power of philosophy!

Concretely:
The Foucault Art Work takes place from 14 October to 5 December (7 weeks) at
the Palais de Tokyo. I want to make a sort of Bataille Monument, but on the inside,
in an institution. What have been the lessons from my experience of the Bataille
Monument! That this experience produces something: meetings, confrontation,
production, thought, more work, loss, discussions, friendship. To produce that, I
have understood that it’s necessary for the artist to be present all the time and
not to be alone. This event must be very well prepared. You have to work uphill
on this project with contributors, participants, co-producers. Foucault Art Work
is going to be an event that must be produced elsewhere at least once (US, Japan
or elsewhere). I want the Palais de Tokyo to be only the first event. There must
be another. Another partner must be found. Foucault Art Work must be an event
with between 700 and 1000 square metres of space. The proposed alcove of the
Palais de Tokyo is too small. I need more space! It needs a minimum of 700
square metres. In the Foucault Art Work event, I want to work closely with my
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philosopher friend Marcus Steinweg from Berlin. He will be with me on site all
the time, during the event. He prepares, he proposes, and he accompanies this
work. He is part of the work. He will affirm. He will appropriate. He will act with
love, like me, but not with respect. With the love of philosophy, not with the
respect of a hommage. Foucault Art Work will be made with love and without
respect. Every day there will be the intervention of a philosopher, a friend, a writer
who will interpret the work of Foucault. There will be a Michel Foucault exhibition.
I want the public to understand: the exhibition is only one part of the Foucault
Art Work. The exhibition with photos, personal books, original documents, press
cutttings (international). Peter Gente of the Merve-Verlag Berlin made a beautiful
exhibition at ZKM in Karlsruhe. There will be a sound-, book- and media-library
with all the books (in all languages), all the videos and all audio material of
Foucault. I want there to be photocopiers, video material, sound material, on
site, simple and efficient, so that the public can take home photocopies or video
and audio copies, books, extracts of books or other documents, as they wish. I
want the Foucault Art Work not only to be a place of production, but also of
dissemination. It is important to diffuse and give diffusion to the work of Foucault
or to parts of Foucault’s works. There will be a Michel Foucault shop. The shop isn’t
a place to sell things, the shop is in fact another exhibition. It’s an exhibition of
souvenirs made to look at, not to buy. As in the vitrines of a big football club,
where trophies are exhibited, photos of former players, the players’ vests, the
club’s different stadiums, the celebrity visits. These are important but not
decisive souvenirs. Decisive is what is made today. Today and tomorrow. There
will be a Foucault-Map. A work that I will do with Marcus Steinweg. Like I did the
Nietzsche-Map and the Hannah Arendt-Map. It’s a very big plan of the
philosophical position of Foucault in the galaxy of philosophy. There will also be
documents and elements that put the Foucault Archives at your disposal. This can
be integrated in the Foucault Art Work project. However the archives must be
exposed in another (second) manifestation. Finally I want there to be a simple
and condensed auditorium for lectures, concerts, speeches. I want the public to
be inside a brain in action. There will be no narration, no discussion, no
illustration. There will be affirmation. There will be ideas. There will be
confrontation. When I say: there is no discussion, I mean: it’s not to debate and
discuss philosophy and art. It’s necessary to confront yourself. It’s necessary to
forge a resistance. I want all the forms, all the contributions to be chosen
politically, philosophically, artistically. Because it’s the same thing. No element is
chosen for any reason other than political. I want the Foucault Art Work project
to be a proposition that overtakes me, that makes my capacity for responsibility
explode. It’s necessary to try and be responsible for something which I can take
responsibility for. There must also be a Foucault-Studio. A place of work with
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computers and space for working. Making sculpture, doing research, having
experiences that you don’t usually have. Learning another language, for
example. I repeat: the Foucault-Studio, the Foucault-Shop, the Auditorium, the
book-, sound- and media-library, the Foucault Exhibition, the contributors (every
other day), the Foucault-Map, the Foucault Archives. These eight elements will be
put alongside each other as in the human brain; they disrupt each other, they
complete each other, they compete against each other. But they never contradict
each other – they demonstrate the complexity and the infinity of thought. There
will be chairs, lots of chairs, armchairs, lots of armchairs for sitting down and
reflecting, reading and exchanging. There will be lots of light. Foucault Art Work
will be very lit. In the Foucault Art Work there will be lots of computers,
photocopiers, audio-recorders, video and DVD recorders, TV screens, but all these
objects will be integrated, mastered; tools, arms, but never aesthetic effects with
which to intimidate the public, or to show them new technology. The
technologies serve art, they serve philosophy. They will be tools, but not
necessities. To kill them, it’s not necessary to have a gun. To construct a house, it’s
not necessary to have a hammer. You must always work firstly with your brain.
Foucault Art Work will not be a Thomas Hirschhorn exhibition. I will have
contributed to this project with others, I hope lots of others. Marcus Steinweg,
Manuel Joseph, Christophe Fiat, Peter Gente, not to mention those to whom I’ve
already spoken of the project. This project will be made together, multiply, with
multiple singularities, active, turned towards affirmation, the other. Turned to
the other with friendship, but without compromise. Neither visual, nor of
meaning, nor of space, nor of content.
Foucault Art Work is an ambitious project. It is itself an affirmation as much
as a work of art.
Thomas Hirschhorn, artist’s proposal, 24h Foucault Journal (Paris: Palais de Tokyo, 2–3 October 2004).
Translated by Claire Bishop, 2006.
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?
COLLABORATION
IS THE ANSWER
BUT WHAT IS
THE QUESTION

Hans Ulrich Obrist, cited in Hal Foster, Chat Rooms, 2004

CRITICAL AND CURATORIAL POSITIONS
Nicolas Bourriaud Relational Aesthetics//158
Lars Bang Larsen Social Aesthetics//170
Molly Nesbit, Hans Ulrich Obrist, Rirkrit Tiravanija
What is a Station?//182
Hal Foster Chat Rooms//188
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Nicolas Bourriaud
Relational Aesthetics//1998

Relational Aesthetics has come to be seen as a defining text for a generation of
artists who came to prominence in Europe in the early to mid 1990s. The
following text is a selection of excerpts from Bourriaud’s collection of seven
discrete essays originally published in magazines and exhibition catalogues.
The work of art as social interstice
The possibility of a relational art (an art that takes as its theoretical horizon the
sphere of human interactions and its social context, rather than the assertion of
an autonomous and private symbolic space) is testimony to the radical upheaval
in aesthetic, cultural and political objectives brought about by modern art. To
outline its sociology: this development stems essentially from the birth of a
global urban culture and the extension of the urban model to almost all cultural
phenomena. The spread of urbanization, which began to take off at the end of
the Second World War, allowed an extraordinary increase in social exchanges, as
well as greater individual mobility (thanks to the development of rail and road
networks, telecommunications and the gradual opening up of isolated places,
which went hand in hand with the opening up of minds). Because this urban
world’s inhabitable places are so cramped, we have also witnessed a scaling
down of furniture and objects, which have become much easier to handle: for a
long time, artworks looked like lordly luxury items in this urban context (the
dimensions of both artworks and the apartments where they were displayed
were intended to signal the distinction between their owners and the hoi polloi),
but the way their function and their mode of presentation has evolved reveals a
growing urbanization of the artistic experience. What is collapsing before our
very eyes is quite simply the pseudo-aristocratic conception of how artworks
should be displayed, which was bound up with the feeling of having acquired a
territory. We can, in other words, no longer regard contemporary works as a
space we have to walk through (we were shown around collections in the same
way that we were shown around great houses). Contemporary art resembles a
period of time that has to be experienced, or the opening of a dialogue that
never ends. The city permits and generalizes the experience of proximity: this is
the tangible symbol and historical framework of the state of society, or the ‘state
of encounter’, that has been ‘imposed’ on people, as Althusser puts it,1 as
opposed to the dense and unproblematic jungle of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s state
of nature. Rousseau’s jungle was such that there could be no lasting encounters.
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Once it had been elevated to the status of an absolute civilizational rule this
intense encounter finally gave rise to artistic practices that were in keeping with
it. It gave rise, that is, to a form of art with intersubjectivity as its substratum. Its
central themes are being-together [l’être-ensemble], the ‘encounter’ between
viewer and painting, and the collective elaboration of meaning. We can leave
aside the problem of the phenomenon’s historicity: art has always been relation
to some extent. It has, in other words, always been a factor in sociability and has
always been the basis for a dialogue. One of the image’s potentials is its capacity
for ‘linkage’ [reliance], to use Michel Maffesoli’s term: flags, logos, icons and
signs all produce empathy and sharing, and generate links.2 Art (practices
derived from painting and sculpture and displayed in the form of an exhibition)
proves to be an especially appropriate expression of this civilization of
proximity. It compresses relational space, whereas television and books send us
all back to spaces where we consume in private; and whereas the theatre or the
cinema bring small groups together to look at univocal images, there is in fact no
live commentary on what a theatre or cinema audience is seeing (the time for
discussion comes after the show). At an exhibition, in contrast, there is always
the possibility of an immediate – in both senses of the term – discussion, even
when the forms on show are inert: I see, comment and move around in one
space-time. Art is a site that produces a specific sociability; what status this
space has within the range of ‘states of encounter’ proposed by the Polis remains
to be seen. How can an art that is centred on the production of such modes of
conviviality succeed in relaunching the modern project of emancipation as we
contemplate it? How does it allow us to define new cultural and political goals?
Before turning to concrete examples, it is important to take a new look at
where artworks are situated within the overall system of the economy –
symbolic or material – that governs contemporary society: quite apart from its
commodified nature or semantic value, the artwork represents, in my view, a
social interstice. The term interstice was used by Karl Marx to describe trading
communities that escaped the framework of the capitalist economy: barter,
selling at a loss, autarkic forms of production, and so on. An interstice is a space
in social relations which, although it fits more or less harmoniously and openly
into the overall system, suggests possibilities for exchanges other than those
that prevail within the system. Exhibitions of contemporary art occupy precisely
the same position within the field of the trade in representations. They create
free spaces and periods of time whose rhythms are not the same as those that
organize everyday life, and they encourage an inter-human intercourse which is
different to the ‘zones of communication’ that are forced upon us. The
contemporary social context restricts opportunities for interhuman relations in
that it creates spaces designed for that purpose. Superloos were invented to
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keep the streets clean. The same line of thinking governed the development
communicational tools while the streets of our cities were being swept clean of
all relational dross. The result is that neighbourhood relations have been
impoverished. The general mechanization of social functions is gradually
reducing our relational space. Until only a few years ago, the early morning call
service still used human voices; the responsibility for waking us up now falls to
synthesized voices… The ATM has become the transit model for the most basic
social functions, and professional behaviours are modelled on the efficiency of
the machines that are replacing them. The same machines now perform tasks
that once represented so many opportunities for exchanges, pleasure or conflict.
Contemporary art is really pursuing a political project when it attempts to move
into the relational sphere by problematizing it.
When Gabriel Orozco puts an orange on the stalls of a deserted market in
Brazil (Crazy Tourist, 1991) or sets up a hammock in the garden of New York’s
Museum of Modern Art (Hamoc en el MoMa, 1993), he is operating in the heart
of the ‘social infra-thin’ [inframince], or that tiny space for everyday gestures that
is determined by the superstructure constructed and determined by large-scale
exchanges. Orozco’s photographs are an uncaptioned documentary record of
tiny revolutions in ordinary urban or semi-urban life (a sleeping bag on the
grass, an empty shoebox): they bear witness to the silent life (a still life or nature
morte) that is now painted by our relations with others. When Jens Haaning uses
a loudspeaker to broadcast jokes told in Turkish on a square in Copenhagen
(Turkish Jokes, 1994), he instantly produces a micro-community of immigrants
who have been brought together by the collective laughter that inverts their
situation as exiles. That community is formed in relation to and inside the work.
An exhibition is a privileged place where instant communities like this can be
established: depending on the degree of audience participation demanded by
the artist, the nature of the works on show and the models of sociability that are
represented or suggested, an exhibition can generate a particular ‘domain of
exchanges’. And we must judge that ‘domain of exchanges’ on the basis of
aesthetic criteria, or in other words by analysing the coherence of its form, and
then the symbolic value of the ‘world’ it offers us or the image of human
relations that it reflects. Within this social interstice, the artist owes it to himself
to take responsibility for the symbolic models he is showing: all representation
refers to values that can be transposed into society (though contemporary art
does not so much represent as model) and inserts itself into the social fabric
rather than taking inspiration from it). Being a human activity that is based upon
commerce, art is both the object and the subject of an ethics: all the more so in
that, unlike other human activities, its only function is to be exposed to that
commerce. Art is a state of encounter… […]
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Conviviality and encounters
A work can function as a relational device in which there is a degree of
randomness. It can be a machine for provoking and managing individual or
collective encounters. To cite a few examples from the last two decades, this is
true of Braco Dimitrijevic’s Casual Passer-by series, which disproportionally
celebrates the names and faces of anonymous passers-by on posters the size of
those used for advertisements, or on busts like those of celebrities. In the early
1970s, Stephen Willats painstakingly charted the relationships that existed
between the inhabitants of a block of flats. And much of Sophie Calle’s work
consists of accounts of her encounters with strangers: she follows a passer-by,
searches hotel rooms after getting a job as a chamber maid, asks blind people
how they define beauty, and then, after the event, formalizes the biographical
experiments that led her to ‘collaborate’ with the people she met. We could also
cite, almost at random, On Kawara’s I met series, the restaurant opened by
Gordon Matta-Clark in 1971 (Food), the dinners organized by Daniel Spoerri or
the playful shop opened by George Brecht and Robert Filliou in Villefranche (La
Cédille qui sourit). The formalization of convivial relations has been a historical
constant since the 1960s. The generation of the 1980s picked up the same
problematic, but the definition of art, which was central to the 1960s and 1970s,
was no longer an issue. The problem was no longer the expansion of the limits
of art,3 but testing art’s capacity for resistance within the social field as a whole.
A single family of practices therefore gives rise to two radically different
problematics: in the 1960s, the emphasis was on relationships internal to the
world of art within a modernist culture that privileged ‘the new’ and called for
linguistic subversion; it is now placed on external relationships in the context of
an eclectic culture where the work of art resists the mincer of the ‘Society of the
Spectacle’. Social utopias and revolutionary hopes have given way to day-to-day
micro-utopias and mimetic strategies: any ‘direct’ critique of society is pointless
if it is based upon the illusion of a marginality that is now impossible, if not
regressive. Almost thirty years ago, Félix Guattari was already recommending the
neighbourhood strategies on which contemporary artistic practices are based:
‘Just as I think it is illusory to count on the gradual transformation of society so I
believe that microscopic attempts – communities, neighbourhood committees,
organizing crèches in universities – play an absolutely fundamental role.’4
Traditional critical philosophy (and especially the Frankfurt school) can no
longer sustain art unless it takes the form of an archaic folklore, or of a splendid
rattle that achieves nothing. The subversive and critical function of
contemporary art is now fulfilled through the invention of individual or
collective vanishing lines, and through the provisional and nomadic
constructions artists use to model and distribute disturbing situations. Hence
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the current enthusiasm for revisited spaces of conviviality and crucibles where
heterogeneous modes of sociability can be worked out. For her exhibition at the
Centre pour la Création Contemporaine, Tours (1993), Angela Bulloch installed a
café: when sufficient visitors sat down on the chairs, they activated a recording
of a piece by Kraftwerk. For her Restaurant show (Paris, October 1993), Georgina
Starr described her anxiety about ‘dining alone’ and produced a text to be
handed to diners who came alone to the restaurant. For his part, Ben Kinmont
approached randomly-selected people, offered to do their washing up for them
and maintained an information network about his work. On a number of
occasions Lincoln Tobier set up radio stations in art galleries and invited the
public to take part in broadcast discussions.
Philippe Parreno has drawn particular inspiration from the form of the party,
and his exhibition project for the Consortium, Dijon, consisted in ‘taking up two
hours of time rather than ten square metres of space’ by organizing a party. All
its component elements eventually produced relational forms as clusters of
individuals gathered around the installed artistic objects… Rirkrit Tiravanija, for
his part, explores the socio-professional aspect of conviviality: his contribution
to Surfaces de réparation (Dijon, 1994) was a relaxation area for the exhibiting
artists, complete with a table-football game and a well-stocked fridge. To end
this evocation of how such conviviality can develop in the context of a culture of
‘friendship’, mention should be made of the bar created by Heimo Zobernig for
the Unité exhibition, and Franz West’s Passtücke [‘adaptives’].5 Other artists
suddenly burst into the relational fabric in more aggressive ways. The work of
Douglas Gordon, for example, explores the ‘wild’ dimension of this interaction
by intervening in social space in parasitic or paradoxical ways: he phoned
customers in a café and sent multiple ‘instructions’ to selected individuals. The
best example of how untimely communications can disrupt communications
networks is probably a piece by Angus Fairhurst: with the kind of equipment
used by pirate radio stations, he established a phone link between two art
galleries. Each interlocutor believed that the other had called, and the
discussions degenerated into an indescribable confusion. By creating or
exploring relational schemata, these works established relational microterritories that could be driven into the density of the contemporary socius; the
experiences are either mediated by object-surfaces (Liam Gillick’s ‘boards’, the
posters created in the street by Pierre Huyghe, Eric Duyckaerts’ video lectures)
or experienced immediately (Andrea Fraser’s exhibition tours) […]
The Subject of the Artwork
Every artist whose work derives from relational aesthetics has his or her own
world of forms, his or her problematic and his or her trajectory: there are no
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stylistic, thematic or iconographic links between them. What they do have in
common is much more determinant, namely the fact that they operate with the
same practical and theoretical horizon: the sphere of interhuman relationships.
Their works bring into play modes of social exchange, interaction with the
viewer inside the aesthetic experience he or she is offered, and processes of
communication in their concrete dimensions as tools that can to be used to
bring together individuals and human groups.
They therefore all work within what we might call the relational sphere,
which is to today’s art what mass production was to Pop and Minimalism.
They all ground their artistic practice in a proximity which, whilst it does not
belittle visuality, does relativize its place within exhibition protocols. The
artworks of the 1990s transform the viewer into a neighbour or a direct
interlocutor. It is precisely this generation’s attitude towards communication that
allows it to be defined in relation to previous generations: whilst most artists
who emerged in the 1980s (from Richard Prince to Jeff Koons via Jenny Holzer)
emphasized the visual aspect of the media, their successors place the emphasis
on contact and tactility. They emphasise immediacy in their visual writing. This
phenomenon can be explained in sociological terms if we recall that the decade
that has just ended was marked by the economic crisis and did little to encourage
spectacular or visionary experiments. There are also purely aesthetic reasons
why this should have been the case; in the 1980s, the ‘back to’ pendulum stopped
with the movements of the 1960s and especially Pop art, whose visual
effectiveness underpinned most of the forms proposed by simulationism. For
better or worse, our period identifies with the Arte Povera and experimental art
of the 1970s, and even with the atmosphere of crisis that went with it. Superficial
as it may be, this fashion effect had made it possible to re-examine the work of
artists such as Gordon Matta-Clark or Robert Smithson, whilst the success of
Mike Kelley has recently encouraged a new reading of the Californian ‘junk art’ of
Paul Thek and Tetsumia Kudo. Fashion can thus create aesthetic microclimates
which affect the very way we read recent history: to put it a different way, the
mesh of the sieve’s net can be woven in different ways. It then ‘lets through’
different types of work, and that influences the present in return.
Having said that, when we look at relational artists, we find ourselves in the
presence of a group of artists who, for the first time since the emergence of
conceptual art in the mid-1960s, simply do not take as their starting point some
aesthetic movement from the past. Relational art is neither a ‘revival’ of some
movement nor the return of a style. It is born of the observation of the present
and of a reflection on the destiny of artistic activity. Its basic hypothesis – the
sphere of human relations as site for the artwork – is without precedent in the
history of art, even though it can of course be seen, after the event, to be the
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obvious backdrop to all aesthetic practice, and the modernist theme par
excellence. Anyone who needs to be convinced that interactivity is scarcely a new
notion has only to reread Marcel Duchamp’s 1957 lecture on ‘the creative act’.
The novelty lies elsewhere. It resides in the fact that, for this generation of
artists, intersubjectivity and interaction are neither fashionable theoretical
gadgets nor adjuncts to (alibis for) a traditional artistic practice. They are at once
a starting point and a point of arrival, or in short the main themes that inform
their work. The space in which their works are deployed is devoted entirely to
interaction. It is a space for the openness (Georges Bataille would have called it
a ‘rent’) that inaugurates all dialogue. These artists produce relational spacetimes, interhuman experiences that try to shake off the constraints of the
ideology of mass communications; they are in a sense spaces where we can
elaborate alternative forms of sociability, critical models and moments of
constructed conviviality. It is, however, obvious that the day of the New Man of
the future-oriented manifestos and the calls for a better world ‘with vacant
possession’ is well and truly gone: utopia is now experienced as a day to day
subjectivity, in the real time of concrete and deliberately fragmentary
experiments. The artwork now looks like a social interstice in which these
experiences and these new ‘life possibilities’ prove to be possible. Inventing new
relations with our neighbours seems to be a matter of much greater urgency
than ‘making tomorrows sing’.6 That is all, but it is still a lot. And it at least offers
a welcome alternative to the depressive, authoritarian and reactionary thought
that, at least in France, passes for art theory in the shape of ‘common sense’
rediscovered. And yet modernity is not dead, if we define as ‘modern’ meaning
a taste for aesthetic experience and adventurous thinking, as opposed to the
timid conformisms that are defended by philosophers who are paid by the line,
neo-traditionalists (the ludicrous Dave Hickey’s ‘Beauty’) and militant passéistes
like Jean Clair. Whether fundamentalist believers in yesterday’s good taste like it
or not, contemporary art has taken up and does represent the heritage of the
avant-gardes of the twentieth century, whilst at the same time rejecting their
dogmatism and their teleology. I have to admit that a lot of thought when into
that last sentence: it was simply time to write it. Because modernism was
steeped in an ‘oppositional imaginary’, to borrow a phrase from Gilbert Durand,
it worked with breaks and clashes, and cheerfully dishonoured the past in the
name of the future. It was based on conflict, whereas the imaginary of our period
is concerned with negotiations, links and coexistence. We no longer try to make
progress thanks to conflict and clashes, but by discovering new assemblages,
possible relations between distinct units, and by building alliances between
different partners. Like social contracts, aesthetic contracts are seen for what
they are: no one expects the Golden Age to be ushered in on this earth, and we
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are quite happy to create modus vivendi that make possible fairer social relations,
more dense ways of life, and multiple, fruitful combinations of existence. By the
same criterion, art no longer tries to represent utopias; it is trying to construct
concrete spaces […]
The Criterion of Coexistence (Works and Individuals)
Gonzalez-Torres’ art gives a central role to negotiation and to the construction of
a shared habitat. It also contains an ethics of the gaze. To that extent, it belongs
within a specific history: that of artworks that make the viewer conscious of the
context in which he or she finds himself/herself (the happenings and
‘environments’ of the 1960s, site-specific installations).
At one Gonzalez-Torres exhibition, I saw visitors grabbing handfuls of sweets
and cramming as many of them as they could into their pockets: they were being
confronted with their own social behaviour, fetishism and acquisitive
worldview… Others, in contrast, did not dare to take the sweets, or waited until
those next to them took one before doing likewise. The ‘candy spill’ works thus
raise an ethical problem in a seemingly anodyne form: our relationship with
authority, the use museum attendants make of their power, our sense of
proportion and the nature of our relationship with the artwork.
To the extent that the latter represents an opportunity for a sensory
experience based upon exchange, it must be subject to criteria analogous with
those on which we base our evaluation of any constructed social reality. The
basis of today’s experience of art is the co-presence of spectators before the
artwork, be it actual or symbolic. The first question we should ask when we find
ourselves in the presence of an artwork is:
Does it allow me to exist as I look at it or does it, on the contrary, deny my
existence as a subject and does its structure refuse to consider the Other? Does
the space-time suggested or described by this artwork, together with the laws
that govern it, correspond to my real-life aspirations? Does it form a critique of
what needs critique? If there was a corresponding space-time in reality, could I
live in it?
These questions do not relate to an excessively anthropomorphic vision of
art. They relate to a vision that is quite simply human; to the best of my
knowledge, artists intend their work to be seen by their contemporaries, unless
they regard themselves as living on borrowed time or believe in a fascistfundamentalist version of history (time closing over its meaning and origins). On
the contrary, those artworks that seem to me to be worthy of sustained interest
are the ones that function as interstices, as space-times governed by an economy
that goes beyond the prevailing rules for the management of the public. The first
thing that strikes me about this generation of artists is that they are inspired by
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a concern for democracy. For art does not transcend our day to day
preoccupations; it brings us face to face with reality through the singularity of a
relationship with the world, through a fiction. No one will convince me that an
authoritarian art can refer its viewers to any real – be it a fantasy or an accepted
reality – other than that of an intolerant society. In sharp contrast artists like
Gonzalez-Torres, and now Angela Bulloch, Carsten Höller, Gabriel Orozco or
Pierre Huyghe, bring us face to face with exhibition situations inspired by a
concern to ‘give everyone a chance’ thanks to forms that do not give the
producer any a priori superiority (let’s call it divine-right authority) over the
viewer, but which negotiate open relations that are not pre-established. The
status of the viewer alternates between that of a passive consumer, and that of
a witness, an associate, a client, a guest, a co-producer and a protagonist. So we
need to pay attention: we know that attitudes become forms, and we now have
to realize that forms induce models of sociability.
And the exhibition-form itself is not immune to these warnings: the spread
of ‘curiosity cabinets’ that we have been seeing for some time now, to say
nothing of the elitist attitudes of certain actors in the art world, which reveals
their holy terror of public spaces and collective aesthetic experimentation, and
their love of boudoirs that are reserved for specialists. Making things available
does not necessarily make them banal. As with one of Gonzalez-Torres’ piles of
sweets, there can be an ideal balance between form and its programmed
disappearance, between visual beauty and modest gestures, between a childlike
wonder at the image and the complexity of the different levels at which it can
be read. […]
Relational Aesthetics and Constructed Situations
The Situationist concept of a ‘constructed situation’ was intended to replace
artistic representation with the experimental realization of artistic energy in
everyday environments. Whilst Guy Debord’s diagnosis of the spectacular
process of production seems pitiless, Situationist theory overlooks the fact that,
whilst the spectacle’s primary targets are forms of human relations (the
spectacle is ‘a social relationship between people, mediated by images’), the only
way we can analyse and resist it is by producing new modes of human relations.
Now the notion of a situation does not necessarily imply coexistence with
my fellows. It is possible to image situations that are ‘constructed’ for private
use, or even situations that deliberately exclude others. The notion of a situation
reintroduces the unities of time, place and action in a theatre that does not
necessarily involve a relationship with the Other. Now, artistic practice always
involved a relationship with the other; at the same time, it constitutes a
relationship with the world. A constructed situation does not necessarily
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correspond to a relational world founded on the basis of a figure of exchange. Is
it just a coincidence that Debord divides the temporality of the spectacle into the
‘exchangeable time’ of labour, (‘the endless accumulation of equivalent intervals’)
and the ‘consumable time’ of holidays, which imitates the cycles of nature but is
at the same time no more than a spectacle ‘to a more intense degree’. The notion
of exchangeable time proves here to be purely negative: the negative element is
not the exchange as such – exchange is a factor in life and sociability – but the
capitalist forms of exchange that Debord identifies, perhaps wrongly, with
interhuman exchange. Those forms of exchange are born of the ‘encounter’ that
takes place in the form of a contract between an accumulation of capital (the
employer) and available labour-power (the factory or office workers). They do
not represent exchange in the absolute sense, but a historical form of production
(capitalism): labour time is therefore not so much ‘exchangeable time’ in the
strong sense of the terms, as time that can be bought in the form of a wage. An
artwork that forms a ‘relational world’ or a social interstice can update
Situationism and reconcile it, in so far as that is possible, with the world of art.
[…]
The Behavioural Economy of Contemporary Art
‘How can you bring a classroom to life as though it were an artwork?’ asks
Guattari.7 By asking this question, he raises the ultimate aesthetic problem. How
is aesthetics to be used, and can it possibly be injected into tissues that have
been rigidified by the capitalist economy? Everything suggests that modernity
was, from the late nineteenth century onwards, constructed on the basis of the
idea of ‘life as a work of art’. As Oscar Wilde put it, modernity is the moment
when ‘art does not imitate life; life imitates art’. Marx was thinking along similar
lines when he criticised the classical distinction between praxis (the act of selftransformation) and poiêsis (a ‘necessary’ but servile action designed to produce
or transform matter). Marx took the view that, on the contrary, praxis constantly
becomes part of poiêsis, and vice versa. Georges Bataille later built his work on
the critique of ‘the renunciation of life in exchange for a function’ on which the
capitalist economy is based. The three registers of ‘science’, ‘fiction’ and ‘action’
destroy human life by calibrating it on the basis of pre-given categories.8
Guattari’s ecosophy also postulates that the totalization of life is a necessary
preliminary to the production of subjectivity. For Guattari, subjectivity has the
central role that Marx ascribes to labour, and that Bataille gives to inner
experience in the individual and collective attempt to reconstruct the lost
totality. ‘The only acceptable goal of human activities,’ writes Guattari, ‘is the
production of a subjectivity that constantly self-enriches its relationship with
the world’.9 His definition is ideally applicable to the practices of the
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contemporary artists who create and stage life-structures that include working
methods and ways of life, rather than the concrete objects that once defined the
field of art. They use time as a raw material. Form takes priority over things, and
flows over categories: the production of gestures is more important than the
production of material things. Today’s viewers are invited to cross the threshold
of ‘catalysing temporal modules’, rather than to contemplate immanent objects
that do not open on to the world to which they refer. The artists go so far as to
present themselves as worlds of ongoing subjectivation, or as the models of their
own subjectivity. They become the terrain for privileged experiences and for the
synthetic principle behind their work. This development prefigures the entire
history of modernity. In this behavioural economy, the art object acquires a
deceptive aura, an agent that resists its commodified distribution or becomes its
mimetic parasite.
In a mental world where the ready-made is a privileged model to the extent
that that it is a collective production (the mass-produced object) that has been
assumed and recycled in an autopoetic visual device,, Guattari’s theoretical
schema help us to conceptualize the mutation that is under way in contemporary
art. That was not however their author’s primary goal, as he believed that
aesthetics must, above all, accompany societal mutations and inflect them. The
poetic function, which consists in reconstructing worlds of subjectivation, might
therefore be meaningless, unless it too can help us to overcome ‘the ordeals by
barbarism, by mental implosion and chaosmic spasm that loom on the horizon
and to transform them into unforeseeable riches and jouissances.’10
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Lars Bang Larsen
Social Aesthetics//1999

The Danish curator Lars Bang Larsen has been at the forefront of supporting sociallyengaged practices in the Nordic region. In this essay he presents a number of
contemporary Scandinavian examples, and seeks to recover a historical context for
this work.
What I choose to call ‘social aesthetics’ is an artistic attitude focusing on the
world of acts. It also experiments with the transgressions of various economies.
The term is coined as a common denominator, as one that simply lends itself
with the least resistance to the internal and external dynamics of some recent
and historic artistic and art-related examples. One could probably say that the
examples below describe a recent tradition of art as activism; yet they are
perhaps closer to a discussion of the uses of art-institutional space than is
commonly seen in art activism. The term ‘ephemeral’ art is also often used in
this discussion as the description of a sensibility and a practice aligned to the
heritage of Fluxus and Situationism but not fitting under the artistic
demarcations of these schools. Common to the understanding of the eleven
examples below is that the dynamic between artistic activity and the realms
that are traditionally relegated to the fabric of the social fails properly to
describe a dialectic. Social and aesthetic understanding are integrated into each
other. Here, some forms of social aesthetic activity have deliberately been
launched within the art circuit as art projects; others qualify as art, or qualify for
artistic discussion, after their actualization in other contexts.
The untenable dichotomy of art versus reality is exploded by these projects
– a dichotomy that anyway usually hides the positioning of art in a privileged
and aloof status in relation to other forms of cultural activity, however weak art
may be when located in ‘living reality’. The distinction between art and other
realms of knowledge is made operative in the osmotic exchange between
different capacities to do things, which opens up the creation of new subject
positions and articulations of democratic equivalence. The same thing goes for
the dichotomy of institutional/non-institutional space. The present examples all
share the fact that art and the art institution as resource become frames for
activity that is real, because social interaction and the observation of its effects
are allowed without conceptual rigidity.
The social aesthetic artwork involves a utilitarian or practical aspect that
gives a sense of purpose and direct involvement. In the construction of the
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subject’s interaction with culture it could be said that social aesthetics discusses
a notion of the lasting phenomenon that substantiates a critical cultural analysis,
a reason for one’s existence. It is a way of involving the metaphorical value of
artistic concepts and projects on other professional spheres, such as
architecture, design, financial structures, etc., either as an understanding
integrated in an artistic project, or as a process of decoding and actualizing artrelated activity within its cultural location. In this way artistic work assumes a
general focus on performance in a social perspective, either by means of its own
nature as an ongoing project without closure or by the real activity it occasions.
This often involves collective organization and an employment of art’s capacities
for going against professional specialization.
Nonetheless it would be wrong to say that the opposite of social aesthetics is
a painting or a sculpture, or any other traditional form of artistic expression.
Social aesthetics can’t be observed alone and in this sense the term is double
bound. It says that the social probably can’t operate in a meaningful way without
the aesthetic and vice versa, hence both the social and the sphere of art and
aesthetics inform it.
The following examples are all related to the Scandinavian art scene, which
may be due to a certain orientation, especially among Copenhagen artists. But if
one employs the results of the small but distinct number of contemporary artists
working with a productive revisitation of 1960s strategies in the visual arts, it
would surely enable an outlook untrammelled by geographic boundaries. There
remain many stories left unexplored in the local and global histories of art’s
ramifications on the social.
The examples are presented in dialogue across history. These dialogues
represent associated motifs and related engagements and ideas. As motifs they
qualify each other by dint of uncovering mutually specific, historical references.
A sort of historical double-exposure or cross-fertilization, if you like.

Playground action on Nørrebro, Model for a Qualitative Society and
N55/Spaceframe
During one Sunday in the spring of 1968, the artist Palle Nielsen built a
playground in the slum of Copenhagen’s Northern Borough. Together with a group
of left-wing students he planned to clear the court of a neglected housing scheme
and erect new facilities for children. At seven o’clock in the morning the group
went around to all the residents with a bag containing two rolls and a paper
attached to it with an image of two children playing on the kerb. The text read:
Do you have children yourself or do you just hear the children scream and shout
in the stairwell and entrance when you come home? Do you remember your own
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possibilities for playing as few? Why do the children still make noise in the
entrances? So few things have changed since you were a child. You may now
follow up the demands for more kindergartens and day nurseries, for better
playgrounds and youth centres, and for greater investment in children’s wellbeing by actively participating in a public debate. Have you asked your council or
your local residents’ association about investments in child-orientation? Do you
know that the authorities are empowered to give grants and are willing to invest
in children’s well-being if you demand it? It is your attitude towards the needs of
adolescent children that decides the size of investment that funds increased
clearing of backyards, better play facilities in future developments and new
designs of municipal playgrounds. Sensible facilities for play means that the
children stop making noise in the entries and stairwells. They won’t have time.
They’ll be playing.

So, the residents came down and participated in the action, and by four o’clock
in the afternoon everything was changed.
In 1968, during a research stay in Stockholm, Palle Nielsen chose the
Moderna Museet as a framework to explore what he had previously been
practising as actionism. After a period of bargaining for an invitation, in October
1968 a playground in the museum, Model for a Qualitative Society, was built with
the assistance of a group of local Vietnam activists. Facilities for continued
creativity were at the children’s disposal during the entire course of the
manifestation, in the form of tools, paint, building materials and fabrics. The
Royal Theatre donated period costumes from different epochs to be used for role
play. To this day, the noise level of the pedagogical art project is surely
unparalleled in art history: loudspeaker towers were placed in each corner of the
exhibition space, and the young museum-goers operated the turntables with LPs
from every genre, playing dance music from the Renaissance at an ear-splitting
level. In the restaurant a number of TV screens with live transmission offered a
panopticon for uneasy parents, and enabled more sedate visitors to take in the
active study of children’s contact language. The playground architecture made
concrete the pedagogical aim: a protected but pedagogically empowering
milieu, to be accessed freely by all of Stockholm’s kids (adults had to pay 5
crowns to get in). During its three-week exhibition period the Model received
over 33,000 visitors, 20,000 of whom were children.
The notion that a child’s early social relations form the adult individual was
investigated by way of the Model. Creativity and experiential contact were thus
incited as ways of assigning new priorities to human needs and acknowledging
the ‘qualitative human being’ as an individual of society. The value of group
relations was made evident as well as the necessity to work collectively as an
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alternative to authoritarian society. The Model accepted the white cube as a ‘free’
topological premise: free in the sense of public access, accentuated by the antielitist stance of the Model; free in the sense that what is inserted into art
institutions automatically legitimates its existence (or that is what they tell us,
anyhow). Hence the Model embraced the art institution as a vehicle positioned in
such a way in culture that the statements it conveys are catapulted into society.
The Copenhagen artists’ group N55 rethink the social dimensions from
which we basically structure our everyday lives. In the summer of 1999, on a
dock by Copenhagen harbour, they built N55 Spaceframe: a residential unit of
transformable, lightweight construction in flexible steel modules designed in
collaboration with an architect. It is a functional and inhabitable sculpture and
constitutes a radical revision of the house as we know it, as an object stationary
in its construction and placement. Being much more than merely a goal-oriented
installation, the construction of the living unit suggests an organic process that
people may enter in all possible ways. Musicians, artists, architects, writers and
curators each contribute to the social ambience of the work with projects, labour
force, and their mundane, sociable presence. N55 Spaceframe constitutes the
frame for activities that the participants themselves will establish, without any
institutional interference. N55 Spaceframe is, for that matter, a utopian project in
as much as it is an initial gesture, a rediscovery of the world. But in contrast to the
great utopia, each time it is erected, N55 Spaceframe is architecturally and socially
connected with the social surplus that it provides in connection with the process
of construction and the context within which it functions. The ‘utopian’ in the
project is not like a master plan that analytically anticipates social change, but one
that describes a determined attitude from people’s actions in concrete situations.
Palle Nielsen’s way of practising art as a critique of architecture and living
conditions is aligned with N55’s praxis as a social fantasy, so to speak. As a
reconceptualization of the residence, the N55 Spaceframe stands, shimmering, in
the middle of Copenhagen as a fantastic creature which has just landed, staring
the demands of contemporary living right in the eyes. If the idea of settling in an
N55 Spaceframe doesn’t appeal to you, then the project, at least constructively,
constitutes a way of reflecting on the opposition between the individual and the
forms of habitual thinking that too often sneak their way in as a syntax for our
lives. One could object that N55 is merely replacing the old habits and linguistic
forms with new habits, but in the space between these two positions and in the
movement away from that which already is ossified toward the new and selfconceived, room is being made for the formulation of new differences. N55
accommodates what is currently the dominant, neoliberal determination of
freedom of choice and is displacing the market mechanisms’ relational dynamics
in the direction of postulating that there are things which must be done.
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Palle Nielsen’s projects for Festival 200 and Middelburg Summer 1996
In his writing, Palle Nielsen addresses the notion of large-scale communication
including collective production of significance and value, and modes of
distribution. Proceeding from a collective discussion and praxis surrounding
common intentions, and in contradistinction to ‘consumption’s constraint and
the production apparatus’s power over the people’, one can have qualitative and
quantitative goals and thereby push communication boundaries. This calls for a
positive and outgoing revision of aesthetic expressions which have been
overhauled and repeated, and a revision of traditional forms of art distribution.
The art institution’s resources are cast into public space.
Festival 200 in 1969 was the 200-year jubilee of Charlottenborg
Udstillingsbygning, the exhibition building of the Royal Danish Art Academy. Art
historian Troels Andersen was invited to curate the anniversary show, and in
accordance with his orientation towards non-violent anarchism – and in
response to a minimal budget – artists from all over Europe were given a train
ticket and free exhibition space if they would show up and participate with
some project or other. In the week before the opening of the exhibition, the
invitation to participate was open to everybody.
Palle Nielsen participated in three projects: a shooting range, a roulette, and
an offset-printing works, all functioning representations of mass
communication with popular appeal, imbuing the exhibition with a theme park
atmosphere. Placed as the first thing by the entrance, the roulette was provided
by the child-welfare committee and functioned as a metaphor for the anarchistic
freedom promised by the exhibition. The shooting range offered air guns with
which you could shoot your dislikes, organized in the form of photographs of
Danish and international politicians and public persons. The roulette, as well as
the shooting range, stood unattended.
The offset-printing works consisted of state-of-the-art rotaprint equipment
to be used freely by everybody, and its appurtenant photo lab enabled general
access to artistic expression. The festival’s daily paper, flyers, leaflets, and
printed matter in all colours were produced here. Some of it was distributed in
the city or in other contexts, while others were integrated into the exhibition.
Palle Nielsen’s projects introduced a reflexivity between play and production
which must have seemed somewhat frivolous in the light of the era’s will to
revolutionary upheaval. On the one hand, play qualified large-scale
communication as a way of stating that political artistic engagement doesn’t
exist in terms of practical politics, but as reform work with the prospect of
change. On the other hand, play had to be organized and set free, seeing that
society no longer offered integrated possibilities for living in its regulated,
specialized spheres. To introduce social processes in the art institution is,
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according to Nielsen, socially irrational. Social processes should happen where
people are, in direct relation to what they do. But since social reproduction is in
dire straits, there is a strong need for the production of participation, and for
accessible metaphors of freedom.
In 1995 and 1996, Jens Haaning produced a series of production lines, where
a number of people engaged in symbolically charged but ultimately undefined
activities. In Weapon Production (1995), part of the group show RAM held in a
Copenhagen suburb, a handful of young immigrants with some previous
experience (so to speak) assisted the artist in the production of illegal street
weapons; in Flag Production (1996), shown at the Traffic show in Bordeaux,
France, Asian pupils from the local art academy sewed flags for an unknown
nation. Middelburg Summer 1996 (1996), a solo show at De Vleeshal, in the
Dutch city of Middelburg, was in a sense the culmination of these works, in that
the activity of the workers wasn’t art-related in the first place:
Haaning engaged the Turkish-owned clothing manufacturers, Maras
Confectie, to relocate its production facilities to the Kunsthalle for the duration
of the exhibition. The entire institution was transformed into an appropriate
environment for Maras Confectie’s twelve Muslim (Turkish, Iranian and Bosnian)
employees, replete with an office and canteen, soccer banners and blaring
TÜRKÜ (a form of Turkish blues). As a beholder, you had to adapt to a peripheral
position, as opposed to laying claim to the visual control and leisurely regulated
space that exhibition architecture usually offers. You were, in fact, trespassing in
foreign territory: not only an alien workplace, but a place where ‘aliens’ work.
Middelburg Summer 1996 provided an episodic mobilization of the dynamics of
the cultural other, or ‘the world market as ready-made’, as one critic put it.
The work’s critical position could also be summed up in the words of
sociologist John Foran, writing in the 1997 Theorizing Revolutions: ‘Oppositional
cultures are often elaborated in contradistinction to the state, but they are also
always rooted in the actual experience of diverse social sectors, that is, they have
an eminently practical dimension.’ As Fordist artefacts, production lines embody
the dimension of physical labour, which is rapidly becoming obsolete in the era
of immaterial work. Apart from privileging cultural otherness in a collectively
organized form, Middelburg Summer 1996 rejected art’s service relationship to
information society. Its laconic, alienating stageplay resisted the communicationdriven prescriptions of the agents of the digital age, along with their (our)
continual innovation of forms and modalities for the commerce of ideas.
Nielsen and Haaning point to conflicts in social processes and come up with
solutions which are formally alike; for both projects Nielsen aptly calls the
printing works a ‘production installation’. It could be said, however, that
Middelburg Summer 1996 is an aestheticized version of Nielsen’s production
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installation. Actual participation is one step removed, something that may make
the two works seem to differ in their conception of aesthetics; what actually
aligns them may be their political stance in terms of social irrationality. (As an
aside to his work, Haaning quoted Arthur Schopenhauer’s dictum for De
Vleeshal’s website: ‘The world is my imagination’.) The printing works at
Festival 200 and Middelburg Summer 1996 each delivered critiques of the
different effects of the acceleration of modernity’s displacements, which
increasingly control us as social beings.

The public bath and sauna were installed by the artist Paul Gernes. He wanted the
artwork to be inserted in situations where things are used and thus his practice
became strongly oriented in the direction of public art. The everyday function is
taken literally in his public bath for Festival 200, and ‘transposed to a level where
it affects our senses and our thinking anew’.2 Troels Andersen continues:
It was given in the ideas of Morris, Ruskin and Gropius that people’s behaviour in
a surrounding world which in such high degree as ours is determined by things,
could be changed by a revaluation of the surrounding objects, aesthetically and

Public Bath and N55 Hygiene System
In a feature on Copenhagen called ‘Bursting the Gates of Welfare Utopia’, the
Village Voice’s David Gurin wrote in November 1969 about ‘the energy and
beauty of the young Danes involved’ in Festival 200:

functionally. But these fashioned objects let themselves become easily integrated
in the existing situation without any significant changes in norms of behaviour.
Our society is still built on the nuclear family, and our whole production of
consumer items (also counting a number of ‘art objects’) is based on this
structure. What the conception of the happening among many other things

[Troels] Andersen and a committee of Danish artists offered a second-class train

contained was the suggestion of a new type of social form. […] It implied the

fare to artists from all over Europe. An adventurous group accepted his invitation

establishing of a new situation, the construction of an offer – but didn’t

and put together a fantastically relaxed and unpretentious show. On some days it

necessarily force people in a certain direction.3

included a rock band in the sedate Charlottenborg courtyard. Otherwise it began
for the visitor on the wall above a grand staircase that leads to the main floor of
the gallery – pictures of Albertslund [a working-class Copenhagen suburb] and
old Copenhagen were flashed side by side by two slide projectors. They seemed
to beckon the viewer to stand up for some kind of environmental choice. A third
projector flashed abstract forms. In an anteroom on the main floor were pinball
machines and a shooting range with the prime minister of Denmark and Richard
Nixon among the bull’s eyes. In the grand exhibition hall were drawing tables and
two offset printing presses. Materials and paper were liberally provided and
anyone could design and print his/her own poster with expert help. At the back
was a primitive hut, like a succah,1 with uneven slats of wood for walls, and
branches and leaves for a roof. Inside lived a nude ‘family’, with varying numbers
of adults and children. They ate, drank, played and talked. […] Occasionally one
man in the family would climb up a rope ladder from the hut to the high ceiling
of the hall from where, perched nude on the rope-ladder, he would film all the
spectators whose eyes were on him. […] Another room had a Danish artist’s love

Troels Andersen’s revaluation of the object also applies to N55 and their
catalogue of functional art objects, with which they aim to create a social
surplus. So far, N55’s production of functional art objects with ethical and
aesthetic consequences include a home hydroponics unit (a device for the
domestic growth of vegetables ), a clean-air machine, a hygiene system (lowcost bathroom), new designs for chairs, and a table. Everything is of N55 own
design, in some cases with the help of experts to solve technical problems.
Compared to an ordinary, utilitarian logic, their objects have a twist in relation
to formalistic design: N55’s attitude to the object is characterized by a sensitivity
towards its role as a social determinant, as a role maker. The object answers back
to the activity that surrounds it, instead of being a design-like hypostasis of
itself. Or, in other words, the human activity and the object factor meld into one
another – ergo, socially generous and disarming gestures like a collective
installation of the hygiene system in mirthful colours, or the projection of a bed
serviceable for six persons instead of the customary one- or two-person model.

letters strewn on the floor – people stood around reading them. […] In another
grand exhibition hall were a ping-pong table and a functioning sauna and shower.
Artists and visitors – and the genius of the festival was that the two were not very
distinguishable – played ping-pong, saunaed, and showered in the openness of
the hall. […] One especially touching room had a single rose in water on each of
eight pedestals. Each day one rose was removed and a new one added, so the
roses were in a gradually withering away of life and death.
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The Oslo Trip and Travel Agency
In May 1970 the artists Finn Thybo and Per Bille were invited as part of the
Danish representation in the Young Nordic Biennial at Kunstnernes Hus (The
Artists’ House) in Oslo. They decided to spend their grant of DKK 8,000 on
buying 50 return tickets for the Oslo ferry and distributing them to 50 youths,
mostly artists, musicians and architects. The group was to be installed,
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collectively, in the exhibition as an artwork on the opening night, together with
musicians from Oslo invited to participate in a pickup concert with the
Copenhagen band Furekåben. Thus the group itself comprised the work of art
and no one was allowed to leave it at any point.
Arriving in Oslo in good spirits the group, despite its hippie appearance,
made it successfully through customs (with Black Afghan disguised as Tom’s
Caramels), and moved in one long column up through the streets of the
Norwegian capital. Then, to the amusement of local businessmen, the group
occupied what later turned out to be the rear entrance of the Oslo bourse.
Wearing red banners and red ribbons round the head, or dressed up as native
Americans, the group documented itself in front of banks and the sights of the
city with a banner reading ‘PEOPLE OF THE WORLD UNITE’. The arrival of the
artwork at Kunstnernes Hus occasioned great commotion in the management,
and the entire board was called for, but in the end accepted to host the group.
Next, flyers for the opening party were distributed in Oslo, and snapshots and
film were quickly developed; the same evening the doors of Kunstnernes Hus
were opened for a presentation of documentation of the trip and the concert,
where the director was seen in the rhythm section playing the bongos. The
group returned in good order to Copenhagen on the ferry the next morning.
In Jens Haaning’s work Travel Agency (1997), airline tickets were sold at
competitive prices as artworks at Galerie Mehdi Chouakri in Berlin, capitalizing
on German tax laws which exempt art from an eight per cent VAT.
Accompanying certificates stated that if used for their original purpose, these
tickets ceased to exist as art. If art is taxed less than other goods, why not label
those other goods ‘art’? That is, the airline ticket had a double capacity, each of
which could be respective to art logic and economic logic; but if you want to
grasp the idea of the work and the conceptual itinerary of each ‘artwork’ you can
not do without the supplement of the other logic. By refusing to valorize high
culture, and instead concentrating on the exchange of artistic ideas with realworld economics, Haaning created the possibility for realizing certain financial
gains while upsetting the market at a micro-level.
In the Oslo Trip and Travel Agency, subversive sensibilities and art
institutional allegiances together instigate a set of mutual deformations of
incompatible cultural logics. Ideally, cultural and economic significance are put
on equal footing, each invested in the multifold processes of ideological and
geographic exchange. For Oslo Trip participants Finn Thybo and Kirsten Dufour,
however, the work itself described a break with the art world for fifteen years.

TTA Løgstør and Life is Sweet in Sweden
After the Oslo Trip the work of Dufour and Thybo moved further in the direction
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of activism. They worked with squatters in Copenhagen, and experimented with
alternative social structures in small, closed communities in Jutland. In the
‘aesthetic and political void’ of the early seventies, Dufour and Thybo were
looking for a position from which the local population in a given place could
participate actively in a social, humanistic and political action. Based in Løgstør
in Northern Jutland they started a ragpicker group in 1975, for the benefit of
liberation movements in the third world, among them Zimbabwe African
National Union and Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front. During the 12 years the
group TTA Løgstør (Clothes for Africa) managed to collect the following and send
it off to Africa: 112 tons of clothes and shoes; 30 sewing machines; 1 dental
clinic; 3 operating tables; 15 hospital beds; 17 wheelchairs; 27 packages of other
hospital equipment; 39 packages of toys; 30 packages of educational material;
and the sum of DKK 447,911.
These goods were obtained mainly by means of household collecting, flea
markets, enquiries at hospitals etc., and clearing up of estates. TTA workers were
voluntary and paid a membership fee. Thybo describes the aims of TTA Løgstør:
Interactivity within the ragpicking group:
By collecting the surplus [of consumer society] and recycling it for humanitarian
purposes, we solved several problems at the same time: we could make people
aware of the conditions in other parts of the world and get them involved in an
action, in the project. Leaflets about the collection of clothes were handed out to
new households, and press releases about the annual flea market were sent to
newspapers and local radio stations that covered the whole province. Here we
informed others about the local conditions in those countries where we
supported the liberation movements. We also spoke about the fact that the
clothes were given to the liberation movements who distributed them in the
refugee camps over which they had taken responsibility.
Last but not least, essential because of their tremendous contribution, the
core of the group, ‘the activists’, who actively took part in the daily work, were
recruited from the local community. It was our basis that Clothes for Africa should
be both a local/social and a political/global project […]4

The last flea market was held in 1986. There was a steady reduction of activism,
membership flow ebbed out, there was a split in the group, and the eventual
conclusion was that it looked like solidarity work belonged to a certain generation.
In August 1995, Gothenburg was turned upside down. Sweden’s secondlargest city was about to host the World Championships in athletics. In an
atmosphere of self-conscious activity, the urban environment was transformed
through a series of ‘beautification’ projects, ranging from the architectural
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remodelling of the inner city to the injection of a host of new commercial venues
– greenery, colourful advertising and ‘fresh paint’ signs were sprouting up
everywhere. A new black market for apartment sublets appeared and
restaurants were openly advertising for ‘young blonde female’ staff. The visitors
arrived at a sparkling new Gothenburg, starting the for-all-tourists search for the
authentic folk and local spirit. With gorgeous weather, the pride of the citizens
was only slightly stained by the embarrassment of having invented the place
and themselves specifically for the tourists, and embarrassed that this act of
deception was larger than their own naïveté. More than that, the debate over the
day-to-day adjustments to all the newness made clear that, for better or worse,
the Gothenburgers were losing their sense of belonging to the place they were
proud to represent. The staging of the host’s role turned from being an
abstraction, ‘the city’, towards involving every single citizen. The distinction
between ‘guests’ and ‘hosts’ began to dissolve. Not even a guide’s uniform
guaranteed discretion: everybody was new to the place they found themselves
in, and to each other.
In the middle of this turbulence Aleksandra Mir opened Life is Sweet in
Sweden: Guest Bureau, an alternative tourist office in downtown Gothenburg. 150
square metres were made available from the public sector, and Mir renovated
and decorated the premises in a half-official, half-private cosy atmosphere that
should make everybody feel welcome. Equipped with comfortable sofas, plastic
greenery, an aquarium, dim lights and soft muzak, electric footbaths, a television
with shopping channels and even a fresh smelling lavatory, the tourist bureau
was freely available for use by any and everybody. The host’s role was
personified by anybody who wore the hostess uniform for Life is Sweet in
Sweden; a blue-yellow dress-suit in a stewardess-cum-cashier cut, with the
company’s logo embroidered in silver on the breast pocket. From the beginning,
twelve uniforms were available and during the project, 46 persons assumed the
role as hostess, regardless of whether they had any connection with Gothenburg
or not. With several hundred guests every day during the ten days that the
World Championships took place, the tourist bureau became a social limbo,
taking shape according to the constellations of people interacting with one
another on the spot. The entire process of the situation established itself as a
public coefficient where the participants, guests as well as hosts, were involved
in a mutual endeavour intrinsic to sociability.
TTA Løgstør was evaluated critically as art after the fact; Dufour and Thybo
presented documentation of the project for their exhibition in the N55
spaceframe, opening it up to a new narrative removed from the terminology of
its time. TTA Løgstør and Life is Sweet… can both be contained in the same
sphere as the aims and characteristics of the ‘happening’ – as outlined above by

182//CRITICAL AND CURATORIAL POSITIONS

Troels Andersen – and together they have resonance for more recent notions of
identity politics. Just as TTA Løgstør’s working premise was that the local
belongs in a global society and that identities are created across geography and
nationality, so Life is Sweet… was concerned with the loss of what might
normally be considered solid identities. It also refers to those who always come
back as subjects in the postmodern debate of identity – nomads, hybrids,
immigrants, tourists. The limbo of the Gothenburgers – as that of the privileged
Western citizen – was the whole point here, a collective intervention and
mobilization in the face of an ambivalent official economy.
Both projects, like the other examples, take place in real time and depend on
the presence of the other, whether it be the cultural other or the people in local
surroundings waiting to be activated. Not least of all, the projects depend on
each other in order to live on as collective memories with the people who took
part, and the ones to whom the stories are told.
1

[A succah is a type of hut like the one described, built during the Jewish festival of Succot, and
based on the portable nomadic dwellings of Moses and his followers during their desert exile.]

2

[footnote 1 in source] Troels Andersen: Paul Gernes, 1966, 1970.

3

[2] Ibid.

4

[3] Dufour, Thybo, Sørensen: TTA Løgstør 1975–1988.

Lars Bang Larsen, ‘Social Aesthetics: 11 examples to begin with, in the light of parallel history’,
Afterall, no. 1 (London: Central Saint Martins School of Art and Design, 1999) 77–87.
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Molly Nesbit, Hans-Ulrich Obrist, Rirkrit Tiravanija
What is a Station?//2003

Utopia Station, presented at the Venice Biennale in 2003, contained work by over
150 artists. Like Documenta 11 (2002), it was preceded by a number of seminars and
exhibitions through which the exhibition’s theoretical position was formulated. The
following text, written by its three curators, outlines their political and aesthetic
aspirations for a re-examination of utopia.
During a debate with Theodor Adorno in 1964, Ernst Bloch, pushed to the wall
to defend his position on utopia, stood firm. Adorno had begun things by
reminding everyone present that certain utopian dreams had actually been
fulfilled, that there was now television, the possibility of travelling to other
planets and moving faster than sound. And yet these dreams had come
shrouded, minds set in traction by a relentless positivism and then their own
boredom. ‘One could perhaps say in general’, he noted, ‘that the fulfilment of
utopia consists largely only in a repetition of the continually same “today”.’
Bloch countered. The word utopia had indeed been discredited, he noted, but
utopian thinking had not. He pointed to other levels of mind, to removes that
were less structured by Western capital. Utopia was passing less auspiciously
under other names now, he remarked, for example, ‘science fiction’ and the
beginnings of sentences starting with ‘If only it were so…’
Adorno agreed with him there and went on. ‘Whatever utopia is’, he said,
‘whatever can be imagined as utopia, this is the transformation of the totality.
And the imagination of such a transformation of the totality is basically very
different in all the so-called utopian accomplishments – which, incidentally, are
all really like you say: very modest, very narrow. It seems to me that what people
have lost subjectively in regard to consciousness is very simply the capability to
imagine the totality as something that could be completely different.’ How to
think utopia then? Adorno saw the only possibility to reside in the notion of an
unfettered life freed from death. All at once the discussion of utopia expanded; it
became not merely old, but ancient. It seemed to shed ideologies as if they were
skins. Adorno declared that there could be no picture of utopia cast in a positive
manner, there could be no positive picture of it at all, nor could any picture be
complete. He went very far. Bloch only followed him part way. He summoned up
a sentence from Brecht. He let it stand as the nutshell that held the incentive for
utopia. Brecht had written ‘Something’s missing.’
‘What is this “something”?’ Bloch asked. ‘If it is not allowed to be cast in a

184//CRITICAL AND CURATORIAL POSITIONS

picture, then I shall portray it as in the process of being. But one should not be
allowed to eliminate it as if it really did not exist so that one could say the
following about it: “It’s about the sausage”. I believe utopia cannot be removed
from the world in spite of everything, and even the technological, which must
definitely emerge and will be in the great realm of the utopian, will form only
small sectors. That is a geometrical picture, which does not have any place here,
but another picture can be found in the old peasant saying, there is no dance
before the meal. People must first fill their stomachs, and then they can dance.’
‘Something is Missing’, the statement from Brecht. Typically when searching
for utopia, one relies on the steps taken by others, for ever since its first
formulation in 1516 in the book by Sir Thomas More, ever since its invention as
the island of good social order, utopia has been a proposition to be debated,
several speakers often pitching in at once. They bring thoughts, experience, the
fruits of the past. For utopia is in many ways an ancient search for happiness, for
freedom, for paradise. Sir Thomas More had had Plato’s Republic in mind as he
wrote. By now however utopia itself has lost its much of its fire. The work done
in the name of utopia has soured the concept, left it strangled by internal,
seemingly fixed perspectives, the skeletons of old efforts which leave their
bones on the surface of the body as if they belonged there. Has utopia been
strung up? Or obscured by bad eyesight? Certainly it has gone missing. Utopia
itself has become a conceptual no-place, empty rhetoric at best, more often than
not an exotic vacation, the desert pleasure island of cliché. Abbas Kiarostami,
when asked recently if he had any unrealized or utopian projects, refused the
long perspectives of utopia altogether. He preferred to fix matters in the present,
taking each day one hill at a time. We in turn have set our sights on the middle
ground between the island and the hill. We will build a Station there and name
it Utopia Station.
The Utopia Station is a way-station. As a conceptual structure it is flexible;
the particular Station planned for the Venice Biennale is physical too. It will rise
as a set of contributions by more than sixty artists and architects, writers and
performers, the ensemble being coordinated into a flexible plan by Rirkrit
Tiravanija and Liam Gillick. It has been important to all concerned that the plan
not present itself as a finished picture. Let us therefore conjure up the Station by
means of a few figures. It begins with a long low platform, part dance-floor, part
stage, part quay. Along one side of this platform is a row of large circular benches
so that you can watch the movement on the platform or silently turn your back
or treat the circle as a generous conversation pit. Each seats ten people. The
circular benches are portable; as an option one could line them up like a row of
big wheels. Along the other side of the platform a long wall with many doors
rises up. Some of the doors take you to the other side of the wall. Some open into
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small rooms in which you will see installations and projections. The wall wraps
around the rooms and binds the ensemble into a long irregular structure. Over it
floats a roof suspended on cables from the ceiling of the cavernous room in the
old warehouse at the far end of the Arsenale where the Station sits. Outside the
warehouse lies a rough garden. Work from the Station will spill into it.
The Station itself will be filled with objects, part-objects, paintings, images,
screens. Around them a variety of benches, tables and small structures take their
place. It will be possible to bathe in the Station and powder one’s nose. The
Station in other words becomes a place to stop, to contemplate, to listen and see,
to rest and refresh, to talk and exchange. For it will be completed by the presence
of people and a programme of events. Performances, concerts, lectures,
readings, film programmes, parties, the events will multiply. They define the
Station as much as its solid objects do. But all kinds of things will continue to be
added to the Station over the course of the summer and fall. People will leave
things behind, take some things with them, come back or never return again.
There will always be people who want to leave too much and others who don’t
know what to leave behind or what to say. These are the challenges for a Utopia
Station being set up in the heart of an art exhibition. But in addition, there are
the unpredictable effects, which Carsten Höller has been anticipating, the points
where something missing turns to something that becomes too much. The doubt
produced between these two somethings is just as meaningful as any idea of
utopia, he believes. These tensions will be welcomed like a guest.
What does a Station produce? What might a Station produce in real time? In
this produce lies an activity rather more complex than pure exhibition, for it
contains many cycles of use, a mixing of use. It incorporates aesthetic material,
aesthetic matters too, into another economy which does not regard art as fatally
separate.
But what is its place? The discussion of this question has been opened again
by Jacques Rancière, in his book Le partage du sensible, which in French has the
advantage of having a partition and a sharing occupy the same word. What is
sectioned off and exchanged? It is more than an idea. Rancière takes his
departure from Plato, pointedly, in order to remind us of the inevitable relation
between the arts and the rest of social activity, the inevitable relations, it should
be said, that together distribute value and give hierarchy, that govern, that both
materially and conceptually establish their politics. This theatre of relations
wraps itself around visions of worlds, each of them islands, each of them forms,
but all of them concrete realities replete with matter and force. This is a
philosophical understanding of aesthetic activity; it extends materialist
aesthetics into the conditions of our present; it is a book to bring to a Station. As
we have. But, once released, a book too leaves its island.
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The Utopia Station in Venice, the city of islands, is part of a larger project.
Utopia Stations do not require architecture for their existence, only a meeting, a
gathering. We have already had several in Paris, in Venice, in Frankfurt, in
Poughkeepsie, in Berlin. As such the Stations can be large or small. There is no
hierarchy of importance between the gatherings, meetings, seminars,
exhibitions and books; all of them become equally good ways of working. There
is no desire to formalize the Stations into an institution of any kind. For now we
meet. Many ideas about utopia circulate. Once when we met with Jacques
Rancière, it was in Paris last June, he spoke to the difficulties involved in putting
the idea of utopia forward. He pointed to the line that says ‘There must be
utopia’, meaning that there must not only be calculations but an elevation, a
supplement rising in the soul, and said that this line of thought has never
interested him. Indeed he has always found it unnerving, even irritating. That
which does interest him, he explained, is the dissensus, the manner in which
ruptures are concretely created – ruptures in speech, in perception, in
sensibility. He turned to contemplate the means by which utopias can be used
to produce these ruptures. Will it begin and end in talk?
On another occasion, in Poughkeepsie last winter, just as a blizzard was
about to blow in, Lawrence Weiner reminded everyone present that the artist’s
reality is no different from any other reality. Liam Gillick asked that we avoid
utopian mirage, instead asking for utopia to become a functional step moving
beyond itself. Martha Rosler told the story of going to see the space in Venice,
arriving however as night fell to see only an interior of darkness, there being no
lights. But utopia, she said, is what moves. Jonas Mekas warned of obsessions
with ideas, since the dream, he said, could only succeed if we forget them. Leon
Golub was apocalyptic. Allan Sekula, at our urging, showed the first five minutes
of the tape he had made the day before during the peace demonstration in New
York. Anri Sala showed us a tape of Tirana, where the mayor had painted
apartment block walls into a geometric vision, a concrete hope. Édouard Glissant
came. He spoke of the desire for the perfect shape, he spoke his language of
landscapes. Only by passing through the inextricable of the world, he told us, can
we save our imaginaire. In that passing there would come the tremblement, the
tremor being fundamental to the passage.
Nancy Spero sent a morphine dream. Agnès Varda sent us the song of the
Cadet Rousselle. Together we read an article Étienne Balibar had written six
years ago for Le Monde which proposed to take complete leave of utopia now, in
order to return to the heart of the matter – to let the imagination free to accept
the sudden emergence of subjectivity in the social field. Let us make a sudden
rush, a place for the imagination to expand, a place of fiction, fiction in its fullest
sense. Balibar sees fiction to be the production of the real, something stemming
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from experience itself, knowledge and action brought together so that they
become indistinguishable, insurrection emptying into constitution. He used
these thoughts to preface his Droit de cité. Another book for the Station.
It is simple. We use utopia as a catalyst, a concept most useful as fuel. We
leave the complete definition of utopia to others. We meet to pool our efforts,
motivated by a need to change the landscape outside and inside, a need to think,
a need to integrate the work of the artist, the intellectual and manual labourers
that we are into a larger kind of community, another kind of economy, a bigger
conversation, another state of being. You could call this need a hunger.
Dare one rewrite a sentence by Brecht? Something we need is missing. The
man who, seventy years ago, wrote ‘Art follows reality’ would surely not mind.
Let us then take these words and press on. We need the words, old words and
new words, we need the dance, we need the sausage, and still we need more. We
have started, we meet in the Utopia Station, we start out again. The Station
becomes a place to gather our starting points temporarily. It is primarily for this
reason it resists capture and summary as a single image. Or is it the image of
open possibility? The image of mixed use? Many things will happen there. And
they will spark others.
Think of the Station as a field of starting points, many starting points being
brought and offered by many different people. Some will bring objects now,
others later. Each present and future contributor to the Station is being asked to
do a poster for use in the Station and beyond: wherever it can hang, it can go. A
paper trail for once goes forward. New posters continue to be added. In this way
the Utopia Station produces images, even as it does not start with one. And a
loose community assembles. It develops its own internal points of coherence,
which shift with the times, as conversations and debates do.
Each person making a poster has been asked to make a statement of at least
one and up to two hundred words. Independent of one another the statements
collect. Stuart Hall and Zeigam Azizov elaborate upon a proposition: the world
has to be made to mean. The bittersweet baked into hope, writes Nancy Spero.
Pash Buzari sent a poem where darkness is dialled. The Raqs Media Collective
calls utopia a hearing aid. This probably will not work. Jimmie Durham cites the
Cherokee, and adds that the ‘probably’ keeps people active. There will be
hundreds of statements like these in the end. They will branch out. As they do
certain figures begin to repeat. Ships and songs and flags, two times potatoes,
two times Sisyphus, figures familiar from the discussion of utopia forty years
ago, but they have been assimilated rather than cited. Utopia becomes the secret
garden whose doors can be opened again. Utopia becomes the catalyst that
burns and returns. None of us can say we begin from scratch.
These actitivities imply an activism. For many who come to the Station, its
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invitation to self-organize speaks a political language already known to them
and already being practised. The proposal to build non-profit de-centralized
units and make them become the underlying mode of production, fitting
together through the real market (not the monopolistically controlled world
market of the present system), has been made by Immanuel Wallerstein in his
book Utopistics. It would eliminate the priority given to the endless
accumulation of capital. Still another book for the Station.
As the catalyst burns, it fumes. For ours is not a time of continually same
todays. When we met in Poughkeepsie in mid-February, around the world vast
crowds marched for peace. Seven weeks later, when we met in Frankfurt, the
Coalition forces were entering Baghdad. The days come like Kiarostami’s hills. It
is not the continually same utopia. In the speech to the graduating West Point
cadets in June 2002, President George Bush announced his policy of pre-emptive
strikes and wars with the reassurance that ‘America has no empire to extend or
utopia to establish.’ The idea of empire has been receiving much scrutiny. But
what about the other idea here, the refusal of utopia, the concept that presumes
forward social vision? Is it not this refusal that gives us reason enough to revive
the question of utopia now? Whether it comes as catalyst or fume, the word
should be pronounced. And so we start.
Molly Nesbit, Hans-Ulrich Obrist, Rirkrit Tiravanija, Utopia Station (Venice: 50th Venice Biennale,
2003).
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Hal Foster
Chat Rooms//2004

The Anglophone reception of relational art has been relatively belated. In the
following text, originally written as a book review of Bourriaud’s Relational
Aesthetics and Postproduction, and Hans Ulrich Obrist’s Interviews, Hal Foster
expresses reservations about the optimistic rhetoric accompanying collaboration
and participation.
In an art gallery over the last decade you might have happened on one of the
following. A room empty except for a stack of identical sheets of paper – white,
sky-blue, or printed with a simple image of an unmade bed or birds in flight – or
a mound of identical sweets wrapped in brilliant coloured foil, the sweets, like
the paper, free for the taking. Or a space where office contents were dumped in
the exhibition area, and a couple of pots of Thai food were on offer to visitors
puzzled enough to linger, eat and talk. Or a scattering of bulletin boards, drawing
tables and discussion platforms, some dotted with information about a famous
person from the past (Erasmus Darwin or Robert McNamara), as though a
documentary script were in the making or a history seminar had just finished.
Or, finally, a kiosk cobbled together from plastic and plywood, and filled, like a
homemade study-shrine, with images and texts devoted to a particular artist,
writer or philosopher (Fernand Léger, Raymond Carver or Gilles Deleuze). Such
works, which fall somewhere between a public installation, an obscure
performance and a private archive, can also be found outside art galleries,
rendering them even more difficult to decipher in aesthetic terms. They can
nonetheless be taken to indicate a distinctive turn in recent art. In play in the
first two examples – works by Felix Gonzalez-Torres and by Rirkrit Tiravanija –
is a notion of art as an ephemeral offering, a precarious gift (as opposed to an
accredited painting or sculpture); and in the second two instances (by Liam
Gillick and by Thomas Hirschhorn), a notion of art as an informal probing into a
specific figure or event in history or politics, fiction or philosophy. Although each
type of work can be tagged with a theoretical pedigree (in the first case, ‘the gift’
as seen by Marcel Mauss, say, or in the second ‘discursive practice’ according to
Michel Foucault), the abstract concept is transformed into a literal space of
operations, a pragmatic way of making and showing, talking and being.
The prominent practitioners of this art draw on a wide range of precedents:
the everyday objects of Nouveau Réalisme, the humble materials of Arte Povera,
the participatory strategies of Lygia Clark and Hélio Oiticica and the ‘institution-
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critical’ devices of Marcel Broodthaers and Hans Haacke. But these artists have
also transformed the familiar devices of the readymade object, the collaborative
project and the installation format. For example, some now treat entire TV
shows and Hollywood films as found images: Pierre Huyghe has reshot parts of
the Al Pacino movie Dog Day Afternoon with the real-life protagonist (a reluctant
bank robber) returned to the lead role, and Douglas Gordon has adapted a couple
of Hitchcock films in drastic ways (his 24 Hour Psycho slows down the original to
a near-catatonic running time). For Gordon, such pieces are ‘time readymades’–
that is, given narratives to be sampled in large image-projections (a pervasive
medium in art today) – while Nicolas Bourriaud, a co-director of the Palais de
Tokyo, a Paris museum devoted to contemporary art, champions such work
under the rubric of ‘postproduction’. This term underscores secondary
manipulations (editing, effects and the like) that are almost as pronounced in
such art as in film; it also suggests a changed status of the ‘work’ of art in the age
of information which has succeeded the age of production. That we are now in
such a new era is an ideological assumption; nonetheless, in a world of
shareware, information can appear as the ultimate readymade, as data to be
reprocessed and sent on, and some of these artists do work, as Bourriaud says,
‘to inventory and select, to use and download’, to revise not only found images
and texts but also given forms of exhibition and distribution.
One upshot of this way of working is a ‘promiscuity of collaborations’
(Gordon), in which the Postmodernist complications of originality and
authorship are pushed beyond the pale. Take a collaborative work-in-progress
such as No Ghost Just a Shell, led by Huyghe and Philippe Parreno. A few years ago
they found out that a Japanese animation company wanted to sell some of its
minor characters; they bought one such person-sign, a girl named Annlee, and
invited other artists to use her in their work. Here the artwork becomes a ‘chain’
of pieces: for Huyghe and Parreno, No Ghost Just a Shell is ‘a dynamic structure
that produces forms that are part of it’; it is also ‘the story of a community that
finds itself in an image’. If this collaboration doesn’t make you a little nervous (is
the buying of Annlee a gesture of liberation or of serial bondage?), consider
another group project that adapts a readymade product to unusual ends: in this
work, Joe Scanlan, Dominique Gonzalez-Foerster, Gillick, Tiravanija and others
show you how to customize your own coffin from Ikea furniture; its title is DIY,
or How to Kill Yourself Anywhere in the World for under $399.
The tradition of readymade objects, from Duchamp to Damien Hirst, is often
mocking of high and/or mass culture or both; in these examples it is mordant
about global capitalism as well. Yet the prevalent sensibility of the new work
tends to be innocent and expansive, even ludic – again an offering to other
people and/or an opening to other discourses. At times a benign image of
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globalization is advanced (it is a precondition for this very international group
of artists), and there are utopian moments, too: Tiravanija, for example, has
organized a ‘massive-scale artist-run space’ called ‘The Land’ in rural Thailand,
designed as a collective ‘for social engagement’. More modestly, these artists aim
to turn passive viewers into a temporary community of active interlocutors. In
this regard Hirschhorn, who once worked in a Communist collective of graphic
designers, sees his makeshift monuments to artists and philosophers as a
species of passionate pedagogy – they evoke the agit-prop kiosks of the Russian
Constructivists as well as the obsessive constructions of Kurt Schwitters.
Hirschhorn seeks to ‘distribute ideas’, ‘radiate energy’ and ‘liberate activity’ all at
once: he wants not only to familiarize his audience with an alternative public
culture but to libidinize this relationship as well. Other artists, some of whom
were trained as scientists (such as Carsten Höller) or architects (Stefano Boeri),
adapt a model of collaborative research and experiment closer to the laboratory
or the design firm than the studio. ‘I take the word “studio” literally’, Gabriel
Orozco remarks, ‘not as a space of production but as a time of knowledge.’
‘A promiscuity of collaborations’ has also meant a promiscuity of
installations: installation is the default format, and exhibition the common
medium, of much art today. (In part this tendency is driven by the increased
importance of huge shows: there are biennials not only in Venice but in São
Paulo, Istanbul, Johannesburg and Gwangju.) Entire exhibitions are often given
over to messy juxtapositions of projects – photos and texts, images and objects,
videos and screens – and occasionally the effects are more chaotic than
communicative. Nonetheless, discursivity and sociability are central concerns of
the new work, both in its making and in its viewing. ‘Discussion has become an
important moment in the constitution of a project’, Huyghe comments, and
Tiravanija aligns his art, as ‘a place of socialization’, with a village market or a
dance floor. ‘I make art’, Gordon says, ‘so that I can go to the bar and talk about
it’. Apparently, if one model of the old avant-garde was the Party à la Lenin,
today the equivalent is a party à la Lennon.
In this time of mega-exhibitions the artist often doubles as curator. ‘I am the
head of a team, a coach, a producer, an organizer, a representative, a cheerleader,
a host of the party, a captain of the boat’, Orozco says, ‘in short, an activist, an
activator, an incubator’. The rise of the artist-as-curator has been complemented
by that of the curator-as-artist; maestros of large shows have become very
prominent over the last decade. Often the two groups share models of working
as well as terms of description. Several years ago, for example, Tiravanija, Orozco
and other artists began to speak of projects as ‘platforms’ and ‘stations’, as
‘places that gather and then disperse’, in order to underscore the casual
communities they sought to create. Last year Documenta 11, curated by an
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international team led by Okwui Enwezor, was also conceived in terms of
‘platforms’ of discussion, scattered around the world, on such topics as
‘Democracy Unrealized’, ‘Processes of Truth and Reconciliation’, ‘Creolité and
Creolization’ and ‘Four African Cities’; the exhibition held in Kassel, Germany,
was only the final such ‘platform’. And this year the Venice Biennale, curated by
another international group headed by Francesco Bonami, featured sections
called ‘Utopia Station’ and ‘Zone of Urgency’, both of which exemplified the
informal discursivity of much art-making and curating today. Like ‘kiosk’,
‘platform’ and ‘station’ call up the Modernist ambition to modernise culture in
accordance with industrial society (El Lissitzky spoke of his Constructivist
designs as ‘way-stations between art and architecture’). Yet today these terms
evoke the electronic network, and many artists and curators fall for the Internet
rhetoric of ‘interactivity’, though the means applied to this end are usually far
more funky and face-to-face than any chat room on the Web.
The forms of these books by Bourriaud [Relational Aesthetics; Postproduction]
and Obrist, the chief curator at the Musée d’art moderne de la Ville de Paris, are
as telling as the contents. The Bourriaud texts are sketchy – brief glosses of
projects that use ‘postproduction’ techniques and seek ‘relational’ effects, while
the Obrist tome is diffuse, with nearly a thousand pages of conversation with
figures such as Jean Rouch and J.G. Ballard as well as the artists in question – and
this is only volume I. (Ballard lets fly with a sharp aperçu; ‘The psychological test
is the only function of today’s art shows’, he says, with the Young British Artists
in mind, ‘and the aesthetic elements have been reduced almost to zero.’ He
means it as a compliment.) The conceptual artist Douglas Huebler once
proposed to photograph everyone in the world; the peripatetic Obrist seems to
want to talk to everyone (many of his interviews take place on planes). As with
some of the art discussed in the book, the result oscillates between an
exemplary work of interdisciplinarity and a Babelesque confusion of tongues.
Along with the emphasis on discursivity and sociability, there is a concern with
the ethical and the everyday: art is ‘a way to explore other possibilities of
exchange’ (Huyghe), a model of ‘living well’ (Tiravanija), a means of being
‘together in the everyday’ (Orozco). ‘Henceforth’, Bourriaud declares, ‘the group
is pitted against the mass, neighbourliness against propaganda, low tech against
high tech, and the tactile against the visual. And above all, the everyday now
turns out to be a much more fertile terrain than pop culture.’
These possibilities of ‘relational aesthetics’ seem clear enough, but there are
problems, too. Sometimes politics are ascribed to such art on the basis of a shaky
analogy between an open work and an inclusive society, as if a desultory form
might evoke a democratic community, or a non-hierarchical installation predict
an egalitarian world. Hirschhorn sees his projects as ‘never-ending construction
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sites’, while Tiravanija rejects ‘the need to fix a moment where everything is
complete’. But surely one thing art can still do is to take a stand, and to do this
in a concrete register that brings together the aesthetic, the cognitive and the
critical. And formlessness in society might be a condition to contest rather than
to celebrate in art – a condition to make over into form for the purposes of
reflection and resistance (as some modernist painters attempted to do). The
artists in question frequently cite the Situationists but they, as T.J. Clark has
stressed, valued precise intervention and rigorous organization above all things.
‘The question’, Huyghe argues, ‘is less “what?” than “to whom?” It becomes
a question of address’. Bourriaud also sees art as ‘an ensemble of units to be
reactivated by the beholder-manipulator’. In many ways this approach is another
legacy of the Duchampian provocation, but when is such ‘reactivation’ too great
a burden to place on the viewer, too ambiguous a test? As with previous
attempts to involve the audience directly (in some abstract painting or some
conceptual art), there is a risk of illegibility here, which might reintroduce the
artist as the principal figure and the primary exegete of the work. At times, ‘the
death of the author’ has meant not ‘the birth of the reader’, as Roland Barthes
speculated, so much as the befuddlement of the viewer.
Furthermore, when has art, at least since the Renaissance, not involved
discursivity and sociability? It is a matter of degree, of course, but might this
emphasis be redundant? It also seems to risk a weird formalism of discursivity
and sociability pursued for their own sakes. Collaboration, too, is often regarded
as a good in itself: ‘Collaboration is the answer’, Obrist remarks at one point, ‘but
what is the question?’ Art collectives in the recent past, such as those formed
around AIDS activism, were political projects; today simply getting together
sometimes seems to be enough. Here we might not be too far from an artworld
version of ‘flash mobs’ – of ‘people meeting people’, in Tiravanija’s words, as an
end in itself. This is where I side with Sartre on a bad day: often in galleries and
museums, hell is other people.
Perhaps discursivity and sociability are in the foreground of art today because
they are scarce elsewhere. The same goes for the ethical and the everyday, as the
briefest glance at our craven politicians and hectic lives might suggest. It is as
though the very idea of community has taken on a utopian tinge. Even an art
audience cannot be taken for granted but must be conjured up every time, which
might be why contemporary exhibitions often feel like remedial work in
socialization: come and play, talk, learn with me. If participation appears
threatened in other spheres, its privileging in art might be compensatory – a pale,
part-time substitute. Bourriaud almost suggests as much: ‘Through little services
rendered, the artists fill in the cracks in the social bond.’ And only when he is at
his most grim does he hit home: ‘The society of spectacle is thus followed by the
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society of extras, where everyone finds the illusion of an interactive democracy
in more or less truncated channels of communication.’
For the most part these artists and curators see discursivity and sociability in
rosy terms. As the critic Claire Bishop suggests, this tends to drop contradiction
out of dialogue, and conflict out of democracy; it is also to advance a version of
the subject free of the unconscious (even the gift is charged with ambivalence,
according to Mauss). At times everything seems to be happy interactivity:
among ‘aesthetic objects’ Bourriaud counts ‘meetings, encounters, events,
various types of collaboration between people, games, festivals and places of
conviviality, in a word all manner of encounter and relational invention’. To
some readers such ‘relational aesthetics’ will sound like a truly final end of art,
to be celebrated or decried. For others it will seem to aestheticize the nicer
procedures of our service economy (‘invitations, casting sessions, meetings,
convivial and user-friendly areas, appointments’). There is the further suspicion
that, for all its discursivity, ‘relational aesthetics’ might be sucked up in the
general movement for a ‘post-critical’ culture – an art and architecture, cinema
and literature ‘after theory’.
Hal Foster, ‘Chat Rooms’ (2004), published as ‘Arty Party’, London Review of Books (London, 4
December 2004) 21–2.
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Martiniquan writer, poet and essayist whose work on Frantz Fanon and around the ideas of

works involving ‘sensorial’ experiences of objects and encounters, informed by her concurrent

‘creolisation’ and Caribbean identity has been widely influential. His books include Le Discours

practice as a psychoanalyst. Her ideas were also closely affiliated with those of the artist Hélio

antillais (1981), Poétique de la Relation (1990; Poetics of Relation, 1997) and Traité du Tout-Monde

Oiticica (see below) and the Brazilian Tropicália movement, in which they had a central role.
Retrospectives include Fundació Antoni Tàpies, Barcelona (1997).

(1997).
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Félix Guattari (1930–92) was a French psychoanalyst and political activist who was a central figure

d’art moderne de la Ville de Paris. Among the many exhibitions and events he has co-curated are

in the events of May 1968. Best known for his collaborations with the philosopher Gilles

Manifesta I, Rotterdam (1996), Cities on the Move, Secession, Vienna (1997, and touring), the
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Adrian Piper is a New York-based artist and philosopher. After participating in the beginnings of
New York conceptualism in the 1960s, from 1970 she developed a ‘catalytic’ form of intervention

Carsten Höller is a Belgian-born artist based in Sweden. With a doctorate in phytopathology, he uses

in public or group situations to involve others in the questioning of perceptions derived from

his scientific training to make investigatory installations and artworks that actively engage

unchallenged notions of race, gender or class. Retrospectives include the New Museum of

viewers’ perceptions and physiological reactions to environments and stimuli. Major solo

Contemporary Art, New York (2000).

exhibitions include Sanatorium, Kunst-Werke, Berlin (1999), New World, Moderna Museet,

Jacques Rancière is a French philosopher who first came to prominence as a co-author, with Louis

Stockholm (1999), Fondazione Prada, Milan (2000) and One Day One Day, Fargfabriken,
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constitution of knowledges. Since the late 1990s he has investigated the political and its

1959, a term he abandoned in 1967, after which he explored other participatory models. The

relationship to aesthetics within western culture. His books include Le Maître ignorant (1982;

range of his early 1960s works is documented in his Assemblages, Environments and Happenings

The Ignorant Schoolmaster, 1991), Disagreement (1998) and The Politics of Aesthetics (2004).
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early 1970s. His books include Meilensteine: 50 Jahre documenta (2005).
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– Nordic Festival of Contemporary Art (1998), Fundamentalisms of the New Order

York (1997), Secession, Vienna (2002), Museum Boijmans Van Beuningen (2005) and The Land,

(Charlottenberg, 2002), The Invisible Insurrection of a Million Minds (Bilbao, 2005) and Populism

Chiang Mai, Thailand (ongoing from 1998).

(Vilnius, Oslo, Amsterdam, Frankfurt, 2005).
Jean-Luc Nancy is a French philosopher among whose central reference points are the ideas of
Georges Bataille, Maurice Blanchot, Jacques Derrida and Friedrich Nietzsche. His key works
include Le Titre de la Lettre (with Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, 1973; The Title of the Letter: A Reading
of Lacan, 1992), Le communauté désoeuvrée (1986; The Inoperative Community, 1991), Le retrait du
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pluriel (2000; Being Singular Plural, 2000).
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the University of California, Berkeley, and Barnard College, Columbia University. A contributing
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(2000). She was a co-curator of Utopia Station, Venice Biennale (2003).
Hans Ulrich Obrist is a Swiss curator who is Co-Director of Exhibitions and Programmes at the
Serpentine Gallery, London. From 1993 to 2005 he ran the ‘Migrateurs’ programme at the Musée
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